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Better to help them do it imperfectly, than to do it perfectly yourself, 
for it is their country, their war, and your time is short Actually, also, 
under the very odd conditions of this country, your practical work will 
not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. ' 
1 Adapted from: T. E. Lawrence, The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence', The Arab Bulletin (20 August 1917), 
http: //www. telawrence. info/life/quotes. htm, 14 June 2004. 
Abstract 
Abstract 
At the beginning of the 21" century, the delivery of humanitarian emergency assistance 
has become a complex and contested activity. Humanitarian relief organisations have been 
blamed for a lack of efficiency and for failing to take on a more substantial role in 
ameliorating conflict. Since the 1990s, donors and aid agencies alike have re-evaluated 
policy and practice. The British Labour Government has been influential in addressing 
both the alleged shortcomings and the potential role of humanitarian emergency assistance 
in tackling conflict. To that end, in 1998 the Department for International Development 
(DFID) developed its New Humanitarianism. Sierra Leone became a test case for this new 
British relief policy. 
This thesis analyses the contents and consistency of British New Humanitarianism and 
its application to Sierra Leone. The objective is to investigate the effectiveness of policy 
implementation and the capacity of humanitarian assistance addressing broader political 
objectives. To that end, this study explores the extent of the British policy change both at 
the senior policy making level in the British government and the local level in Sierra Leone. 
The thesis demonstrates that a lack of policy clarity inhibited collaboration of the 
implementation bureaucracy. It also presents evidence to suggest that the fragmentation of 
the implementation process diluted the intention of New Humanitarianism and prohibited 
substantial policy change and effective implementation. This indicates that within violent 
conflict and without a significant structural reform of the aid sector, the utility of 
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Key Definitions and Terms 
Key Definitions and Terms 
The following section defines essential terms of this thesis, that is terms that are 
essential for an understanding of the subject matter and argumentation. It is meant to be 
read in concert with the main body of the text. A decision was made to add a stand-alone 
list of key definitions and terms, given the frequency of contested or inconsistently applied 
terminology within this field of study. Such a glossary also facilitates the reading of this 
study. 
Accountability The requirement to explain and justify actions taken to 
a client or donor, to act on criticisms, and to accept 
responsibility for failure. 
Actors Individuals, groups or institutions who are 
- engaged in dealing with humanitarian emergency 
assistance; 
- engaged in the operational theatre of a 
humanitarian intervention; 
- contributing to a humanitarian emergency. 
Agent (in terms of actor A provider of goods or services, or for the purpose of 
analysis) this study, a humanitarian aid organisation. 
Note: In most cases, agents (in terms of this study) are 
both agent and principal, as aid organisations 
outsource programmes, projects or partial projects to 
other agents. Also note that agents cannot be assumed 
to act as unitary actors; rather they are a collection of 
individuals acting on behalf of a common agenda (also 
termed a coalition). 
Bilateral (aid) Aid granted from one country or government to 
another or from a national donor to a non- 
governmental organisation. Bilateral aid is frequently 
tied to conditions (earmarked for specific programmes, 
projects or areas of engagement). Also: earmarked 
funding for a multilateral organisation. 
Capacity building A generic term relating to interventions designed to 
develop the ability of organisations to plan and deploy 
resources in order to achieve their objectives more 
effectively and efficiently. 2 
2 Adapted from: Department for International Development (DFID), Glossary of Derxlopment Terms and 
Abbredations (London: Department for International Development (DFID), 2004), 
http: //www. DFID. gov. uk/, 17 March 2004. 
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Coherence The degree to which policies and actions overlap and 
aim towards corresponding objectives. 
In the framework of this study, the term entails 
mobilising humanitarian assistance alongside 
international trade, diplomacy, development initiatives 
and even military intervention to meet common policy 
objectives 3 
Complex emergencies Internal, most often lengthy and violent conflicts that 
involve a large variety of actors, display multiple 
symptoms and are brought about by various root 
causes. Frequently, this entails `large-scale 
displacements of people, fragile or failing economic, 
political, and social institutions ... and violence against 
non-combatants'. ' 
Conditionality (humanitarian) 'The term humanitarian conditionality denotes those 
social representations, wider pressures or actual 
policies that have the effect of qualifying the 
availability of humanitarian aid relative to certain 
requirements or conditions being met. For example, 
that specific parties guarantee certain criteria (e. g., 
providing a secure environment or respect for human 
rights), or that humanitarian aid itself should 
contribute to achieving social or political aims (e. g., 
supporting development or promoting peace). At the 
same time, it should avoid making the situation worse 
(e. g., inducing economic dependency or fuelling 
conflict)'. ' 
Conflict sensitivity Capacity of an organisation to: 
- Comprehend the wider political and socio- 
economic context in which it operates; 
- Analyse its intervention's wider impact; 
- Understand the interaction between its 
intervention and the context; and 
- `Act upon the understanding of this interaction, in 
order to avoid negative impacts and maximise 
positive impacts on the (conflict) context and the 
s Adapted from: Maria Lange and Mick Quinn, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meetrxg the 
Challenges (London: International Alert, December 2003), 14. 
" Thomas G. Weiss/Cindy Collins, `Evolution of the Humanitarian Idea', in: Thomas G. Weiss, 
Humaxitariax Challenger and Intervention (Boulder. West View Press, 1996), 4. 
s Mark Duffield, 'humanitarian Conditionality: Origins, Consequences and Implications of the Pursuit of 
Development in Confect', in: Geoff Loane and Tanja Schumer (eds), The Wider Impact of Humanitarian 
Assistance. The Case of Sudan and the Implications for European Union Policy, Aktuelle Materialien zur 
Internationalen Politik 60,6 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 97-130,100. 
6 Maria Lange and Mick Quinn, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peaceb; dldng, 40. 
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intervention .' 
Control Rules and procedures to control agent and stakeholder 
behaviour and the process of policy implementation. 
Development aid Medium to long-term external interventions. The term 
furthermore implies sustainable development projects 
'will be able to continue to deliver benefits long term 
including after foreign assistance has lapsed'. ' 
Flexibility (humanitarian The immediate ability and preparedness to engage and 
emergency policy) disengage on the basis of humanitarian need or in 
order to respond to signs of recipient compliance with 
donor conditionality or openness for increased 
dialogue. It necessitates at least an element of 
decision-making at the local level on the basis of local 
active monitoring and assessment. 
Good governance The British Government has defined good governance 
as `the implementation of sound economic policies, 
effective use of resources, absence of corruption, 
avoidance of excessive military expenditure, freedom 
of expression, political pluralism, broad participation in 
the development process, respect for human rights and 
the rule of law'. ' 
The above is an expression of the rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which political powers 
are exercised at the state and community level by 
government officials, particularly with regards to 
participation, transparency, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence. ' 
Humanitarian emergency Temporary assistance designed to rapidly reduce 
assistance (also emergency human suffering, including `objects indispensable to 
assistance or relief) the survival of the civilian population'; this includes 
food (including food supplies, crops, livestock, water, 
water installations and irrigation works); medicine, 
objects necessary for religious worship, clothing, 
beddings, and shelter'. 10 
Humanitarian emergency Humanitarian emergency assistance narrowly based on 
assistance (principled) traditional humanitarian principles as outlined in 
7 Department for International Development (DFID), Glorsag of Detelopment Terms. 
8 Department for International Development (DFID), Glossary of Development Terms. 
9 Adapted from: European Commission: European Govrnance: a White Paper (Brussels: European 
Commission, July 2001), http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001 O428en01. pdf, 25 
March 2004. 
10 Geneva Conventions IV, Article 23, Protocol I Article 54, Protocol II Articles 14 and 18, Protocol I, 
Article 69; cited after. Fransoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law (Lanham, 
Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 332. 
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assistance (principled) international humanitarian law and the International 
Red Cross Code of Conduct. " (This term is contested: 
it is sometimes used for humanitarian emergency 
assistance based on other international principles such 
as human rights. ) 
Ilumanitarian emergency Ilumanitarian emergency assistance that incorporates 
assistance (wider) objectives beyond the immediate, life-saving mandate 
of traditional or principled humanitarian emergency 
(also wider relief) assistance. It is meant to address the root causes of 
violent conflict, prevent the so-called negative side- 
effects of aid, support human rights and maximize 
policy output through a coherent approach to, and 
implementation of, emergency assistance policy in the 
framework of foreign policy. Wider emergency 
assistance also displays elements of coercion in the 
application of political conditionality as a lever to 
induce behavioural change within recipient societies. 
Humanitarian space Freedom of movement and access to territory for 
humanitarian emergency assistance personnel in order 
to respond to humanitarian need. This includes the 
political freedom to operate effectively. 
Impartiality (humanitarian) Impartial: acting on the basis of humanity and 
responding to need alone. This includes strictly 
upholding impartiality and not acting on the basis of 
gender, race, religion, class or any other such criteria. 
Indicators Pointers (data) that `provide a simple and reliable basis 
for measuring change or performance. Indicators can 
be used to measure inputs, outputs, results/effects or 
impacts. They may measure achievement and/or 
value'. 12 
Institutions See organisations. 
Intervention (humanitarian) Humanitarian emergency assistance activity. In the 
framework of this study, humanitarian intervention 
refers to military intervention within a 
country/situation with the stated objective of 
facilitating humanitarian emergency assistance activities 
only if specified. 
11 Red Cross, Code of Conduct (Geneva: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent, 2000). 
12 Africa Peace Forum, CECORE, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA), FEWER, International 
Alert, Saferworld, Conflia-Sensitize Appmacbu to Decrlopment, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding 
(London: Saferworld, 2004). 
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Multilateral (humanitarian aid) Aid granted by a state donor to an international 
organisations such as a United Nations agency (United 
Nations Development Programme) and that is not 
earmarked for specific programmes, projects or areas 
of engagement. 
Note: Earmarked funding to an international 
organisation is not defined as multilateral funding. 
Neutrality (humanitarian) Neutral: not taking on a political position but acting 
with the sole objective of sustaining lives. 
Output The product or result of a project or policy; also 
referred to as deliverables. (Also see result-based or 
output-based programming. ) 
Ownership Ensuring that the stakeholders, actors, recipients feel 
that the project is theirs and that they can influence its 
design, implementation and evaluation 
Participatory development A developmental process `by which people take an 
active and influential hand in shaping decisions which 
affect their lives'. " 
Partners (also partnership) Conceptual basis for humanitarian relief relations 
between the British Government and implementing 
organisations. 
(Controversial as at times interpreted as a mechanism 
for closer co-operation or control rather than a 
reflection of a donor/agent relationship. ) 
Peacebuilding `Activities that are focused on long-term support to, 
and establishment of, viable political, socio-economic 
and cultural institutions capable of addressing the root 
causes of conflicts and mediating social conflict, as 
well as other initiatives aimed at creating the necessary 
conditions for sustained peace and stability. These 
activities also seek to promote the integration of 
competing or marginalized groups within mainstream 
society, through providing equitable access to political 
decision-making, social networks, economic resources 
and information and can be implemented in all phases 
of conflict'. " 
u Department for International Development (DFID), Glossary of Detelopment Terms. 
14 OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), The DAC Guideknes. " He4ing Pt nt Violent Conf ct 
(Paris: OECD, 2001), 
http: //www. oecd. org/document/45/0,2340, en 2649 33721 1886125_1 111,00. html, 12 March 
2004. 
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Peace enforcement Deployment of a heavily armed military presence 
(possibly entailing civilian or police elements) under 
the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Peace enforcement is coercive in nature and conducted 
when the consent of all parties to a conflict has not 
been achieved or might be uncertain. Peace 
enforcement is designed to maintain or re-establish 
peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. " 
Peacekeeping International measures undertaken with the consent of 
local parties with the objective of upholding a peace 
agreement or keeping contentious forces apart. 
Typically, this entails the deployment of a (mostly 
international) lightly armed, neutral and impartial 
military, civilian or police presence, with the consent of 
all the parties concerned and on the basis of a United 
Nations resolution (or tolerated by the United 
Nations). The application of the use of force is limited 
to self-defence. 
(A controversial term as often used in the generic 
sense signifying a vast variety of mostly military 
engagement. ) 
Policy (also policy For the purpose of this paper, policy is understood as 
implementation) both the underlying political strategies as put forward 
in ministerial public documentation and speeches by 
core ministerial personnel as well as governmental 
actions, that is the process of policy implementation. 
Humanitarian emergency assistance policy 
implementation is, in large parts, outsourced to other 
organisations. Therefore, implementing organisations' 
actions, when executing UK-sponsored programmes, 
are an essential aspect of policy implementation. 
Poverty eradication Poverty eradication is the primary objective of the 
Millennium Development Goals. Poverty can be 
defined in broad terms as unacceptably low living 
standards. It arises from several interrelated forms of 
deprivation': economic deprivation, low human 
capabilities, political powerlessness, social exclusion, 
and vulnerability. " 
Principal (in terms of actor 'Buyer or `funder' of goods or services, or for the 
analysis) purpose of this study the donor organisation. 
is Paraphrased according to: NATO Peace Support Operations (PSO) Doctrine. 
16 Stephen Jones and Gareth Williams, `A Common Language for Managing Official Development 
Assistance: A Glossary of ODA Terms', Oxford Po/icy Management, 2002, 
http: //www. optnl. co. uk/docs/ACF53F9. pdf, 16 March 2004,5. 
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Note: In theory, donors are agents acting on behalf of 
a policy maker (principal). In order to simply the 
present analysis, donors are defined as principals 
within an aid relationship. 
Also note, that principals cannot be assumed to act as 
unitary actors; rather they are a collection of 
individuals acting on behalf of a common agenda (also 
termed a policy coalition). 
'The principal-agent relationship is governed by a 
contract specifying what the agent should do and what 
the principal must do in return'. " 
Protection International Humanitarian Law has defined a 
necessary restraint in war in order to protect a civilian 
population and individual's humanitarian and human 
rights including economic and political rights. 
Protection encompasses: `the provision of life- 
supporting protection and assistance to populations at 
risk. ... the responsibility to react to an actual or 
apprehended human catastrophe,... the responsibility 
to prevent it, and the responsibility to rebuild after the 
event'. " It does not entail `physical safety. " Human 
safety is the responsibility of the state or of other 
international states should a state be either unable or 
unwilling to protect is own citizens. 
Humanitarian emergency organisations have 
nevertheless been blamed for failing to ensure the 
security of individuals under their protection, as in the 
case of the Rwandan genocide. 20 
Rights-based (also rights A conceptual framework that incorporates human 
based approach or rights norms (terminology and standards) in the design 
programming) and implementation of humanitarian emergency 
assistance with the objective to promote and protect 
human rights. Three distinctly different rights-based 
approaches: 
Rhetoricak incorporation of human rights terminology 
17 Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, `Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion? ', Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 8,2 (April 1998), 173-203,173. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect, 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development 
Rcscarch Center, Dcccmbcr 2001), 16. 
19 Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law, 308. 
20 Refer to: Mark Frohardt, Diane Paul, and Larry Minear, 'Protecting Human Rights: The Challenge to 
Humanitarian Organizations', Occasional Paper 35 (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999); Diane Paul, 
`Protection in Practice: Field-Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians From Deliberate Harm', RNN 
Network Papers 30 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1999); Thomas Weiss and Larry Minear, 
Assistrng, and Protecting Grslians. " The State of the Transatlantic Debate (Providence: Watson Institute, 1999); 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect. 
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into classical humanitarian emergency assistance 
discourse and operations at a purely rhetorical level; 
Operational Human rights objectives are added to a 
range of goals and criteria for humanitarian emergency 
assistance organisations; 
Pivgramoratic. The mandate of humanitarian emergency 
assistance itself is redefined in human rights terms, 
potentially bringing about a fundamental rethinking. " 
Stakeholder Participants in and recipients of national or 
international humanitarian interventions, mostly these 
include people who were affected by the war. 
`Affected stakeholders' and `beneficiaries' will be used 
interchangeably in the framework of this study. 
Neither one is meant to imply passivity nor that people 
invariably benefit from the humanitarian services 
provided. (a controversial term) 
War-effected persons include: refugees, internally 
displaced people (IDP), their host communities, youth, 
and others who suffer from diverse problems such as 
extreme poverty, food insecurity, health problems, 
disabilities, trauma or the inability to reintegrate into 
their former communities. 
Theatre Area of engagement. 
Wider humanitarian See IIumanitarian Emergency Assistance (wider) 
emergency assistance 
(also wider relief) 
21 Adapted from: UNHCHR, http: //www. unhchr. ch/development/approaches-04. html, 20 May 2003; and 
Peter Uvin, On High Moral Gmuxd The Ixco, oratiox of Human Rights by the Decrlopmext Exteiprise, 
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Chaptcr I- The Politics of New Humanitarianism 
I. The Politics of New Humanitarianism: An Introduction 
At the beginning of the 21' century, humanitarian emergency assistance has become a 
complex, dangerous and contested profession' Ever since the mid-1990s, emergency 
relief organisations have been criticised for a lack of professionalism and for not effectively 
helping those in need' Relief aid was seen to do little towards addressing the structural 
aspects of armed conflict and bringing about sustainable change for the people it meant to 
help. This criticism was especially relevant given relief organisations' inability to 
sufficiently measure their actions' wider and long-term impact. "' Over the last ten years, 
donors and aid agencies alike have attempted to re-evaluate policy and practice. The 
present British Labour Government has made an effort to address both the alleged 
shortcomings and the potential role of humanitarian emergency assistance in tackling 
conflict and human rights abuses. To that end, in 1998 the Department for International 
Development (DFID) developed its `New Humanitarianism', or ' wider relief' as it is 
referred to in this study. `Wider relief' was deemed a more appropriate term as it indicates 
the intentional broadening of relief objectives to include political objectives beyond the 
immediate protection of a vulnerable individual. The term New IIumanitarianism has been 
used inconsistently by diverse actors indicating quite different practices. This British New 
Humanitarianism incorporated objectives beyond the immediate, life-saving mandate of 
traditional humanitarian emergency assistance. It was meant to address the root causes of 
violent conflict, prevent the so-called negative side-effects of aid, and support human 
rights. New Humanitarianism also displayed elements of coercion in the potential 
7.7. Please refer to the previous section 'Key Definitions and Terms' for a definition of all subject specific 
terminology. A decision was made to add a glossary of definitions rather than footnoting definitions in 
the main text, given the frequency of contested terms. These terms are essential for an understanding of 
the subject matter, but have been used inconsistently by a variety of organisations. The glossary also 
facilitates the reading of this study. Throughout this thesis the terms humanitarian emergency assistance, 
relief and aid will be used interchangeably. Unless otherwise stated, both refer to humanitarian 
emergency assistance and not development aid, nor do they refer to military intervention. 
23 Tony Waters, Bunamcratirjng the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of Humanitarian Reh f Operations (Boulder 
Colo. /Oxford: Westview, 2001), 74. Also see: Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief 
Industry in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1997); and Michael Bryans, Bruce Jones, Janice Gross Stein, 
`Mean Times: Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies - Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas', 
Coming to Terms 1,3 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999). 
24 `It is difficult to identify cases in which humanitarian action unambiguously prolonged or worsened 
violent conflict. Impacts are highly contextual; they depend on the weight and economic significance of 
humanitarian assistance relative to overall levels of resources in affected societies. How can we identify a 
specific impact without knowing what would have happened in its absence? ' International Journal, 
`Humanitarian Action and Conflict', International Journal LIV, 4 (Autumn 1999), 537-561,542. 
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application of political conditionality as a lever to induce political change within recipient 
societies . 
2' 
This thesis explores the development, contents and rationale of British New 
Humanitarianism. It also analyses components of its practical application in Sierra Leone. 
The reason for including a case study is to examine the policy's coherent implementation 
and effectiveness. The case study assesses, whether or not New Humanitarianism was 
implemented beyond the policy making level towards the formulation of a country strategy 
in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, it explores, whether or not the structure and administration 
of the implementation process was effective and whether it facilitated policy change. 
The objective of this first chapter is threefold: firstly, it delineates the historical 
framework within which New Humanitarianism is situated. This facilitates an 
understanding of the political and operational motivations driving the development of New 
Humanitarianism. Secondly, this chapter outlines the objectives and contents of this thesis. 
Thirdly, it provides a brief summary of the key arguments and findings. For an analysis of 
humanitarian principles and humanitarian conditionality please refer to Annex I. 
1. Setting the Stage: Formulating New Humanitarianism 
The end of the Cold War initially brought about a temporary international confidence 
into the utility of so-called humanitarian military intervention and humanitarian emergency 
assistance operations ameliorating violent conflict. There was widespread hope of reducing 
long-term violent conflict and human suffering, and promoting human rights and 
democracy. At the same time, non-governmental humanitarian emergency organisations 
experienced a rapid growth. The funds provided to these organisations increased along 
with the numbers of actors involved. They also underwent tremendous change in the 
nature of their engagement in zones of violent conflict Hugo Slim argues that by 2004, 
`never have humanitarians been this rich, this powerful or this numerous. Never has 
humanitarian law been so mainstream in international consciousness' (sic). ' Yet, the 
combination of increased state reliance on non-governmental and commercial actors, and 
donors' subsequent application of rigorous performance and accountability criteria led to 
the development of new sets of (possibly counterproductive) relationships between 
u Refer to Annex II for a definition and analysis of humanitarian conditionality in all its forms. 
26 Hugo Slim, `A Call To Alms: Humanitarian Action and the Art of War', Humanitariax Dialogue (ti üon 
(Geneva: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004), 1-18,4. 
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humanitarian actors and international donor organisations. So did the awkward and 
possibly harmful integration of international humanitarian assistance and relief 
organisations into military interventions. The blurring of roles and responsibilities of 
intergovernmental organisations, donors, the military and humanitarian agencies aggravated 
the fragmentation of the aid community and a lack of common principles. " Arguably, this 
merging of relief and security responses also reduced security for emergency personnel and 
threatened access to vulnerable populations, as relief organisations' neutrality (or 
perception thereof) was jeopardised. " It also changed agency and donor attitudes toward 
the efficient management of the intersection of politics and their own activities in 
humanitarian emergencies. Increasingly, humanitarian organisations were used and 
marketed themselves as private service providers on behalf of governments. This 
apparently intentional blurring of emergency assistance, development aid and security 
inhibited this thesis from analytically clearly differentiating between humanitarian 
emergency assistance and development aid. The breadth of the overall British engagement 
in Sierra Leone, which had a distorting impact on all aspects of the intervention including 
emergency assistance programmes, exacerbated the a priori difficulty of clearly defining 
emergency assistance. 
By mid-1990, this hope for a new world order and multilateralism dissipated following 
the recurrence of humanitarian disasters and several fraught international peacekeeping 
missions - such as in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. Increasingly, 
donor governments showed themselves reluctant to assertively address international violent 
conflict outside their immediate sphere of interest and to intervene beyond the provision of 
humanitarian emergency assistance. This was despite their apparent increased, yet 
piecemeal interest in addressing so-called `soft' security issues such as human rights, 
poverty and security sector reform. Mark Bradbury has suggested that `there has been an 
accommodation with the permanence of crisis' and a redefinition of what constitutes an 
emergency, or what are acceptable levels of suffering. 79 He argues further that this has 
resulted in a refocus on institutions and mechanisms, instead of on individual human need. 
27 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), for example, has taken on humanitarian tasks in 
Kosovo, and British and North-American forces have delivered relief during and following upon the war 
in Iraq in an effort to win the support of the Iraqi population. 
28 Refer to Annex I for a discussion of humanitarian principles and their value and suitability in 
contemporary war. 
29 Mark Bradbury, Behind the Rhetoric of the Relief-to-Development Continuum', Paper prepared for the 
NGOs in Complex Emergencies Project (London: September 1997), 11. 
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This reluctance by international donor governments to get militarily or politically engaged 
in the prevention and/or resolution of violent conflict brought about a perception that 
there were few other mechanisms but humanitarian emergency assistance to access 
vulnerable populations in areas of armed conflict. The provision (or suspension) of aid 
was also hoped to provide - albeit limited - leverage over the perpetrators of violence and 
human rights abuses or the potential spoilers of a peace process. 
Simultaneously, the recurrent nature of many wars and humanitarian emergencies, 
frequent incidences of diverted emergency aid supplies, and the apparently powerless co- 
existence of relief centres and belligerent forces manifested a fear of humanitarian 
assistance doing more harm than good. 30 Allegations as to the negative side-effects of 
relief aid included: aid fuelling conflict, putting people at risk, failing to prevent human 
rights abuses, causing dependency by undermining local capacities and markets, 
contributing to the displacement of people, and sustaining war economies. " Following the 
Rwanda genocide, for example, aid organisations were criticised for not speaking out and 
acting against the perpetrators of violence. They were blamed for not sufficiently 
protecting victims, and enabling the perpetrators of genocide to regroup and continue their 
destabilising influence over the entire region for years to come. 32 This debate on the 
possible negative impact of relief aid highlighted a policy discrepancy between reliefs 
primary objective of securing emergency assistance for those in need, its protection 
capacity and its potential for playing a constructive role in promoting political change. 
Many donors and some relief organisations responded to the perceived failure of 
traditional humanitarian assistance within armed conflict by: 
" Subjugating the principles of a right to humanitarian assistance, neutrality and 
impartiality (or unconditional relief aid) in the interest of peacebuilding and 
30 See for example: Hugo Slim, `International Humanitarianism's Engagement With Civil War in the 1990's: 
A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory', Journal of Humanitarian Arsistance (19 December 1997), 
http: //www-jha. spa. cam. ac. uk/a/a565. htm, posted on 1 March 1998. 
31 For a discussion of the negative side-effects of humanitarian emergency assistance see: Mary B. 
Anderson, Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace - or War (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1999); 
Geoff Loane and Tanja Schumer (eds), The Wider Impact of Humanitarian Assistance, Geoff Loane and 
Celine Moyroud, Tracing Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance: The Case of Sudan. Field Study 
and Recommendations for the Runpeý1n Community Humanitarian Office. Aktuelle Materialien zur 
Internationalen Politik 60/9 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). 
32 See for example: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 1996. The International Response to Conflict and 
Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience', Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (14 April 1996). 
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development in conflict. Some organisations abandoned these principles for 
the benefit of solidarity with the victims of abuse. 
" Suspending humanitarian assistance in the face of rights abuses and in support 
of political change. David Bryer and Edmund Cairns, for example, question 
whether in some cases `the abuse of aid outweighs its benefits' and 
disproportionately puts people at risk. " Mickael Barfod of the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has argued that in some cases the 
limited or negative net benefit of relief aid might necessitate a reassessment of 
the continuation of relief operations. 34 ECHO has done so in several cases, 
including in Afghanistan in protest of the Taliban's treatment of women. 
" Holding humanitarian agencies accountable for recipients' protection, including 
physical protection. One aspect of strengthening humanitarian protections is 
speaking out against the perpetrators of violence or against the abuse of human 
rights. In criticism of this, Eliason amongst others, argues that speaking out in 
support of recipients' rights (and therefore jeopardising the principles of 
neutrality) possibly risks cutting off humanitarian access to those in need by 
offending local authorities and/or belligerents. 35 
Limiting donor funding for un-earmarked humanitarian emergency assistance 
(or in other words by tying funding either to a specific recipient or outcome) in 
an attempt to raise efficiency of and control over relief operations. 
" Advocating a deepening and broadening of the humanitarian mandate as an 
instrument in support of wider political objectives. In some instances, this 
included the use of implicit or explicit conditionality (or the utilization of relief 
as leverage over combatants and political leaders). 
33 David Bryer and Edmund Cairns, 'For Better? For Worse? Humanitarian Aid in Conflict', Detrlopmeat in 
Practice 7,4 (1997), 363-374,363. Also see: Jan Eliasson, The Challenge of Humanitarian Action, 194. 
34 Mikael Barfod, `Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality: ECHO's Experience and Prospects Under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, in Nicholas Leader, Joanna Macrae (eds), Terms of 
Engagement Conditions and Conditionality in Humanitarian Action', Report of a Conference Organised 
by the Overseas Development Institute and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, 3-4 May, 
2000, IIPG Report 6 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000), 37-43,38. 
35 Jan Eliasson, The Challenge of Humanitarian Action: Protecting People and Supporting Peace', in: 
Kevin M. Cahill (ed), A Framework forSurzivak Health, Haman Rights and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts 
and Disaster (New York and London: Routledge and the Center for International Health and 
Cooperation, 1999), 189-199,197. 
29 
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Placing political restrictions on the availability of relief aid caused widespread criticism 
within the international aid community. ' Mark Duffield, Joanna Macrae and Nicholas 
Leader criticised humanitarian conditionality for punishing people for something they have 
little control over (for the actions of their leaders). Also, they have argued that 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy could not be held responsible for tasks that 
surpassed its essential capacity and mandate, and that were critically dependent on other 
actors, especially governments? ' 
As a consequence, between 1994 and 2003 humanitarian organisations and academics 
agonised over the future role of humanitarian emergency assistance. Could and should 
humanitarian assistance provide protection to a vulnerable population (and if so which 
kind of protection)? Could humanitarian organisations work effectively alongside military 
intervention? By 1997, a rift had developed in humanitarian policy and practice: There 
was no longer a united framework for humanitarian emergency assistance but a cacophony 
of diverse and - at times - contradictory approaches. Ian Christopolos has argued that 
within humanitarian circles the key debate ran between the minimalists and maximalists, or 
those who called for upholding traditional humanitarian principles and those who believed 
in the need to deepen and broaden the humanitarian mandate. 38 Some humanitarian 
organisations focused on ensuring the survival of vulnerable individuals. Others adopted a 
more political stance, speaking out against human rights abuses and the diversion of aid. 
They attempted to effect the environment in support of lasting change and ultimately 
protect a vulnerable population rather than vulnerable individuals. " The present British 
36 See: Peter Uvin, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthe is and a Commentary on the Lessons 
Learned from Care Studes on the Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentnes and Dirinerntitrr 
for In, luendng Conflict Situations, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation 
(Paris: Development Assistance Committee, Sept 1999), 9; Austen Davis, Thoughts on Conditions and 
Conditionalities', in: Nicholas Leader and Joanna Macrae (eds. ), 'Terms of Engagement: Conditions and 
Conditionality in Humanitarian Action', Report of a Conference Organised by the Overseas 
Development Institute and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, 3-4 May, 2000, HPG Report 
6 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000), 27-32. 
37 See: Mark Duffield, 'Humanitarian Conditionality: Origins, Consequences and Implications'; Nicholas 
Leader, The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice', HPG Report 2 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000); Nicholas Leader and Joanna Macrae (eds. ), Terms of 
Engagement: Conditions and Conditionality in Humanitarian Action', Report of a conference organised 
by the Overseas Development Institute and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, 3-4 May, 
2000, HPG Report 6 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000). 
38 Ian Christopolos, 'Keeping Watch', New Routes 3 (1998), 20-25; Nicholas Leader, The Politics of 
Principle, 3. 
39 Ian Martin, for example, reports of 14 humanitarian organisations speaking out against abuse and the 
failure to protect victims of persecution and abuse during the Rwandan genocide and threatening to 
withdraw from the refugee camp in Goma. (Ian Martin, `Hard Choices after Genocide: Human Rights 
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Government has tended towards the latter approach. In formulating its Nev., 
Humanitarianism it attempted to alter British emergency aid politics accordingly. 
In 1997, just as the Labour Government had been elected, as DFID was formulating its 
New Humanitarianism and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) an `ethical 
dimension' to British foreign policy, Britain committed itself to the restoration of 
democracy in one of its former colonies: Sierra Leone. On May 29 of the same year, a 
military coup had overthrown the elected President, Tejan Kabbah, and immersed Sierra 
Leone in a devastating and horrific civil war. Several British humanitarian agencies claimed 
that in the autumn of 1997 DFID suspended humanitarian emergency assistance to Sierra 
Leone in order to pressure the rebels to reinstate the President. DFID initially defended its 
action by arguing that it was concerned for the safety of relief workers. This explanation, 
however, was misleading. The British Government continued to support relief efforts by 
the European Union and some other European humanitarian organisations. As soon as 
President Kabbah was reinstated through an exceptional display of international political 
and military force by the United Kingdom, the United Nations and a regional peacekeeping 
operation, it allowed relief aid to Sierra Leone to resume. This was despite continuing high 
levels of insecurity. The allegation that DFID had subjected humanitarian emergency 
assistance policy to political objectives and political conditions was subsequently critically 
discussed before the British Parliamentary International Development Committee. It also 
caused unease and criticism in European aid circles. 40 
Once President Kabbah was returned to power, the UK embarked on an ambitious and 
unique recovery programme. It integrated humanitarian emergency assistance within a 
broad peacehuilding and recovery strategy. Sierra Leone became a test case for the United 
Kingdom's (UK) New Humanitarianism and engagement in so-called complex political 
emergencies. The British strategy in Sierra Leone was to become instrumental in shaping 
future international aid relations. Trends that were noticeable in Sierra Leone - such as the 
and Political Failures in Rwanda', in: Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choices and Moral Dilemmas in 
Hxmanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefields, 1998), 157-176, 
161. ) Rony Brauuran reports of the MSF refusing to engage with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia given 
their human rights violations: Rony Brauman, 'Refugee Camps, Populations Transfers and NGOs', in: 
Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choices and Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intertrntion (Lanham, Boulder, 
New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefields, 1998), 177-194,179. 
40 International Development Committee, Fifth Special Report, Government Reeponse to the Feh Report fmm the 
Committee, House of Commons, Session 1998 (London: DFID, 1999); International Development 
Committee, Sixth Report, Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstn ction, VoL I, Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee, The Home of Commons 20 July 1999, Session 1998/99 (London: DFTD, 1999). 
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privatisation and the militarisation of emergency assistance - were sustained in 
humanitarian emergency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sierra Leone was deemed, 
therefore, an appropriate and fruitful case study for an analysis of British humanitarian 
emergency assistance policy and its implementation. 
2. A Discussion of the British New Humanitarianism 
2.1 Objectives and Approach 
This thesis analyses the substance and rationale of the British New Humanitarianism 
and the process of its implementation. It does so by tracking the changes of British 
humanitarian policy from its inception by the new Labour Government in 1997 up to and 
including 2003. It then assesses the British strategy's adaptation into practice in one 
country strategy, namely Sierra Leone. The objectives of this thesis are to: 
" Assemble the contents of a British New Humanitarianism from multiple and 
often vague policy documents and speeches; 
" Trace the key objectives of British policies in Sierra Leone and assess whether 
British New Humanitarianism was transformed into country strategy; 
" Assess the extent of British policy change; 
" Identify causes of disparity between policy and policy execution; 
" Explore key aspects of the implementation process of wider relief in Sierra 
Leone; 
" Evaluate the effectiveness of the administration of New Humanitarianism's 
implcmcntation, and assess, whether the ; mplementation process substantially 
affected the policy outcome; 
" Offer recommendations on the efficacy of New Humanitarianism and on how 
to create a more coherent and effective humanitarian emergency assistance 
policy. 
This thesis pursues two key hypotheses: Firstly, at the strategic senior policy making 
level the British Government formulated a wider relief policy but failed to standardise it 
across the bureaucracy and implement it in Sierra Leone. Secondly, the administrative 
process of implementing a wider relief policy prohibited significant policy change. It did 
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not meet the structural requirements for successfully implementing a policy that required 
substantial administrative control and a high level of cross-ministerial co-ordination. Both 
hypotheses are analysed in detail in the subsequent chapters. 
Through examining the policy implementation process, this study identifies relevant 
institutional forces that shape a wider or conditional emergency assistance policy. It also 
assesses the likelihood and depth of policy change. By focusing on the local and 
international implementation environments, this thesis shows how the differing interests 
within a policy coalition can undermine effective policy implementation. This approach 
offers a framework that helps to explain the transitory and contradictory state of 
humanitarian emergency policy. Implementation failure is too easily interpreted as policy 
failure, therefore misguiding future policymaking. The practicalities of policy 
implementation are all too often not taken into consideration when drafting policies. 
`Policy failure occurs when the policy is fully implemented but fails to achieve what is 
expected of it'. " This might be due to a flawed approach or assumptions, exceptional 
external influences, operational differences and contradicting objectives within the 
implementation coalition. It might also be due to misinterpretations of the policy contents 
and goals by implementing organisations. Implementation failure occurs if an approach is 
impossible to implement or unacceptable to external actors and stakeholders, but most 
often when a given policy coalition does not hold. `Z 
2.2 Originality 
This thesis goes beyond previous evaluations of emergency assistance policy in Sierra 
Leone. The research does not evaluate specific emergency assistance projects; instead, it 
explores the efficiency of the policy implementation environment of British New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. It also discusses opportunities for broadening relief 
mandates. The analysis contributes towards ongoing governmental evaluations of 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy and aid effectiveness. As an external evaluation 
it is expected to be more critical and less focused on narrow output criteria. By analysing 
British policy from 1997 to today this thesis focuses on a much more comprehensive 
duration of Labour aid politics than other studies. The issues of New Humanitarianism 
41 Michael Clarke and Steve Smith (eds. ), Forrioor Polrry ImßlementaI. ion (Winchester Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 
1985), 173. 
42 Ibid., 173. 
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and humanitarian conditionality present a particularly acute challenge to understanding the 
notion of an ethical foreign policy. 
The research represents a timely project addressing a highly policy relevant issue that 
has as of today found little specific reflection, if not in current thinking then in the present 
literature. It makes a contribution to the literature of humanitarian emergency assistance 
policy and practice, contemporary conflict, British foreign policy in West Africa, joined-up 
approaches to policy implementation, and implementation theory. 
Last but not least, the use of the implementation methodology to examine the British 
New Humanitarianism is new and innovative. 
23 Contents 
Chapter one introduces the primary objectives of this thesis and traces the evolution of 
the British New Humanitarianism. The second chapter identifies an analytical approach 
and methodology based on implementation theory and organisational theory. In order to 
draw meaningful conclusions from the case study analysis, the subsequent structured 
comparison of the implementation of wider relief interventions requires a common set of 
questions and evaluation categories. " 
Chapters three to five identify and evalate a wider British emergency assistance policy at 
the strategic level and its adaptation to a country strategy in Sierra Leone: Chapter three 
analyses British New Humanitarianism. It assesses to what extent it lived up to a concrete 
policy. It also discusses the debates and concepts that have influenced the British 
Government in rationalising, designing and executing New Humanitarianism. Chapter 
four analyses the political and humanitarian history of Sierra Leone as relevant to this 
study's objectives. It introduces the relevant actors, their rationale and the international 
and national humanitarian and political parameters in which they operated. Whenever 
relevant, it draws on the international discourse on `the causes and character of 
contemporary war' and its impact on emergency assistance. Chapter five explores British 
policy in Sierra Leone and the role of humanitarian emergency assistance within the full 
scope of the British engagement. On this basis it is possible to draw conclusions on the 
43 Alexander George, 'Case Studies: The Method of "Structured, Focused Comparison"', in Paul Gordon 
Lauren (ed. ), Dolomag: NewApproacbes in History, Tbeoy and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68. 
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extent of British policy change towards a more critical and more integrated humanitarian 
emergency policy, as well as the divergence between national policy and country strategy. 
Chapter six evaluates the effectiveness of implementing the British New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. It does so on the basis of a comparative analysis of the 
actions and approaches of a broad range of international humanitarian emergency 
assistance organisations in Sierra Leone. All of these organisations are, or have been, in a 
contractual agreement with the British Government, or specifically DFID. As such their 
actions were an important aspect of British policy implementation in Sierra Leone. 
Chapter seven draws conclusions and evaluates the implementation of British 
emergency assistance policy and the British policy engagement in Sierra Leone. It identifies 
causes of the divergence between policy and policy execution in Sierra Leone. In 
conclusion, it offers recommendations that contribute towards creating a more effective 
future policy and practice. 
The following research does not evaluate the contents of specific emergency assistance 
programmes as implemented by individual humanitarian organisations (like food aid or 
water & sanitation rehabilitation in Bonthe). An evaluation of this type would have 
required substantially more resources (in terms of financial support, time and/or 
personnel) and co-operation from the aid community including DFID. Nor is it the 
objective of this study. 
3. Argument in Brief 
This thesis indicates that the theoretical foundations for and practical administration of 
the British New Ilumanitarianism as developed by DFID were not sufficiently explicit and 
coherent. The policy remained too vague to allow a possibly innovative approach to be 
effectively adapted into a coherent country strategy, and to win the support of the 
implementation bureaucracy. There might have been a vision at the senior policy making 
level in the British development administration to bring about a new British humanitarian 
approach; or more specifically an approach that sought to address the root causes of 
conflict and tackle humanitarian relief's inherent contradictions (like between the right to 
emergency assistance and solidarity with the victims of abuse). Yet these ambitious plans 
have not resulted in any substantial policy change at the local level. British New 
Humanitarianism was never implemented in Sierra Leone as a national country strategy. 
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Attempts to widen the humanitarian mandate, far from representing a co-ordinated and 
coherent policy response to contemporary conflict, were un-co-ordinated and incoherent. 
This thesis presents evidence to suggest that the implementation process of emergency 
assistance policy had an important role in explaining policy and policy efficiency. It shows 
that the fragmented, often contradictory and competitive implementation environment of 
humanitarian emergency aid policy necessarily rendered ineffective a coherent policy 
interpretation. It obstructed substantial policy change and further complicated policy 
implementation. In practice, British New Humanitarianism was based on a series of poor 
compromises between a set of transient actor coalitions. While this is a feature of all 
democratic policy making and while British emergency policy may not be expected to be 
perfect, it could nevertheless be significantly better. In the absence of a clear and long- 
term political strategy, policy predictability and co-ordinated implementation, humanitarian 
emergency relief had comparatively little leverage over local and international policy 
environments. Without clear principles on mutual accountability and an understanding of 
the consequences of non-compliance, relief conditionality is bound to fail. Given its very 
limited development and application, the British New I Iumanitarianism cannot be deemed 
to have been effective or constructive. 
Wider relief, including humanitarian conditionality, is meant to respond to the 
weaknesses of traditional emergency assistance in contemporary armed conflict. It is 
meant to contribute towards improving the livelihood of a vulnerable population by not 
only addressing emergency need, but also a medium to longer-term structural need for 
change. In order to do so, it is meant to capitalise on the potential of relief to ameliorate 
conflict and benefit development. This study argues that the role of humanitarian 
emergency assistance within a broader peacebuilding framework and as a tool for political 
engagement must be carefully re-evaluated. It also argues that the structure of policy 
implementation requires extensive improvement in order to raise policy effectiveness. The 
present approach and practice has shortcomings that must not be ignored. At the same 
time, donors and their national constituencies cannot be expected to continue granting 
emergency assistance that gets diverted and fails to contribute towards preventing recurrent 
endemic crisis. If relief has a development and peacebuilding capacity beyond its life- 
saving one, it must be capitalised on. 
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II. The Nature of the Beast: Understanding Organisational 
Behaviour 
1. Introduction 
This thesis suggests that not only is the British New Humanitarianism a weak 
compromise of a highly disjointed and transient policy implementation coalition. " It is also 
distorted during its implementation phase. Powerful institutional imperatives subvert 
assertive policy change. They might also prolong inappropriate aid projects, promote 
destructive organisational and individual behaviour and increase competition. As a result, 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy is not more than a compromise between various 
donor departments, and between donor departments and implementing agents. 
This is suggested given the perceived failure of explaining policy and policy impact 
through an analysis of the contents of policy and the process of policy making alone. If 
New Humanitarianism originated in the rational behaviour of a policy bureaucracy working 
towards the same general objectives and according to the same set of preferences and rules, 
then one could deduce that policy can be analysed and predicted according to its merit in 
reaching a set objective. In this case, policy failure would then be caused by a faulty 
approach. This is not necessarily the case. With regard to New Humanitarianism, this 
does not explain the: 
" High degree of divergence of the humanitarian policy as implemented in Sierra 
Leone from national strategy as proclaimed at the senior policy making level 
within the British government; 
" Contradiction between policy makers on the strategic level and those 
implementing policy on the operational level; 
" Inability to define long-term strategic policy objectives sufficiently concise to 
allow for common interpretation and implementation; 
" Need to spend allocated funds and to complete projects irrespective of their 
appropriatcncss; 
44 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, `Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications', World Politics 24, Issue Supplement Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring 
1972), 40-79,42. 
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" Inability to acknowledge failure and organisational reluctance to learn' and to 
alter processes. 
This chapter identifies those characteristics of the international aid environment and 
relationships between its diverse and transient members that play an essential role in 
explaining the policy implementation process and its impact on policy results. The 
chapter's objective is to identify a methodology that facilitates the subsequent analysis of 
the British New Humanitarianism and its application to Sierra Leone. In order to do so, 
the following section discusses several theoretical models that attempt to explain 
organisational behaviour and its effect on policy contents and impact. The second section 
then sets out the nature of the international humanitarian emergency assistance 
implementation environment Section three analyses characteristics of the international 
humanitarian emergency assistance environment that challenge a change of emergency 
policy and undermine the coherent implementation of New Humanitarianism. This allows 
for the identification of a set of minimum standards of successful policy implementation in 
section five. These indicators guide this thesis' analysis of the British New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. Wherever useful, the subsequent analysis draws on 
theory. 
2. Explaining Organisational Behaviour 
Several theoretical approaches have attempted to tackle the mystery of organisational 
behaviour and policy implementation. They can generally be divided into: 
" System theory approaches, in particular several approaches in the field of 
Bureaucratic Politics, the Organizational Process Model, Advocacy-Coalition 
and Principal-Agent Theory; 
" Cognitive approaches, that focus on the origins and motivations of individual 
behaviour within a group or organisational setting and 
" Management Theory, which includes aspects of the above without yet 
attempting to provide analysis beyond the realm of the corporate world. 
None of these theories have been applied substantially to the field of humanitarian 
emergency assistance, with the exception of a handful of case study analyses that employ a 
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principal-agent or cognitive science approach 4S Few have been tested regarding 
international policy implementation and most studies have focused on a limited 
implementation environment (in particular US American foreign policy). ' All these 
theoretical models have their background in a combination of political, sociological, 
economic and psychological approaches and management and public administration 
theories. 
All system theory approaches assume and discuss the fragmentation, contradiction and 
ambiguity of organisational behaviour. Each provides a model to analyse an organisation's 
action process and organisational constraints. The focus of analysis is shifted from what 
kind of action was taken and why to `the processes, motives, interests, sources of power 
[and weaknesses] of the various [policy making and implementing] participants'. " 
According to these models, policy and policy implementation are either an outcome of 1) 
organisational policy preferences as outlined in an organisation's mandate, 2) a bargaining 
process of decision makers, or 3) an organisation's routine behaviour. 
Burraumtic Politics focuses on the tactics and constraints of the bureaucracy and, in 
particular, top decision-makers in establishing and implementing policy. The Adancacy 
Coalition Approach focuses on the bureaucracy only as one actor among many and 
downplays their hierarchical relationships. Both models differ most with regard to the: 
" Understanding of the degree of fragmentation of decision making power and 
number of relevant actors; 
" Level of an organisational decision making process; " 
45 See for example: Mark Walkup, Policy and Behatior in Humanitarian Organizations: The Institutional Origins of 
Operational Dy function, PhD Dissertation, University of Florida (1997); Richard W. Waterman and 
Kenneth J. Meier, 'Principal-Agent Models'; Tony Waters, Bunauc atirf ng the Good Samaritan. 
46 Sec for example: Joanna Spear, Carter and Arms Sales. Implcmcnting the Carter Administration's Arms 
Transfer Restraint Policy (i ioundmills/London/New York: Macmillan Press/St. Martin's Press, 1995). 
47 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), 
313 
48 The Bureaucratic Politics or Governmental Policy Approach is based on the assumptions that 
organisational behaviour is determined through a bargaining process of top decision makers, who take 
on contradicting standpoints according to their position within the organisational structure and their pre- 
existing convictions, biases and character. The strength of actors varies according to the action channel 
of a policy making and implementation process, the actor's skill and on external factors influencing the 
process. The Organizational Process Model, on the other hand, assumes that organisational behaviour is 
an outcome of an organisational routine of lower-level bureaucrats and standard operating procedures. 
Choices are made from a limited range of pre-existing options'. (Joanna Spear, 'Governmental Politics 
and the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks', Renew of International Studies 19 (1993), 369-384,370. ) This 
might undermine assertive action and result in vague policy formulation. (Morton H. Halperin, National 
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" Influence of top decision makers; " 
" Degree of determinism through an organisational structure and standard 
operation procedures. 
Both models fail to: 
" Capture the complexity of the international humanitarian emergency aid arena 
(particularly in terms of the diversity of actors, the multiple roles of donors, 
implcmcnting agents and stakeholders (policy targets), the remoteness of much 
of the implementation environment and the sequence of events. 
" Sufficiently explain and predict individual behaviour and belief systems. While 
both models acknowledge the impact of individual, and possibly contradicting, 
interests and preferences in a decision-making and implementation process, 
they do not analyse the impact of socially constructed and overarching interests, 
norms and perceptions. ' 
" Clarify the role and impact of the top decision making authority in comparison 
to the role of organisational routine. It remains unclear whether routine 
organisational behaviour on the basis of standard operating procedures takes 
place only when top-decision makers do not take on a clear guiding roles' 
Security Policy-Making. Analyses, Cases, and Proposals (Lexington, Toronto, London: Lexington Books, 
1975), 5. ) Yet, as Walter Carlsnaes points out, it might as well facilitate it: once decided upon, policy is 
based on a powerful compromise, which might allow for decisive action. (Walter Carlsnaes and Steve 
Smith (cds), Eutvpcan Forrign Policy. The EC and Changing Penpectzves in Eumpe, Vol. 34, Modern Politics 
Series (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1994), 132. ) 
49 All approaches contend that even the most powerful players need to build coalitions in order to reach 
their objectives. Within the Bureaucratic Politics model, however, the top decision-maker is assumed to 
hold a primary position. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Grins (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 144. 
50 See for example: Jutta Weldes, Bureaucratic Politics* A Critical Constructivist Assessment In: Eric Stem, 
Bergan Verbeek (eds. ), `Whither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A 
Symposium', Mershon International Studies Review 42 (1998), 205-255,216-225,218. 
51 Allison, for example, questions but does not deny the top decision makers decisive role within a 
Governmental Policy approach, while others point out his decisive position particularly in moments of 
bureaucratic stalemate. (Joanna Spear, `Governmental Politics and the Conventional Arms Transfer 
Talks', 383-4. ) The Organisational Process Model remains even less clear on the role of the top decision 
maker, who in this case is relegated to the position of just another player within a highly fragmented 
action process. Within a rushed and highly dangerous environment that is far removed from HQ 
decision makers and donors; routine organisational behaviour is more likely out of sheer necessity. Also 
see: Michael Clarke and Bryan White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach 
(Aldershot-Ilants, Brookfield: Edward Elgar, Gower Publishing, 1989), 117. 
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" Sufficiently take into account the influence of external actors, e. g. civil society 
or the electorate. 52 
" Adequately analyse an organisation's capacity for institutional learning, which in 
itself would predetermine future organisational bchaviour. 53 
" Assess the effect of so-called historical `accidents', events that cannot be 
explained by an analysis of rational organisational behaviour, and external 
shock. 
Both models have been criticised for: 
" Primarily having been applied to events only, to crisis decision making, rather 
than routine policy making and Western, bureaucratic systems; 
" Requiring complex and long-term research, access to information and 
individuals, an intrinsic understanding of the analysed organisation, and of the 
preferences and rationale of relevant players before, during and after a decision 
making process. 
None of these theories alone captures the complexity of the international aid 
environment; none suffices to explain the process and impact of policy implementation in 
the realm of international aid or individual behaviour. Yet in combination with cognitive 
approaches, they provide useful insights into donor-agency relationships and individual and 
organisational behaviour. 54 As such they guide the following development of an analytical 
methodology and facilitate the subsequent analysis of New Humanitarianism. Given the 
constraints of this study, it refrains from discussing any approach in detail. It could not do 
justice to any of them. 
52 Ibid., 117. 
5' Eric Stem and Bertjan Verbeek (eds. ), Wither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign 
Policymaking? A Symposium', Merrhon International Studier Reviewv 42 (1998), 205-255,208. 
54 Mark Walkup has delivered a very conclusive study on the behaviour of aid workers in crisis 
environments. He discusses the value of various cognitive approaches that attempt to explain and 
predict individual behaviour and compares them to institutional or systemic approaches. Ile also 
discusses typical coping mechanisms. His study presents one of the few case study analyses of the 
process of humanitarian policy implementation. Mark Walkup, Pofg and Behavior in Humanitarian 
Otganirations. Also see: Irving L Janis, Grouptbink. Pycbolo ica! Studies of Polity Decision; and Fiascoes, 2 ed. 
(Boston: Boughton Mifflin Company, 1972); Juliet Kaarbo and Deborah Gruenfield, The Social 
Psychology of Inter- and In=a p Conflict in Governmental Politics, in: Eric Stern, Bergan Verbeek 
(eds), `Whither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A Symposium', Mershon 
International Studies Bedew 42 (1998), 205-255,226-240,228. 
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Richard Waterman and Kenneth Meier have suggested that looking at the 
implementation environment and bureaucratic politics in order to analyse humanitarian 
emergency assistance policy tends to be mechanical. " Given the humanitarian policy 
environment's high degree of fragmentation and inconsistency and large number of 
independent variables, it certainly leads towards a critical conclusion. Despite this, 
assuming a bureaucratic politics approach presents a more holistic and conclusive attempt 
to analyse international humanitarian emergency policy. In evaluating the worst-case policy 
implementation scenario within such a transient policy environment, it addresses the 
sources of policy change or failure rather than the symptoms. Through examining the 
policy implementation process, this study identifies relevant institutional and societal forces 
that shape a wider or conditional emergency assistance policy. It assesses the likelihood 
and depth of sustained policy change. It shows how the differing interests within the 
implementation coalition can curtail a wider relief policy from the very beginning. Such an 
approach offers a framework that helps to explain the transitory and contradictory state of 
humanitarian emergency policy. It allows for an explanation of the contradiction between 
policy input and output. Too easily, implementation failure is interpreted as policy failure, 
therefore falsely influencing future policymaking. Equally important, the practicalities of 
policy implementation are all too often not taken into consideration when drafting policies. 
Following the policy process from development through implementation to feedback 
shows how the differing interests within the implementation coalition can curtail a wider 
relief policy from the very beginning. By focusing on the local and international 
implementation environments, this study highlights the contradictory pressures on 
implementing organisations which are aiming to meet differing demands from different 
actors. Given the general lack of information and existence of multiple dependent and 
independent variables, there are few effective methodological choices that facilitate an 
analysis of New Humanitarianism and the process of its application to Sierra Leone. 
55 Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, Trincipal-Agent Models', 188. 
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3. The International Relief Environment: A Bureaucratic Network? 
The `maker' of government policy is not one calculating decision-maker, 
but rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors who 
differ substantially about what their government should do on any 
particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both 
governmental decisions and the actions of their government. ' 
DFID, one of the largest donor organisations world-wide, works in co-operation with a 
great variety of agents to implement wider humanitarian emergency assistance policy. 
These include multilateral donors and international organisations (for example the United 
Nations and its agencies, the World Bank, the European Union), other national 
governments and national and international non-governmental humanitarian organisations. 
In order to implement humanitarian programmes or projects, DFID funds almost 
exclusively other organisations. Its in-house operational capacity is limited. In Sierra 
Leone, there were on average 53 registered international NGOs following the election in 
2002. The UK has co-operated with many of them. The number of local NGOs - though 
incomparable in mandate, size, expertise and sustainability - was considerably higher. They 
were complemented by a plethora of multilateral organisations, donor agencies, private 
service providers, consultancies and private military companies. The broadening of the 
relief agenda has also led to a broadening of the group of actors, involved in its 
implementation. Together, they form a highly heterogeneous, yet to a large extent mutually 
dependent, transient and competitive implementation environment that is marked by 
mutual distrust and a lack of co-ordination and information. DFID itself, or those 
responsible for designing British humanitarian emergency assistance, is made up of 
multiple and fluctuating individuals from a multitude of units and departments. It also 
needs to co-ordinate with other ministries. The following figure tries to capture the nature 
of this policy implementation environment. For the sake of comprehension, some aid 
relationships have been excluded or simplified. 
56 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, `Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm`, 42. 
-43- 
Chapter II -"I'he Nature of the Beast: Understanding Organisational Behaviour 
I Implementation Environment Wider Relief Sierra Leone 
Dona 
cmatakat 
rovýsý2.4gs, c: s __ 
(k I) --- 
S iviu Ic idmc 




ýQ) No as 
tnýrantsn 
HOOS 
Agelaw Laal NCýOs 
(eg RWPP) 
Local Stakeholdan 
r. ý, ýtpuený 
---- (dýroz oo. ames ) 
Laa1Prane Sevice 
The diverse set of actors that has potential relief roles displays little 
structural interdependence, nor does it share a common boundary, other 
than the fact that each component may on occasion contribute to the 
relief process. There certainly is little evidence of a consistent pattern of 
relationships among the components, and, even when focused on a relief 
operation, these components rarely share a set of common institutional 
goals. Over the past decade and a half, an international relief network 
has emerged that is loose, unpredictable, but at least reflects a consensus 
about the nature of disaster relief and which institutions might be 
available for relief work. This network is devoid of any institutional 
framework, lacks coherent goals, reflects few patterned relationships, yet 
points to a variety of transnational and functional linkages that have 
emerged probably more out of informal contacts than formal institutional 
arrangements. 57 
This international relief network (agents) implements wider humanitarian emergency 
assistance projects on behalf of a distant donor organisation (principal or donor) and local 
stakeholders (target). Many agents function both as implementers as well as donors for 
Randolph Kent, Anatomy of Dis Ter Re '. The Intenrasional Network :r., I, --,; or (Pinter Publisher. New 
York/London, 1987), 68f. 
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other implementing agents. All pursue their own objectives and work on the basis of their 
distinct moth operandi. This further complicates common agenda setting and donor-agent 
relationships. 
With the ongoing expansion of DFID in-country field offices, and through the 
employment of external consultants, DFID has created its own implementation capacity. 
Officially, these in-country field offices are part of the UK High Commission. As such 
they are accountable to the UK High Commissioner, who is a political diplomat and part of 
the FCO. In reality, the influence and independence of DFID country field offices 
depends on the strategic importance of the local emergency and DFID and FCO 
personnel Generally, DFID field offices have more money and operational personnel 
than other UK ministerial counterparts. This allows for greater operational flexibility and, 
at times, weight with local partners. " As in the case of Sierra Leone, field offices can 
facilitate the quick release of additional project funds on the basis of application to both 
DFID London and Freetown in cases of project bottlenecks. " In theory, DFID's 
proximity to implementing agents and the area of operations eases its capacity to control 
and evaluate policy implementation in Sierra Leone. 60 Theoretically, at least, this 
strengthens accountability and project efficiency and, in the long run, leads to better- 
informed and co-ordinated policy implementation. On the other hand, it possibly 
diminishcs agcncy indcpcndcncc and thrcatcns the further politicisation of cmcrgcncy aid 
by strengthening UK government agencies' ability to increase co-operation to the benefit 
of foreign policy objectives. 
Policy is understood as referring to the underlying political strategies put forward in 
ministerial public documentation and speeches by core ministerial personnel as well as 
se Confidential interviews with UK personnel and humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone, in May and June 
2002; Interview with former senior DFID executive, 26 November 2002. 
59 Interview with Colin Waugh, International Office of Migration (IoM), 29 May 2002; and Ian Stuart, 
DFID, First Secretary for Aid and Development, Freetown, 22 May 2002 and 29 May 2003. The present 
DFID office in Sierra Leone has little delegated authority. Plans are under way to decentralise DFID 
Sierra Leone policy and to expand the DFID presence into a full, independent country representation 
with authority to make decisions and administer funds by the end of 2004. Interview with Emma 
Morley, Department for International Development (DFID), Social Development Adviser, Freetown, 20 
May 2003. 
60 According to Ian Stuart, First Secretary for Aid and Development DFID Sierra Leone, and Tony Conley, 
Emergency Response Team (ERT), DFID has evaluated DFID-funded projects and their impact on the 
peace process in Sierra Leone through external consultants on an ad hoc basis, allegedly therefore 
increasing both accountability and control. Interview with Ian Stuart, DFID, First Secretary for Aid and 
Development, Freetown, 29 May 2003; Interview with Tony Conley, Emergency Response 
Team/Crown Agents, seconded to NCDDR, 29 May 2002. 
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DFID's actions, (i. e. the process of policy execution). DFID has defined policy 
implementation as `the process of realising a project 'on the ground' in line with the agreed 
work plan'. " This involves the complete project cycle from project identification to 
evaluation. DFID's broad definition includes the following stages: 62 
" Project Identification - ideas for potential projects are identified and explored. 
" Project Preparation - the project idea is carefully developed. 
" Project Appraisal - the project is rigorously assessed. 
" Negotiations and Presentation - at the stage where a project proposal has been 
developed, the parties involved (usually the recipient/borrower and the 
donor/funder) negotiate the detailed requirements for implementation. 
" Project Implementation and Management- the project is progressed in line with 
the agreed work plan and budget 
" Monitoring - the project will be monitored throughout the implementation period 
in order to make sure that everything is going according to plan and that corrective 
action can be taken where necessary. 
" Evaluation - the project is assessed against its objectives in terms of performance, 
efficiency, and impact : 63 
This clearly shows that DFID is simultaneously a donor, implementer and evaluator. 
Processes such as the identification, management and monitoring of implementing partners 
and the more immediate execution of emergency projects are, therefore, all aspects of 
policy implementation. British funded humanitarian emergency and development aid 
policy implementation is undertaken both directly through DFID personnel and 
outsourced to implementing partner organisations. The actions of implementing agents in 
61 Department for International Development, Glossary of De dement Terms. 
62 DFID's definition of project implementation includes only the limited definition of the project cycle, 
which is `project management and monitoring - both financial and non-financial'. As project managers 
responsible for policy implementation are not per se integral parts of strategic policy making but are 
essential in spelling out project and programme details, there was no apparent reason for excluding the 
more analytical aspects of policy implementation, that is the design and negotiation phases. In fact, 
personal preferences and working methods essentially affect the policy contents. Indeed, the impact of 
policy implementation on policy contents and output is subject of this PhD. 
63 Department for International Development, Glossary of Detelopment DFID differentiates between more 
or less detailed project cycles that might or might not emphasise 'decision making with feedback loops 
and include aspects of negotiation, effectiveness, supervision and completion'. 
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executing DFID funded emergency and development aid projects in Sierra Leone are 
therefore integral aspects of DFID policy implementation. As the majority of UK funded 
aid projects in Sierra Leone are outsourced to implementing partners, their actions and the 
process of negotiation and consultation with DFID form the primary focus of this analysis. 
Focussing on procedural or bureaucratic aspects of the execution of public policy allows 
this study to treat the sum of implementing organisations as a quasi-unitary actor. This is 
despite the fragmentation of the policy implementation environment (as previously 
discussed) and the differing or contradicting objectives of the multiplicity of actors in the 
international aid network. Nonetheless, treating implementing organisations as a unitary 
actor limits the quality of conclusions on the effectiveness of implementing public policy. 
This thesis anticipates, that the fragmentation of the policy implementation environment 
prohibits successful policy implementation. Therefore, such a simplification of the pool of 
actors is expected to generate a more positive result than should otherwise be anticipated. 
In summary: British emergency assistance in Sierra Leone is implemented by a diverse 
set of actors that is far from unitary in terms of background, capacity, motivation and level 
of operation. As a result, any policy is a compromise between diverse and often 
contradicting objectives. Mark Duffield has argued that `in order to emerge, policies have 
to have the support of strong groups and interests within institutions: leadership figures 
and entrepreneurs who can initiate policy and forge the wider coalitions necessary for their 
chosen line to gain acceptance. " Yet, charismatic leaders alone only rarely achieve 
substantial policy change. This is illustrated by the later discussed case of British New 
Humanitarianism. Such influential former political figureheads as Secretary of State for 
International Development Clare Short, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, and the director of 
the Conflict and Humanitarian Department (CHAD) within DFID, Mukesh Kapila, have 
failed to achieve a lasting change towards a broader or more conflict-sensitive approach to 
humanitarian emergency assistance, as this study will show. Such a compromise must be 
drivcn by an implcmcntation coalition that has an interest in driving the policy proccss 
forward. Between 1994 and 2004, several political sub-systems and some of their policy 
coalitions merged, such as the proponents of a relief to development continuum, a more 
conditional approach to humanitarian emergency assistance and those arguing to integrate 
security sector reform and peacebuilding into development policy. This allowed for a 
64 Mark Duffield, Global Got mane and the New Wan: The Merging of Development and Secuaity (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 2001), 264. 
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redefinition of rules and policy principles. The shake-up had been instigated by several 
global policy shocks, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Center in 2001. In theory, policy might outlast the duration of a coalition, 
depending on the formality of the policy and the stringency of the implementation 
environment. The latter is most likely within a `rule based bureaucratic environment where 
personnel does not need to become an expert as they act within a pre-defined framework 
[towards a fixed outcome]'. "' 
Tony Waters suggests that a policy's strength is directly related to the extent to which it 
has been bureaucratised. M In order to bureaucratise relief, the delivery of humanitarian 
emergency assistance `has been broken down into tasks done by specialists hired and 
trained to do each action efficiently and effectively'. " Within such an environment, 
characterised by routine processes, policy implementation tends to become policy. `R As 
donors and implementing agents are accountable to distinct stakeholders and overarching 
or secondary principles, and have diverse organisational needs, they are likely to pursue 
different objectives. This study assumes that donors favour and depend upon policies 
consistent with national domestic and foreign policy. Implementing agents are responsible 
to local stakeholders, their own local representation and other implementing agents. They 
are therefore relatively independent from broader policy constraints. This signifies a 
contradiction between upward (toward the public, policy maker or donor) and downward 
(implementing agent or recipient) accountability. It also demonstrates the need to pursue 
`positive' action to benefit a constituency and the difficulty of undertaking action geared 
towards an opposition. 
In theory, aid policy implementation is confined to the policy choices of aid agencies, 
but as they act on the basis of organisational ability and towards fixed outcomes - most 
often on the basis of contractual agreements with donor organisations - they have little 
rational choice and limited room for manoeuvre. Adherence to standard operating 
procedures and obedience to overarching organisational goals and the decision maker's 
directive is increasingly likely the greater the hierarchical structure, the degree to which the 
6 Mark Duffield, Global Governance, 262. 
66 Tony Waters, Bxraucrati jng the Good Samaritan, 32. 
67 Ibid., 3. Also see: Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models', 2; Max Weber, 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Macmillan, 1958). 
68 Michael Clarke and Steve Smith (eds. ), Foreign Polity Lwpkmentation, 175. 
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organisation is a closed system and the inflexibility of its organisational ethos, and the less 
it is subject to external behaviour/events. Yet, 
An agent's fulfilment of a principal's directives cannot be taken for 
granted, and donor-principals face the problems of hidden action and 
information. Because contractor-agents often have de facto control over 
a project's resources, they will try and guide the project so that it 
promotes their own goals, which may or may not be identical to those of 
the donorb' 
In conclusion, policy implementation is far from straightforward. It is subject to diverse 
influences from multiple actors. In order to adequately assess the British New 
Humanitarianism and its application to Sierra Leone, and to differentiate between policy 
success or failure and more systemic implementation success or failure, the subsequent 
study must be based on a set of clear and comparable guiding questions or indicators. The 
following section discusses characteristics of the international humanitarian emergency 
assistance environment that challenge a wider relief policy's implementation. The objective 
is to identify minimum standards of successful policy implementation. Those standards 
then facilitate the subsequent case study analysis of implementing British-led relief 
programmes in Sierra Leone. The following analysis is based on an assessment of 
extensive secondary literature and interviews with donors and implementing agents in 
Sierra Leone. It should not be assumed to be complete. 
4. Challenges to the Implementation of New Humanitarianism 
4.1 Multitude and DiversityofActors 
Due to the empowerment of international NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, both in terms 
of political weight, available resources and access, the world has seen their exponential 
increase both in sheer numbers and skills provided. This has been encouraged by many 
donors' preferential treatment of their own nationals, which has led many organisations to 
open multiple international franchises. These in turn have been eager to increase their 
organisational independence, leading to an even greater cacophony of objectives, mandates 
and funding requests. 7° Together and independently, international relief organisations can 
69 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 'The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action', International Security 27,1 (Summer 2002), 5-39,13. 
70 `Although the global INGO relief market is dominated by eight agencies, each of their country offices is 
forced to compete heavily for individual contracts in particular conflict settings... Together they account 
for more than half of the world's relief market'. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO 
Scramble', 11. 
-49- 
I tn 1 
Chapter II - The Naturc of the Bcast Understanding Organisational Bchaviour 
mobilise significant resources and public support. As a result, they are capable of 
compartmentalising responsibility and share resources. This increases the international 
non-governmental sector's overall strength and level of responsibility in international 
politics and humanitarian emergency assistance. 
Adversely, the rise in the quantity of relief organisations has also: 
" Increased inter-agency competitiveness, with negative effects for individual 
organisation's access to resources and co-ordination. " To complicate co- 
operation further, many humanitarian NGOs working in Sierra Leone believe. 
co-operation (in particular with parties to the conflict including the UN, UK 
and United States) to be counterproductive. It is thought to threaten the fragile 
their neutrality, impartiality and independence. 72 
" Diminished funding for individual organisations, reinforcing programme 
instability and a pursuit of short-term, micro objectives. It also entices 
humanitarian organisations to plan programmes on `the cheap', in order to 
undercut their competitors; 
Amplified confusion within the area of operations, due to a lack of co- 
ordination and a multiplicity of objectives and mandates, some of which might 
be mutually exclusive or replicated. 'The presence of multiple contractors also 
increases recipients' [and donors] ability to play contractors and donors off 
against each other'. " 
" Contributed towards donor fatigue. 
4.2 Marketisation ofAgencies, Organisational Insecurity and Fiscal Uncertainty 
The proliferation of organisations and the resulting competitiveness generates a 
marketisation of relief organisations. So do donor attempts to raise managerial 
effectiveness through competitive bidding, stringent accountability criteria (often on the 
71 As one humanitarian aid worker in Sierra Leone has put it `emergency assistance has become a cut throat 
business as NGOs become their own operations and cannot abstract from their individual institutional 
needs anymore'. Interview with Dr. Heinke Bonnlander, World Vision International, Health Manager, 
Freetown, 12 May 2003. On competition also see: Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, Hnmaaitarian 
Coordination: Lessons f vx Recent Field Ea periencr (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2001). 
72 Confidential interview with country director in Sierra Leone. Others (primarily British NGO's) 
contested this argument 
73 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO Scramble', 15-16. 
-50- 
Chapter 11 -Tbc Nature of the Beast: Understanding Organisational Behaviour 
basis of result-oriented contracts) and reluctance to finance administrative costs. 74 
Alexander Cooley and James Ron suggest: 
that the marketization of many [international organisations] 10 and 
[international non-governmental organisations] INGO 
activities... generates incentives that produce dysfunctional outcomes. " 
This trend is due in particular to the increased use of short term and 
renewable contracts. `Contractors incur significant start-up costs to 
service a new contract - [undertaking project appraisals, ] hiring staff, 
renting offices, and leasing new equipment - and can recoup their 
expenses only by securing additional contracts. ... INGOs are under 
constant pressure to renew, extend, or win new contracts, regardless of 
the project's overall utility. 76 (sic) 
This trend exemplifies the donor-agent power asymmetry: humanitarian organisations 
are rarely capable of resisting donor pressure to fit into wider donor objectives. The 
introduction and monitoring of accountability conditions for both donors and 
implementing agents is certainly required. Yet it also generates multiple counterproductive 
developments including 
" Competitiveness and decreasing co-operation. 
" Opportunism, which might include succumbing to wider donor objectives and 
withholding information about ineffective projects in order to ensure 
organisational stability. " Implementing agents furthermore react highly 
sensitively to criticism. 78 This also leads organisations to imitate donor and 
market-oriented organisations' structures and behaviour, in order to increase 
their predictability and therewith competitiveness. " This diminishes their 
benefit as non profit driven, morally motivated entities. 
" The withholding of information on the misuse of aid supports the 
empowerment of uncooperative local stakeholders. This creates new 
74 See: Ian Smillie, 'Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy', Occasional Paper 33 (Providence: 
Humanitarianism and War Project, 2000), 35-51; and Ian Smillie, The Ahns Bazaar (London: IT 
Publications, 1995). 
?s Alcxandcr Coolcy and James Ron, The NGO Scramblc', 6. 
76 Ibid., 14f. 
'n Naomi Klein, 'Now Bush Wants to Buy the Complicity of Aid Workers', The Guardian (23 June 2003), 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/comment/story/0,3604,982866,00. html, 23 June 2003. 
78 Tony Waters, Burraucrati jig the Good Samaritan, 44. 
79 See: Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO Scramble', 1 (Summer 2002), 5-39,15; and Tony 
Waters, Bxrraucra6#nß the Good Samaritan, 42. 
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relationships and incentives between transnational and local actors and 
decreases operational leverage. 80 
" The likelihood of bureaucratic organisations `shirking', or as Richard Waterman 
and Kenneth Meier suggest, `produce outputs at a higher than needed cost, or 
to produce a level of outputs that is lower than desired'. " 
" Increasing the likelihood of implementing agents pursuing larger projects and 
generating economies of scale in order to maximise income. As a result, aid 
organisations are subject to expansion and diversification. They are compelled 
to underestimate programme expenditure and, in order to reduce costs, to 
neglect efforts that go beyond essential donor requirements. This includes 
stakeholder involvement and capacity building. 
" The need to invest into visibility. 
"A decreased likelihood of organisations undertaking comprehensive prior 
projects and needs appraisals or impact assessment that goes beyond measuring 
immediate project output (for example amount of food delivered or patients 
seen). Monitoring and impact assessment are only rarely included in donor 
appropriations. 
" An increase in staff insecurity and individual stress. Many humanitarian aid 
workers are more liable to become cynical and pessimistic. 82 
Some organisations, in particular those with easy access to private funding, may resist 
marketization or some of its negative effects. 
4.3 Lack ofPolicy Stability, ContradictoryDonor and ImplementingAgent 
Objectives 
As previously discussed, donors and implementing agents possess diverse rationales and 
amodi operandi, pursue different objectives on behalf of different and transient clients and 
operate within highly unlike environments. They also work according to different time 
lines. Given the comparatively short-lived and changing political landscape and frequent 
' Scc: Alcxandcr Coolcy and Jamcs Ron, The NCO Scramble, 12. 
sý Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, 'principal-Agent Models', 176. Also see: Mark Walkup, 
Poly and Behador in Humanitarian O, aniiat ons, 189. 
82 Tony Waters, Bunauaa6#hg the Good Samaritan, 13; confidential interview with GTZ, Freetown, May 
2003. 
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personnel rotations, donors tend to be less capable and less willing to take on long-term 
visions and commitments. Given their even greater fragmentation and dependency on 
coalition building, they tend to react conservatively to change. Donor bureaucracies are 
also more likely to search for standard operating procedures, `one fits all' solutions, in order 
to ease policy decision making' Both principals and agents are highly subject to external 
shocks such as global or national political transformations (like the end of the Cold War or 
an electoral defeat), or negative experiences in other operational theatres. 
Diversity in objectives and rationales might increase the need to compromise and to 
take on diverse approaches. As such, it serves as a mechanism of policy checks and 
balances. Conversely, it leads to essentially vague mandates and objectives. Joanna Spear 
argues that policy vagueness is often vital to preserve a coalition. " More importantly, it 
causes misunderstandings, confusion, antagonism, fear of losing control and secrecy. Both 
individual donor departments and implementing agents must choose which principal to 
follow and compromise between various objectives. This further undermines effective 
policy implementation, co-ordination and programme sustainability. 
4 .4 Lack of Control and Performance Based Contracts 
Given the complexity of the implementation environment, the multitude of 
implementing agents, the width of donor engagements in conflict environments and 
multiple accountabilities, control over policy implementation is inevitably weak. This is 
exacerbated by the remoteness from policy making headquarters of many operational 
theatres. This reduces the availability to donors of reliable information on local conditions 
and programme performance. As a result they are less able or inclined to intervene directly 
in matters of programme implementation. " 
While grants are frequently tied to a recipient organisation's programme proposal and 
agreed-upon results, the project-specific implementation is at a recipient organisation's 
discretion. Once funding has been granted, DFID has little control over project 
implementation: donor organisations lack the capacity to closely monitor field based 
93 On donor coalition building see: Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, `Principal-Agent Models', 
178. 
64 Joanna Spear, Carter and Arms Saks, 12. 
85 Richard XV. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, `Principal-Agent Models', 175. 
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project implementation. This is even more the case in areas that are difficult to access. " 
Donors are also generally interested in entering into aid partnerships. Like most other 
bureaucracies, DFID is under pressure to spend allocated programme funds that in general 
cannot be rolled over into the next financial year. Once recourses have been allocated, the 
organisation depends upon their speedy and complete disbursement in order to justify 
future financial allocations. This is only plausible if previous budgets are spent or even 
overspent within the allocated funding year. DFID's success in policy execution (or profit) 
is measured in terms of the amount spent on development projects and emergencies. " 
Ibis increases DFID's willingness to relinquish control over programme implementation 
and monitoring and to continue projects irrespective of their utility. It also makes it less 
likely that DFID requests funds to be returned due to an agent's failure to meet 
performance based targets. 
The inability and unwillingness of donors to control or closely guide programme 
implementation threatens to lessen policy coherence. It therefore also weakens the 
leverage of both donors and implementing agents. Most of all, it further limits effective 
programme evaluation and the identification of lessons or best practices. 
In order to strengthen project and programme accountability as well as control over 
policy implementation, many donors, including DFID, have tightened their conditions for 
greater project evaluation in accordance to prior contractual agreements. At large, such 
evaluations consist of client self-assessments on the basis of result oriented indicators 
identified in co-operation with (or by) DFID. In addition, DFID and implementing 
agents, in particular multilateral organisations and large humanitarian organisations, 
conclude so-called Programme Partnership Agreements (PPR) or Institutional Strategy 
Papers (ISP). Originally, ISPs were designed and driven by CHAD and in particular its 
former director, Mukesh Kapila. They have since been broadened across other 
departments and have been supported by both the administration and implementing 
agents. Such framework or partnership agreements have increased the predictability and 
transparency of policy and funding. However, as of today there are few strategy papers 
86 In a confidential interview, an executive DFID official claimed that as a donor DFID has little interest in 
upholding control over project implementation and that it rarely presented strict programmatic 
guidelines other reporting requirements. Not only was the outsourcing of policy implementation much 
chcapcr, it also rcduccd complicatcd auditing and accountability rcquircmcnts. Confidcntial intcrvicw 
with DFID personnel (2003). 
87 Joan M. Nelson, 'Promoting Policy Reforms, 1553. 
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distinctly on humanitarian relief; and if they existed, then they are classified, other than 
country strategy papers. 88 Also, Mukesh Kapila's conflict-sensitive programming 
methodology has not taken hold throughout DFID. On the contrary, the bureaucracy has 
rejected such change. " Such PPRs and ISPs commit DFID to medium-term funding. 
Both partners agree upon areas of engagement, common objectives, rules of engagement 
and the accountability conditions an implementing agent must fulfil. With mandates and 
organisational objectives often at odds with one another, some donors (for example DFID) 
are also now `taking a more `result-based management' approach to the funding of both 
development and emergency aid programmes'. " Results-based or output-based 
programming shifts the focus of evaluations on the outcome of programmes, rather than 
the input of resources. In theory, it is also meant to look at their wider impact above and 
beyond the project level. 
The introduction of such strict monitoring and evaluation criteria allows public 
bureaucracies like DFID to strengthen control over the formulation and implementation of 
humanitarian emergency programmes. It is also intended to give the impression of 
facilitating public accountability and policy success: policy outcomes are assessed on the 
basis of predefined quantifiable results. PPSs or ISPs agreements represent a means for 
greater agency upward accountability and donor control. Arguably, such agreements also 
provide implementing agents with greater financial stability. They can be a useful means to 
allow for longer-term planning and ease reporting requirements. They are meant to 
increase transparency in donor-agency relationships. 
However, as was confirmed in several interviews with field personnel, agency field staff 
are rarely fully aware of the contents of such agreements. This warrants the assumption 
that while such agreements guide areas of engagement and reporting, they do not control 
the behaviour of implementing agents. Conversely, such agreements and increased 
earmarking and monitoring might `discourage agencies from engaging in high-risk or 
expenditure activities, and actions that do not have easily quantifiable outputs'. "' As such, 
they stifle flexible programming according to needs and local conditions. If agreed upon 
88 See: Joanna Macrae et alii., 'Uncertain Power. The Changing Role of Official Donors in humanitarian 
Action', IIPG Report 12 (London: Overseas Development Institute, December 2002), 20. 
89 Confidential interview with several executive DFID headquarter based staff, 2003. 
90 Ann M. Fitz-Geralds and F. A. Watthall, 'An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The 
Kosovo Experience', Journal of Humanity ian Assistance, www. jha. ac. /articles/aO71. htm, 16 August 2001, 
7. 
91 Overseas Development Institute, 'The Changing Roll, 2. Also see: Mark Duffield, Glabal Governance, 258f. 
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objectives cannot be met or do not fulfil local requirements, agents are nevertheless 
compelled to either implement programmes according to contract or to shirk responsibility 
for failure or quality and impact based evaluations. Mark Duffield suggests that rule based 
bureaucratic environments and working procedures generate an aid environment in which 
`personnel does not need to become an expert as they act within a pre-defined framewor' 
[towards a fixed outcome] . 92 This weakens both donor and agency performance. 
Furthermore, performance based evaluations offer very limited significant information on 
the broader and long-term impact of humanitarian emergency assistance programmes 93 
International humanitarian emergency organisations threaten to become public service 
contractors, with measurable output benchmarks and limited long-term planning and 
ethical raison d'etre. 94 The establishment of such partnership agreements and DFID's 
drive primarily to work with large international organisations threatens to establish 
humanitarian NGO oligarchies of quasi privatised aid agencies, rather than a balanced and 
flexible base of humanitarian actors. 
4.5 Information Asymmetry 
Given their divergent organisational cultures, resource base, levels of operation and 
proximity to political and programmatic decision makers, donors and implementing agents 
at the headquarter- and field-level have a rather different level of access to information. 
This is especially true in remote locations, where contractors acquire specialized 
information typically unavailable to donors. Donors, on the other hand, have much greater 
oversight over programmes on the whole and regional and global developments that might 
impact on local project implementation. Both, agents and donors, are able to utilize their 
access to specialized information and ability to filter it as leverage. Joanna Spear suggests 
that `information is power and is often reluctantly given in a bureaucracy. "' This thesis 
would argue, that in extension to Joanna Spear, Richard Waterman and Kenneth Meier, 
who argue that a lack of information is necessarily a disadvantage, it can also be an asset: it 
reduces complexity and therefore facilitates policy and project implementation. " 
92 Mark Duffield, Global Gowmance, 262. 
93 For a discussion of donor/agcncy accountability scc for example: Sarah Collinson, `Donor 
gn und Paper for HPG Report 12 (L)ndon: Overseas Development Accountability in the UK', INPG Back 
Institution, December 2004. 
94 The pros and cons of working with private service contractors rather than international or national 
NGOs are discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. 
95 Joanna Spear, Caterand Arms Sales, It. 
96 Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier, `principal-Agent Models', 183. 
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Overall, a lack of information, transparency and clarity is likely to cause 
misunderstandings and secrecy. It can also lead to programme implementation and 
decision making based on anecdotes and rumours. This is particularly probable in fast- 
strung and transient environments encompassing a multitude of actors, such as complex 
humanitarian emergencies. It is also likely to cause greater personalisation of policy 
interpretation and implementation. At the operational level organisational interaction 
revolves around personal, often informal and ad hoc relationships. Frequently, it is 
through personal contacts that project technicalities or bottlenecks are worked out and 
that, for instance, donor objectives are interpreted. Such informal contacts allow for co- 
operation, flexibility and a higher degree of information, whereas formal structures are 
inhibiting. Conversely, it further decreases transparency and eventually sustainability, as it 
limits institutional memory. 
4-6' Necessity ofMaking Field Based AloralJudgments and Difficulty of 
Reconciling Material Pressures With Normative Motivation 
When an organization's survival depends on making strategic choices in a market 
environment characterized by uncertainty, its interests will be shaped, often unintentionally, 
by material incentives, ' whether or not such choices correspond with an organisation's 
normative rationale. " This highlights a potential tension between the morally-founded 
rationale of both the relief organisation and its staff and organisational ability and needs. It 
amplifies the probability of vague mandates. At an individual level, vague mandates 
demand field personnel to make decisions on the basis of their personal belief system or 
emotions, which might well initiate decisions or actions that go beyond organisational 
objectives. This causes stress and confusion in an often highly volatile or extremely 
vulnerable environment. The closer staff are to those in need, the less likely they are to 
comprehend or defend organisational or material requirements. As a result, many relief 
workers are especially subject to burnout, fear and prejudice. " They are also more likely to 
oppose change. The latter is reinforced by field staff's aloofness from policy decision 
making and their perception of disempowerment. The greater an organisational 
bureaucracy, the less an individual feels that he or she is able to make a difference. Field 
97 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO Scramble', 12. 
99 On individual bchaviour of humanitarian cmcrgcncy assistancc pcrsonncl scc: Mark Walkup, Policy and 
Behacrorin Humanitarian OrganiZations. 
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based programmatic decision making further reduces coherent and co-ordinated policy 
implementation, possibly triggering a multiplicity of divergent actions. 
4.7 Legitimacy and Credibility ofHumanitarian Agencies and Donors 
Emergency aid conditionality as an aspect of New Humanitarianism in terms of impact 
represents the bluntest policy tool: it threatens the withholding of those assets required to 
sustain a life-threatened community to the benefit of a questionable future good. 
Humanitarian conditionality as discussed in this study replaces need as the basis for 
humanitarian assistance with adherence to political conditions. It is likely to cause 
suffering. The greater the negative impact on both local power structures and on those in 
need of assistance, the greater the likelihood of the agents of emergency assistance, both 
donors and humanitarian agencies, being regarded as enemies. Humanitarian conditionality 
becomes more questionable if its proponents promote policy objectives they themselves 
frequently contradict. The assumption is that only if based on local ownership and 
paralleled by an active donor foreign policy that safeguards human lives and entails a 
commitment to rebuilding societies, can humanitarian conditionality and wider relief be a 
credible and effective policy. Local ownership also raises the likelihood of sustainability 
and reduces the risk of paternalism. 
5. Indicators for Successful Implementation of Wider Relief: An 
Analytical Approach 
The above analysis facilitates the identification of a set of minimum standards that 
indicate the likelihood of successful implementation of a wider humanitarian emergency 
assistance. Such indicators guide the subsequent case study assessment. This study is 
concerned that a complex, competitive, contradictory and erratic implementation structure 
reinforces a wider relief policy's ambiguities and contradictions and - in particular -a lack 
of coherence and will to carry it through. The following criteria correspond to the three 
criteria most often cited as essential for successfully implementing development 
conditionality and political sanctions: `ownership', coherence and co-ordination, and the 
`ability to target those responsible for policy change'. Minimum implementation 
99 Scc for cxamplc: Tony Killick, Condrtionabty, Ownership and the Comprehensu Deilapment Framework 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 1999); Peter Uvin, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The Limits of 
Political Conditionality', The European Journal of Development Research 5,1 (1993), 63-84; I coward White and 
Oliver Morrissey, `Conditionality When Donor and Recipient Preferences Vary', Journal of International 
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standards for the successful implementation of wider humanitarian assistance that were 
developed for the purpose of this study include: 
1. Clear and consistent objectives, in order to, amongst others, facilitate 
implementation, prevent misinterpretation and increase transparent donor-agency 
relationships. 
2. Agency and donor credibility and adequate empirical and theoretical 
reasoning for policy contents. 
3. Transparency, predictability and long-term policy stability. Joanna Spear 
argues that changes in the 'socio-economic or political conditions should not 
subsequently undermine political support or causal theory' requiring a relatively 
stable national and international environment. " 
4. Support of a committed and well-qualified implementation bureaucracy 
and support from implementing agents. 
5. Control and clear rules of implementation, in order to, amongst others, 
enhance coherence and to ensure provision of the necessary political support. 
`Elemental to bureaucracies is the concept of formal rationality [and well defined 
goals]. Formal rationality means that for a given end, there are rules, regulations 
and social structures designed to optimise the achievement of the organizations's 
goal'. "' 
6. Co-ordination and coherence, in order to prevent contradictive interventions 
and increase leverage and efficiency. 
7. Ownership and proportionality of impact, (to the benefit of increasing 
sustainability, broadening access, and strengthening appropriateness). 
Humanitarian conditionality negatively affects those it does not mean to target but 
to protect: an already vulnerable civilian population. Those responsible for abuse 
of assistance and with the capacity to implement policy change have usually ample 
opportunity to circumvent the impact of the withdrawal or reduction of 
Detrlopment 9,4 (1997), 497-505; Franz Nuschclcr, Contmtrrsies on the Unitrrrality of Human Rights and the 
Conditionality ofAid (Duisburg: Institut fur Entwicklung und Frieden, 1997). 
100 Joanna Spear, Caiterand Arms Sales, 16. 
101 Tony Waters, Bureaucrati fing the Good Samaritan, 96. 
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emergency assistance. The greater the discrepancy between the policy's objective, 
the tool and the impact, the more unlikely its success and sustainability. 
8. Monitoring and evaluation, in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness, 
coherence, accountability and development of best practices. 
9. Flexibility, in order to allow humanitarian emergency aid delivery according to 
local conditions and available skill and resources. 
Some of these criteria entail inherent contradictions that may well not be easily 
overcome within an international democratic policy environment. Successful 
implementation requires both clear mandates and a high level of control throughout all 
project stages. Simultaneously, it also demands flexibility in their implementation in order 
to take heed of local conditions and requirements and vagueness to ensure the support of a 
wider policy coalition. Flexible policy implementation on the basis of clear, transparent 
policy guidelines without contradicting either principle is easier at the local level than at the 
tactical, programmatic leveL Flexible implementation is likely, however, to limit co- 
ordination and coherence, as policy is shaped according to local criteria rather than general 
overarching standards. Most of all, there remains a potential contradiction between the 
rights of the individual and the collective. These contradictions are discussed in greater 
detail in chapters six and seven, yet this thesis is not in the position to overcome them. 
These minimum standards guide the subsequent analysis of British New 
Humanitarianism in the following chapter (chapter three) and the British engagement in 
Sierra Leone in chapter five and six. The following section discusses the methodology 
assumed in assessing the implementation of British policy, and in evaluating the 
effectiveness of a wider humanitarian emergency assistance. 
6. Project Implementation: A Methodology 
This study was developed following a comprehensive analysis of the existing primary 
and secondary literature on the debates that have essentially influenced the still-limited 
discourse on New Humanitarianism and humanitarian conditionality. There exists only 
inadequate specific analytical material on wider humanitarian emergency assistance or 
humanitarian conditionality and virtually no empirical data on its implementation and 
impact. Since the mid-1990s there has been an explosion of primary and secondary 
literature on: 
-60- 
Chapter 11 -'Ihc Nature of the Beast: Understanding Organisational Behaviour 
" The validity and ethics of traditional humanitarian principles and principles of 
humanitarian action in contemporary conflict; 
" The negative side-effects of humanitarian emergency assistance, 'conflict- 
sensitive' programming and `peace and conflict impact assessment'; 
" The `relief to development to security continuum'; 
" Development conditionality and sanctions; 
" Coherence and co-ordination of actors involved in development and 
peacebuilding 
" Civil-military relations and the role of NGOs; 
" War economies; 
" Contemporary conflict and international intervention. 
The available literature includes: primary policy papers (mostly by the UK Government, 
the European Union (EU), multilateral agencies and humanitarian organisations), policy 
reports and evaluations, project outlines (UK Government and humanitarian 
organisations), academic secondary literature and journalistic reports in both English and 
German. 
The data suffered from a ubiquitous lack of recording and the inconsistent use of jargon 
and definitions. Most often, decision making on the project and programme level has been 
personalised, that is: implemented on the basis of personal relationships and informal 
decision-making. Often it is not recorded. This was clearly perceptible, for example, with 
regard to financial records and decision-making processes, which were muddled and lacked 
transparency. The analytical secondary data that could be obtained was not specifically 
generated for the purpose of this study. It might have been recorded on the basis of 
incomparable methodologies -a difficulty that was enhanced by the recurrent lack of 
differentiation between humanitarian emergency assistance and development aid - or 
heavily influenced by anecdotal evidence and bias. Due to the complexity and the highly 
emotional nature of the operational environment, the contentious issues at stake and the 
distrust amongst organisations with highly different operating procedures and objectives, 
there is a general lack of transparency and information sharing. This gives rise to rumours, 
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predispositions and even distortion of information. However, a consistent effort has been 
made to overcome these difficulties. Triangulation of research approaches, including 
frequent cross-referencing with other sources, repeated interviews with the same 
informants, observation of interviewees' behaviour and body language and a large empirical 
base have mitigated these threats of misinterpretation. 
Most of the significant writers on wider humanitarian assistance and humanitarian 
conditionality (such as Nicholas Stockton, Alex de Waal, David Keen, Mark Duffield and 
Nicholas Leader, to name but a few) are or have been closely associated with the policy or 
operations of humanitarian relief or humanitarian intervention themselves. A donor or 
agency has financed all of them at least temporarily. As such, they have the credibility and 
the necessary knowledge to write on highly internal and contentious matters such as New 
Humanitarianism and conditionality. On the other hand, one has to question their 
academic and organisational independence. Others were too specialised, were less 
informed in policy making and strategy and possibly lacked the overview of the entire field 
of humanitarian assistance and political engagement: their judgement would have been 
highly influenced by specific issues. This is not the case with this study. All empirical data 
obtained in the framework of this thesis has been generated independently from 
stakeholders and on the basis of a consistent, transparent and well-recorded methodology. 
Given the weakness of the available literature, the difficulty in accessing grey or 
classified material and the contemporary nature of study, a case study analysis was deemed 
the most appropriate methodological approach to evaluate the implementation of British 
wider humanitarian assistance policy. 102 Primary and secondary sources have been 
complemented by extensive semi-structured interviews with key informants in significant 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and donor organisations. Most interviews were 
conducted in Freetown, the Sierra Leone capital, and London in May/June 2002 and 2003. 
A conscious effort was made to interview staff at various levels within organisational 
hierarchies, and to interview all international non-governmental organisations presently 
engaged in Sierra Leone. " Key informants were identified through a combination of 
purposive and random sampling. All had to: 
102 Robert K. Yin, Case Stud) Research: Design and Methodr, 3'd edition, Applied Social Research Series 5 
(Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), 21. 
103 The sampling of key informants entailed an aspect of bias as it depended on accessibility and education 
and knowledge of personnel to the detriment of field staff and to the benefit of expatriates. Give the 
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" Be involved in humanitarian emergency assistance and/or recovery 
programmes; 
" Be knowledgeable of their organisation and programmes; 
" Be knowledgeable of financial matters and donor relations; 
0 Have a comparatively long personal history of engagement in Sierra Leone; 
Interview partners included: 
" DFID personnel (both at headquarter and field representation level) and 
selected operational consultants, primarily people involved in both the policy 
making and implementation stages (including humanitarian assistance, financial 
and personnel matters, governance, conflict prevention, human rights and 
security sector reform); 
" Members of the UK Cabinet Office responsible for humanitarian affairs and 
selected Members of Parliament; 
" UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) personnel currently seconded to the Sierra 
Leone Government and in the framework of the International Military Advisory 
Team (IMATT)); 
" UK personnel responsible for Sierra T. conc and inter-departmental co- 
ordination within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD). 
" The country directors or operational staff of up to 53 international and 
multilateral humanitarian organisations with a field presence in Sierra Leone; 
" Key ministries in the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and personnel 
directly involved in humanitarian issues (Armed Forces, The National 
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation an Reintegration (NCDDR) and 
the National Committee for Social Action (NACSA), formerly known as the 
National Committee for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
(NCRRR); 
research objectives particular attention was paid to agencies working on behalf of or co-operating with 
DFID. 
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" Selected United Nations agency personnel directly involved in humanitarian 
issues (United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme 
(WFP), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCIIA), 
International Office of Migration (IoM) and selected key personnel of the UN 
peacekeeping operation UNAMSIL with a focus on those involved in the 
reintegration of former combatants and civil-military relations; 
" European Union and EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO) personnel. 
Preliminary interviews in June 2002 allowed the testing of interview techniques and 
assisted in the design of a questionnaire. This questionnaire facilitated interviews in 
May/June 2003 and ensured comparability of the data obtained. It also made it easier to 
quantify findings, thereby strengthening any conclusions drawn. Sending the questionnaire 
out prior to conducting the interviews quickly proved counterproductive and generated no 
results. A conscious attempt has been made to reduce the danger of bias and incomplete 
sampling of interview partners by combining varying interview techniques, personal 
observation and the involvement of a multitude of key informants. 
Semi-structured interviews including mostly open-ended questions proved to be most 
successful in generating relevant and relatively impartial information. Tightly structured 
interviews and closed questions delivered few relevant results, as most interviewees were at 
once reluctant to disclose too much information, suspicious of the research's agenda and 
possible audience, and unable to shape the interview according to their understanding of 
relevant issues. Both policy makers and humanitarian agencies depend upon maintaining 
an image of success for their institutional and personal survival and are eager to please. 
They are under pressure from a negatively (or critically) tainted, relatively weakly informed 
public opinion and press; they also work under highly difficult circumstances and in the 
face of tremendous suffering and are therefore less likely to take perceived criticism lightly. 
Thus, they remain sceptical towards disclosing internal information and discussing 
contentious or critical issues. The nature of a semi-structured interview allowed for a 
degree of safety and trust in which the researcher could ask both controversial and vague 
questions. This encouraged interviewees to open up and explain their organisations' and 
their personal standpoints and operating procedures. Interviews rather than surveys also 
assisted the researcher to record personal observations of the interviewee's (immediate) 
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behaviour and body language; this further facilitated interpretation of the data generated. '" 
Questions were dropped or added at various intervals throughout the research period to 
check. relevant facts and cross reference preliminary conclusions. 
All interviews were conducted after the emergency had peaked and when the 
operational environment had already changed dramatically. "' While this might well have 
resulted in the inadvertent omission of some key informants and relevant issues, this study 
could not have been carried out during the war in Sierra Leone, given the extreme 
insecurity, limited access and a highly traumatic public state at the time. This difficulty was 
overcome through the assertive triangulation of data. 
Frequent informal discussions with many operational emergency personnel engaged 
both in Sierra Leone and other humanitarian emergency operations as well as with 
academics focusing on similar topics allowed for cross-referencing of findings obtained 
through formal interviews. It also allowed for verification of their interpretation and an 
establishment of trust and a degree of frankness. As much as possible, findings drawn 
from interviews were validated through primary and secondary material provided by 
humanitarian agencies, the GoSL, the UK Government (or multilateral organisations) and 
academic or semi-academic evaluations. 
All but one interviewee felt comfortable about the publication of their responses. 
However, given the complex and controversial nature of the subject matter, a decision was 
made to err on the side of caution and professionalism in the publication of names and 
agencies. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the make-up of the international aid environment. It identified 
charactcristics that arc kcy in cnsuring effective and cfficicnt policy implementation. More 
specifically, this chapter discussed the extensive fragmentation of the implementation 
network, which inhibits common agenda setting and undermines inter-operability. It also 
discussed the instability (in terms of resources and liability to external shock) of most 
104 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research, 31d edition (Thousand 
Oaks/London/New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 107-108. 
t°S Burgess points out that interviewees' attitudes and opinions tend to vary on the basis of their immediate 
situation and environment. R. G. Burgess, Field Research: A Sounne Book and Field Manual Contemporary 
Social Research 4 (London: Allan and Unwin, 1982), 115. (Cited by: Eirin Mobekk, Fmm Welfare to 
Dirillurionment A Recipient Country's View of Military-Poktied Intervention in the 1990:: The Case of Had, PhD 
thesis King's College London (2000), 44) 
-65- 
Chapter 11 - The Nature of the Bcast Understanding Organisational Behaviour 
humanitarian relief programmes executed through non-governmental organisations. This 
weakness is aggravated given the typically short-lived duration of donor interest and 
funding. In combination. with the multiplication of aid agencies it leads to a marketisation 
of aid organisations and competition. This is also aggravated by a general lack of quality 
information and formalised channels of communication in particular in emergency 
environments. This lack of information on local conditions and programme impact 
facilitates programming on the basis of personal relationships and belief-systems and the 
spread of rumours and misunderstandings. Most significantly, this chapter discussed an 
absence of donor control and a weakness of evaluation and impact assessment. 
On the basis of this analysis, this chapter has identified a methodology that facilitates 
the subsequent examination of the British New Humanitarianism. The here developed key 
indicators guide the evaluation of the contents of New Humanitarianism at the senior 
policy making level in the UK (chapter three) and of the British country strategy in Sierra 
Leone (chapter five). Most of all, they facilitate an assessment of the effectiveness of 
implementing British policy in Sierra Leone (chapter six). In conclusion, chapter two 
discussed the methodology employed for obtaining relevant information and key sources. 
In summary, this section has established the theoretical basis and research methodology of 
this PhD. 
The following chapter discusses the British New Humanitarianism, its origins (and 
grounding in theory or practice) and development. It assesses whether the approach lived 
up to a concrete policy and to what extent the British policy making establishment 
supported it. Chapter three forms the background for the subsequent analysis of New 
I Iumanitarianism' application to Sierra Leone. 
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Ill. The Department for International Development (DFID) and 
New Humanitarianism 
1. Introduction 
Since its election victory in 1997, the British Labour Government has been influential in 
addressing both the alleged shortcomings of humanitarian emergency assistance and its 
potential capacity, to further political change. The Government has done so by integrating 
humanitarian emergency assistance within a more coherent policy of conflict management 
and development - both in theory and in some areas of engagement. As a result, 
humanitarian emergency relief has threatened to become a policy instrument within the 
inter-ministerial response to conflict and poverty. 
Almost immediately after being elected, the new British Government institutionalised its 
commitment to international development, poverty reduction and multilateral engagement 
by creating an independent and greatly strengthened development ministry: the 
Department for International Development (DFID). 106 The new department's political 
head, Clare Short, was elevated to Cabinet level. She set out to develop an assertive DFID 
policy independent of the control of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). In 
June 1998, DFID published the principles of New Humanitarianism. It also vowed to 
make humanitarian emergency assistance more efficient and accountable. In rationalising 
its policy, DFID drew - albeit incoherently - on discourses that were prevalent in the aid 
community, in particular 1) Do No Harm (or the assumption that humanitarian emergency 
assistance can do harm, but that it also might do good in supporting conflict prevention), 
2) the existence of a relief to development continuum, and 3) poverty and greed as the 
primary causes of violent conflict. '" 
Ilowever, as the following analysis suggests, until 2004 no sufficiently clear and 
consistent humanitarian emergency assistance policy was developed or implemented to 
realise these ambitious plans. DFID humanitarian policy never amounted to more than a 
set of general and inconsistently applied principles, and it failed to win the support of the 
106 Despite a number of earlier attempts by successive governments to create an independent development 
agency, the new ministry's predecessor, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), had 
remained a functional wing of the FCO. While responsible for distinct policy areas, ODA had never 
gained independent and operational functionality. 
107 See in particular the writings of. Alex dc Waal, Famine Crimer, Mark Duffield, `Aid Policy and Post- 
Modem Conflict'; David Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economj of Famine and Relief in Soutb- 
WYWestern Sudan 1983-1989 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994); Mary B. Anderson, 
Do No Haim, Paul Collier et al., 'Redesigning Conditionality'. 
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wider aid community. DFID dropped its assertive campaign in defence of a new or wider 
humanitarian engagement by late 1998, yet at no time did the ministry officially withdraw 
such a policy or refrain from implementing it - albeit inconsistently - in some areas of 
engagement. This left an ambiguous policy vacuum that further undermined assertive 
programme management. Humanitarian emergency assistance policy was outsourced 
predominantly to bilateral humanitarian organisations, and implemented in reaction to key 
international political events and national foreign policy objectives, rather than on the basis 
of a coherent and innovative policy. 
This chapter defines the main concepts of the British `New IIumanitarianism', its 
rationale, justification and subsequent alteration. This analysis forms the background for 
the following chapters four, five and six, which explore DFID's attempts to flesh out and 
implement a wider humanitarian policy in one country case study: Sierra Leone. The 
objective of this chapter is to: 
" Identify the British New Humanitarianism policy, and assess, whether the policy 
lived up to a concrete humanitarian strategy, 
" Evaluate how acceptable a wider relief policy was across ministerial 
departments, in order to assess the likelihood of effective and standardised 
implementation; 
" Assess the rationale, thoroughness (that is its grounding in the relevant literature 
and practice) and stability of such a wider relief policy,. 
The analysis of DFID humanitarian emergency assistance policy design and 
implementation is facilitated by, and corresponds to, the minimum standards for successful 
policy design and implementation defined in the previous chapter, in particular minimum 
standards one to five. The following section reviews DFID's ascent following the Labour 
electoral victory in 1997. The second section appraises the shift towards a broader 
interpretation of humanitarian mandates and a more conditional approach to humanitarian 
emergency assistance. Section three discusses such a New Humanitarianism's rationale and 
justification, transparency and stability and the level of administrative collaboration and 
control. 
68 
Chaptcr III - The Department for International Devclopmcnt (DFID) and New Humanitarianism 
2. Background: From*ODA to DFID 
In 1997, the international political arena seemed favourable to the new Labour Prime 
Minister's reform programme: other Social Democratic leaders had been, or were about to 
be, elected in other European countries and the United States. The clear election victory 
on May 1 gave the new British Government a mandate for change and provided it with the 
political leeway to implement it. `New Labour' and its political platform of the 'Third Way' 
attempted to integrate mainstream political thinking across ministerial and party lines. '' 
Then Secretary of State Robin Cook identified four core areas of foreign policy 
engagement: 1) the promotion and safeguarding of democracy and human rights, 2) free 
trade and the promotion of the British economy, 3) the eradication of poverty, and 4) the 
fight against the proliferation of arms and the support for security sector reform. 'o' He 
called on the UK Government to `deliver a long-term strategy, not just managing crisis 
intervention' and to work together across ministerial areas of responsibility to implement 
these overarching policy goals. This policy approach was labelled `joined-up government'. 
Two years later in April 1999, and in response to the war in Kosovo, the UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair further spelled out a British `ethical foreign policy' in what is today 
called the 'Blair Doctrine'. Ile argued that globalisation - in its economic, political and 
security aspects - compelled Britain to engage in an active multilateral foreign policy, and 
that strong states had an ethical responsibility and national interest in promoting and 
securing adherence to universal human rights, democracy and the eradication of global 
poverty. "' These two themes (an `ethical dimension to foreign policy' and `joined up 
govemment', despite their inconsistent execution and general vagueness, pervaded Labour 
politics. They had a direct impact on the utilisation of humanitarian emergency assistance 
106 For an analysis of Labour's new platform the 'Third Way' and New Labour' as well as its 
implementation and personnel set up see: Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can 
New Labour Debtor? (London: Faber and Faber, 1996); Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of 
Sodal Democrat' (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard I leffeman, 
Ian Holliday, Gillian Peele (eds), Dezdvpments in B, itish Politics, 6th edition (I Ioundmills: Palgrave, 2002); 
Anthony Giddens, LVben Nov for New Labour? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Peter Mandelson, The 
Blair Revolution Restated (Politicos: London, 2002); Donald Maclntyre, Mande/son and the Makin of New 
Labour (London: Harper Collins, 2000); Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People: The Inside Story of New 
Labour (London: Penguin, 2002); James Naughtie, The Rivals: The Intimrate Story of a Political Afanivge 
(London: Fourth Estate, 2001). 
109 Robin Cook, 'Ethical Foreign Policy' (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12 May 1997). 
Also see: Robin Cook, 'Foreign Policy and National Interest', Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Chatham I louse (London: FCO, 28 January 2000); Robin Cook, 'I luman Rights -A Priority of Britain's 
Forcign Policy, Foreign Officc (London: FCO, 28 March 2001); Robin Cook, 'Human Rights Into a 
New Century' (London: FCO, 17 July 1997). 
110 Tony Blair, 'Address to the Chicago Economic Club', 22 April 1999, 
http: //www. pbs. org/newshour/bb/intemadonal/jan-june99/blair doctrine4-23. htm1,15 January 2003. 
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policy for foreign policy objectives. However, the new government did not define a 
foreign policy agenda sufficiently clear to overcome contradictions between an `ethical 
dimension' to foreign policy and other national objectives, in particular the promotion of 
British trade and employment. "' It also introduced an element of selectivity with regard to 
the UK's international engagement: national interest and the likelihood of success. "" This 
had a detrimental effect on the emergence of a coherently implemented and morally driven 
wider humanitarian emergency agenda, as shown in the following analysis. It needs to be 
questioned to what extent the Blair Doctrine included elements of human rights by virtue 
of their inherent value or because they were `classic' components to the construction of a 
`just' case in favour of international military action in Kosovo. 
It has been claimed that between 1997 and 2003, DFID has acted as the Foreign Office 
for lesser strategic areas. "' This was possible given its greater capacity in comparison to 
other ministries for implementing and managing projects and programmes, its substantial 
financial base and its relative operational flexibility. "" Independence allowed DFID 
To establish direct contacts with parts of government previously denied 
it. Policy briefs in relation to specialised humanitarian agencies ... were 
being formulated directly by DFID, and copied to - not drafted by - the 
UN department of the FCO. DFID's new autonomy gave it the ability to 
establish direct contacts with key international political bodies. "' 
DFID was to get involved in questions of trade and security in developing countries, 
until then not traditional fields open to the development policy department. In 1998/9, 
Qare Short personally and assertively called for military intervention in Kosovo on the 
11, See for example: Joanna Spear, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', in: Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, 
Richard Heffernan, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds. ), Deuelopmentr lit British Politics, 6 edition 
(Tavistock, Rochdale: Palgrave, 2002), 276-289,287. Both Robin Cook and Clare Short have repeatedly 
bccn unsuccessful in pushing through thcir human rights or dcvclopmcnt drivcn agcndas against the 
opposition of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). 
Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People. Examples of this are the sale of a British high tech military air 
surveillance system to Tanzania and the sale of military equipment to Indonesia and Zimbabwe despite 
widespread human rights concerns. 
112 Tony Blair, 'Address to the Chicago Economic Club'. 
213 See for example: Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, 'Shifting Sands: The Search for 'Coherence' 
Between Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies', IIPG Report 8 (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, August 2000), 20 
114 Confidential interviews with DFID, FCO and MoD senior personnel in London and Freetown between 
May 2002 and November 2002 and 2004. 
115 Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, 'Shifting Sands', 23. 
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basis of moral considerations, thereby supporting the UK Prime Minister who had taken a 
keen interest in Kosovo beyond the advice of the FCO and MoD. I'6 
According to DFID personnel, it was Clare Short and her immediate advisers who 
expanded her own and the department's independence, political influence and area of 
responsibility and who set grand policy priorities, got involved in major programme and 
project decisions and secured greatly increased financial allocations. "' DFID's support for 
poverty reduction and, to some extent, debt relief was to foster its good, though rocky, 
relations with the UK Treasury and its minister, Gordon Brown. "" Even prior to DFID's 
creation, Clare Short had become a driving force behind Labour's assertive poverty 
reduction agenda and DFID's empowerment. In doing so she repeatedly dashed with 
other departments. According to the majority of both field and policy making personnel 
interviewed in the course of this study, the relationship between DFID and the FCO was 
strained as the new ministry attempted to define and assert its role within the UK political 
establishment. Personality clashes between the departments' political figureheads and 
within DFID did not improve this relationship. "' 
The creation of an independent and greatly strengthened development ministry had 
encouraged a programmatic re-evaluation. In 'November 1997, for the first time in 22 
years, the UK Government set out its development policy in a White Paper: Eliminating 
World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Centuy. 120 The White Paper and subsequent policy 
statements by senior political figures explicitly called for a coherent rights-based approach 
to development co-operation, humanitarian relief and conflict management. A second 
White Paper followed in December 2000, entitled Eliminating World Poverty: lAfakilg 
Globalisation Work for the Poor. 12' Neither White Paper, nor the government's declarations in 
support of the UN Millennium Development Goals, the 2002 `International Development 
Act', nor the new 2002 DFID Public Service Agreement (PSA) went into any details 
116 Joanna Spear, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', 286; confidential interview with former senior DFID 
executive, 26 November 2002; Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People, 263. 
117 Confidential interview with former senior DFID executive, 26 November 2002. 
ils Sec: Spcar, `Forcign and Defence Policy', 278; Andrew Rawnslcy, Servants of the People, 172- 
119 Andrew Rawnsley describes in his recent publication how Clare Short and Robin Cook first fell out over 
Short's comments on the Montserrat volcanic eruptions in August 1997: Andrew Rawnsley, Servants ojthe 
People, 172. The impact of this inter- and inner-ministerial power struggle is assessed later on in this 
chapter. 
'2D Department for International Development (DFID), Eliminating Nord Poverty: A Challenge for the 21' 
Cestx. y White Paper on International Development (London: DFID, November 1997). 
121 Ibid. 
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regarding humanitarian emergency assistance policy. All, however, indirectly impacted 
upon it. At no point did DFID explicitly and publicly set out its approach to humanitarian 
emergency assistance in unambiguous terms. In order to analyse British humanitarian relief 
it was necessary to piece together a policy from public speeches by key personnel, from 
wider, development related sources such as the previously named documents on 
development and DFID's actions. The agenda that emerged clearly displayed an 
orientation towards a focus on democratisation and development objectives within 
humanitarian emergency assistance. The following section identifies the key concepts of 
British New I Iumanitarianism. 
3. Towards a'Rights and Conflict Based New Humanitarianism': 
There and Back Again 
Under the leadership of Clare Short's predecessor, the head of ODA Baroness Chalker, 
the administration had begun to establish an institutional orientation towards greater 
conflict awareness within humanitarian emergency 122 The objective was to 
develop a humanitarian emergency policy more informed by and in support of conflict 
prevention. In doing so, ODA and later on DFID, responded to an international 
intellectual and political move towards addressing conflict, development and emergencies 
holistically; a political development that was picked up by many other European and US 
Governments. 1 Once independent and allocated Cabinet status, DFID deepened and 
operationalised such a broader approach to development and humanitarian aid. This laid 
the groundwork for an application of conditionality to humanitarian emergency assistance. 
In recognition of DPID's greater awareness of conflict issues, in 1998 ODA's 
Emergency Aid Department (EMAD), the Disaster Relief Initiative' and `Emergency 
Logistics Teams' were reorganised into the `Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Department' 
122 Confidential interview with former senior DFID executive, 26 November 2002; comments by Mark 
Hoffman in MA lecture at London School of Economics (LSE), London, 7 February 2003. 
123 Clare Short, 'Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - From Rhetoric 
to Reality, Speech by the Secretary of State, Clare Short, at International Alert (London: International 
Alert, 2 November 1999); George Foulkes, 'UK Policy on Conflict and Ilumanitarian Assistance, 
Speech of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, George Foulkes, at the Overseas Development 
Institute (London: ODI, 12 March 1998). Also see: Alex de Waal, Famine Grmer, Camilla Brueckner, 
Towards a Human Rights Approach to Eumpean Commission Humanitarian Aid?, Echo Discussion Paper 
(Brussels: European Union, 1999); Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choicer, OSCE Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), Corot, Peace and Dectilopment Co-Operation on the Threshold of the 21" Century 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Paris, 1997); European Commission, 
Linking Relief, ' Rehabilitation and Development - An Assessment (EU: Brussels, 23.4.2001); David Keen, 
Benefits of Famine, John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Afeica (Boulder, 
Colo: Lynne Reinner, 1996); liugo Slim, Doing the Right Tbing. 
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(CHAD). CHAD has since been responsible for rapid onset humanitarian emergency 
programmes and projects, for project implementation within conflict and for emergency 
related policy development. 'The co-location of conflict policy and humanitarian policy 
meant that CHAD was able to influence not only the provision of relief, but also the shape 
of the UK's political response to conflict'. " Joanna Macrae argues that unlike its 
predecessor, between 1998 and 2002 `CHAD retained significant programmatic 
responsibilities, acting as the de facto desks for major emergencies in Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan'. " Following the Sierra Leone elections in 2002 and as other emergencies 
such as the Balkans gained prominence, ministerial interest in the commencement of a 
long-term and comprehensive restructuring and peacebuilding programme in Sierra Leone 
grew. The DFID geographical department took over responsibility for the British 
engagement in Sierra Leone. CHAD was handed responsibility for operations in the 
Balkans. " 
Public statements, the two White Papers on development and other official DFID 
publications all committed the Government to an ethical code of conduct for humanitarian 
operations. This conduct was meant to be consistent with the White Paper's concepts of 
poverty elimination, good governance and universal human rights. According to both 
White Papers, development aid policy was to positively effect poverty reduction and 
conflict prevention and resolution strategies; humanitarian emergency assistance policies 
should complement it. 12' The concept of `joined up government' was to have an impact on 
humanitarian assistance policy as it deepened the merging of humanitarian emergency 
policy with development and security. This inevitably transferred the policy of 
conditionality to humanitarian emergency relief. Strategic concepts such as coherence and 
co-ordination and working in partnership with friendly recipient societies that are 
124 Adele Harmer, The Road to Good Donorship: the UK's Humanitarian Assistance', Ilkma ritariaa 
Lrrrhauge 24 (July 2003), 33-36,34. 
12S Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, `Shifting Sands', 23. 
126 As of today, some DFID partner organisations continue to consult with CI LAD on the British position 
in Sierra Leone as a first point of contact. Interview with Tony Conley. 
See: Mark Iloffiman, DI7D Policy on Ilamanit(: ian Aairtainti:. 4 Gut of Politic as Usnat? (London: LSE, 
1999), 4. Action Aid commissioned this paper in preparation of a meeting with DFID in response to 
allegations before the International Development Committee that DFID was applying political 
conditionality to humanitarian emergency relief policy. 
The key objective in DFID's first White Paper is the reduction of poverty in support of sustainable 
development. This is to be achieved through strengthening good governance and the respect of human 
rights. (Department for International Development (DFID), Eliminating World Poceny, 19. ) In this, 
DFID is in line with two of the FCO's policy priorities: the support of human rights as an aspect of 
good governance and poverty reduction. 
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committed to international principles including human rights and/or areas in which British 
engagement promises to make a difference have since also been applied to humanitarian 
emergency assistance. 1 It is worth noting that the idea of working in partnership with 
friendly states introduced an aspect of selectivity into humanitarian emergency relief (both 
with regard to implementing partners and areas of engagement), therefore possibly 
breaking with the principles of impartiality and neutrality and a right to assistance. 
DFID defines its humanitarian assistance objectives as: `to save lives and relieve 
suffering while also helping to protect and rebuild livelihoods and communities, and reduce 
vulnerability to future crises'. Since the development of New Humanitarianism, DFID 
recognises `the obligation to provide humanitarian relief in a principled and accountable 
manner, while at the same time addressing the underlying causes of crises'. 
'' Instead of 
responding to needs alone, in theory DFID also attempts to influence conflicts. That is it 
identifies and addresses the `root causes' of conflict and integrates humanitarian emergency 
assistance into approaches to bring about lasting peace. 
1J' In April 1998 Clare Short stated 
that humanitarian principles 
Imply equal - and crucially, coherently 
linked- attention to the causes and 
consequences of humanitarian crises caused by confict... This new 
rights-based humanitarianism ... 
is about defending, advocating and 
securing enjoyment of human rights which have been recognised by the 
global community but which have been transgressed or neglected in a 
crisis. 131 
Prior to this in March 1998, the Permanent Secretary to DPID, George Foulkes, had 
pronounced that 
It may be uncomfortable for some to move on from a `needs-based 
humanitarianism' to a `rights based humanitarianism'... A more active 
humanitarianism requires taking sides with the oppressed and against the 
oppressor... Humanitarian relief is more and more expected to take a 
developmental approach. Even more than this, humanitarian assistance 
128 Department for International Development (DFID), Eliminating World Potrilj, 39. Once again, this 
mirrors the FCO's concept of 'Critical Engagement' that is promoting dialogue' wherever it can produce 
benefits'. Robin Cook, 'Foreign Policy and National Interest', Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Robin 
Cook, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham I louse (London: FCO, 2 January 2000)- 
121 Department for International Development (DFID), Conflict Reduction and humanitarian Arrirtant 
(London: DFID, 1999), 93-95. 
130 Overseas Development Institute, 'i he . New International 
Detrkpment Act, 5. 
131 Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, 'Principles for a New I iumanitarianism', 
Conference on Trincipled Aid in an Unprincipled World' (London: Church House, April 1998), 2. 
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is now expected to contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. 
This implies the application of conditionality. "2 (sic) 
In mid-1998, DFID launched its Principles for a New Humanitarianism "3' They read as 
follows: 
" We will seek always to uphold international humanitarian and human rights laws 
and conventions; 
" We will seek to promote a more universal approach in addressing humanitarian 
needs wherever they arise. People in need - wherever they are. - should have. 
equal status and rights to assistance; 
" Our humanitarian policy will seek to work with other efforts aimed at tackling 
the underlying causes of a crisis and building peace and stability; 
" We will seek to work with other committed members of the international 
community, and in particular seek collaboration across the North/South divide 
to secure better international systems and mechanisms for timely joined 
humanitarian action; 
" We will agree `ground rules' that prevent diversion of humanitarian goods and 
collusion with unconstitutional armed groups; 
" We will be impartial: our help will seek to relieve the suffering of non- 
combatants without discrimination on political or other grounds with priority 
given to the most urgent cases of distress; 
" We will seek the best possible assessment of needs, and a clear framework of 
standards and accountability from those who work to deliver our assistance; 
" We will encourage the participation of people and communities affected by 
crises to help them find durable solutions which respect their rights and dignity; 
" We will, where possible, seek to rebuild livelihoods and communities, and build 
capacity to rcducc vulncrability to futurc criscs; 
12 Ccorgc Foulkes, 'International Dcvclopmcnt: Beyond the White Pape', 2-3. 
133 Overseas Development Institute, The New International Development Act: The Case for Definition of 
Humanitarian Assistance', notes for a presentation to a meeting of DFID officials/members of the 
International Development Committee (London: Overseas Development Institute, 27 January 1999), S. 
Also see: Department for International Development (DFID), Guidelines on Humanitanan Assistance 
(London: DFID, May 1997). 
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" We recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses 
genuine moral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the 
choices open to us and the ethical considerations involved and communicate 
our conclusions openly to our partners. " 
According to this list of principles and, in particular, policy statements by Clare Short 
and other senior DFID personnel, it is clear that at the senior policy making level within 
the British government humanitarian emergency assistance was no longer regarded an 
automatic response. Instead, it had to complement objectives broader than the survival of 
a vulnerable population. `New humanitarianism' was meant to ground DFID programmes 
on working principles sufficiently explicit to translate the white paper into policy and policy 
implementation and to place it alongside a coherent development framework. Even prior 
to publishing its principles of humanitarian assistance, DFID allegedly had begun to 
implement its new humanitarian emergency strategy in select operational theatres, for 
instance in Sierra Leone. This substantiates the assumption that Sierra Leone had become 
a test case for the UK's New Humanitarianism and its application in contemporary 
conflict. Arguably, alternatively the UK intervention in Sierra Leone brought about the 
strategic advancement of New I Iumanitarianism. 
While the UK Government called for a `rights-based' humanitarianism, it failed to 
establish clear political guidelines on how to deal with the potential abuse of humanitarian 
principles or human rights, other than by withdrawing projects altogether. Nor did it 
guarantee lasting political support of human rights beyond a period of armed conflict. 
British New Humanitarianism never amounted to an explicit, transparent and rigorously 
supported humanitarian emergency assistance policy. At no point was it implemented 
beyond some localised areas of engagement. As such, it failed this study's minimum 
standards one and five: It lacked clear and consistent objectives and mandates. In 
consequence, it also lacked clear rules, regulations and administrative structures designed to 
optimise the achievement of the organisation's goals, that is it lacked control This further 
undermined its strength. The policy's general vagueness had important consequences for 
the implementation of humanitarian emergency operations and for DFID's relationship 
with implementing partner organisations. Notably, the principles lacked clear rules to 
1-14 Department for International Development (DI ID), Code of Coxdwd forJIumaxitaiiax Opemtroxs (London: 
DFID, 1999), 4. 
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mediate when conflicts of interest emerge between ethical imperatives of human rights, and 
those of trade and threats to security'. 135 Without any clear rules of behaviour, field 
agencies were left to assess the local situation, evaluate project impact, and make a moral 
choice of how to respond. In doing so they were, ideally, to promote larger countrywide 
political objectives beyond those of delivering emergency assistance. Field agencies have 
neither the time nor the capacity, professionally and financially, to do so. 
Ultimately, this is a question of defining what is good and bad, 
appropriate and inappropriate ... Emergency implies the presence of war, 
and thus inherently requires evaluating enemies and making moral 
judgments. It also implies defining what is acceptable and not acceptable 
in the conduct of war, who is a combatant and who is a refugee.... [Such] 
judgment introduces strong elements of emotion and irrationality. Rules, 
clear objectives and mandates, are necessary in order to enable the field 
worker to act quickly and reliably and according to a strategy beyond 
local project implementation. " 
Leaving such moral decisions to field agencies might increase implementation on the 
basis of local information, ownership and co-ordination, and therefore efficiency and 
downward accountability. However, it mostly diminishes accountability: vital 
implementation decisions with possible far-reaching and long-term effects are left to 
agencies far less accountable to the British public. There is already a disconnect between 
policy making and implementation and between headquarters and field agents. Given the 
broadening of humanitarian mandates this is likely to widen and to become more 
controversial. 
DFID's public defence of its principles of New Humanitarianism and the government's 
assertive rhetoric to the benefit of a wider approach to humanitarian emergencies 
weakened almost since its first publication in June 1998. While elements of New 
Humanitarianism, including the application of conditionality, could be identified in several 
operational theatres, the original rights-based approach as such has been dropped at least 
publicly. "' No common institution-wide interpretation and application of New 
Humanitarianism was achieved. According to DFID personnel, rights based 
humanitarianism was not applied throughout the DPID bureaucracy, it was also belittled or 
135 Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, 'Shifting Sands, 20. 
im Tony Waters, Bur aucrrrti! ýng the Good Sawa itan, 47-50. 
137 See: Action Aid, 'Inter-Agency meeting on DFID's humanitarian policies and related advocacy' (London, 19 October 1998), 3. 
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criticised. 18 DFID's principles for a New Humanitarianism, moreover, lacked the assertive 
rights-based language of earlier public statements by Parliamentary Under Secretary of State 
George Foulkes from March 1998, Permanent Secretary John Vereker from June 1998 and 
by the Secretary of State Clare Short from April 1998 herself. 139 This might have been an 
early indication that already in mid-1998 DFID attempted to backtrack from its earlier 
ambitious attempts to reshape British emergency assistance policy. The public national and 
international indignation to DFID's 1997/8 humanitarian emergency assistance policy in 
Sierra Leone, or the lack thereof, might have contributed to this. The perception of a 
broadening of humanitarian emergency assistance to incorporate wider political objectives 
and the alleged application of political conditionality in select operational theatres had 
caused the assertive criticism of some humanitarian implementing organisations and other, 
mostly European, development ministries. For example, the UK Parliament's Select 
Committee for International Development had discussed DFID's application of political 
conditionality in Sierra Leone in late 1997/8 but had restricted itself to some general 
criticism. " Dropping the assertive public campaign in defence of a broadening of the 
humanitarian emergency agenda was a sign that humanitarian emergency policy remained 
in flux, that it was to be interpreted at the strategic operational level according to both 
national strategic interest and local criteria. 
In 2000, DFID publicly reiterated its theoretical commitment to a rights-based 
development approach - empowering poor people - and called for a coherent approach 
across institutional boundaries 1" In practice, the department increasingly concentrated on 
standardising the delivery of humanitarian emergency relief and strengthening its technical 
efficiency. In doing so the British government placed stricter accountability requirements 
138 Interview with Sarah McGuire, International Unit, Cl lAD, Fall 2001. 
139 Department for International Development (DFID), `Can Poverty be Eliminated Through Development 
Co-Operation?, Address by John Vereker, Permanent Secretary, Department for International 
Development to the North South Roundtable, 28 June 1998; 
http: //www. DFID. gov. uk/public/news/sp28june. html, 15 May 2002. Clare Short, Secretary of State 
for International Development, 'Principles for a New Ilumanitarianism', Conference on `Principled Aid 
in an Unprincipled World' (London: Church I louse, April 1998). Also see: Clare Short, 'From Rhetoric 
to Reality'. 
140 The Parliament is the primary institution to oversee government departments; the International 
Development Select Committee is above all concerned with overseeing DFID but has very limited 
power and recourses. Its recommendations are not binding and as such it cannot hold DFID 
accountable. Only if a policy broke national law could a government agency be forced by British courts 
to amcnd it. 
141 See for example: Department for International Development (DFID), Realising Ifwmaa Rights for Poor 
People. Strategies forAchreuing the International Detr1opment Targets (London: DFID, October 2000), 7. 
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on implementing agents and selectively chose to co-operate with those organisations that 
supported the government's new humanitarian and political objectives. Rather than 
entering and maintaining an active and impartial dialogue with non-governmental 
humanitarian emergency assistance service providers, the department selectively supported 
large and established international or multilateral agencies (like the International Red Cross) 
to the detriment of smaller and, in particular, local NGOs. Arguably, a failure to meet 
DFID accountability or security requirements could be used as an argument for suspending 
aid operations or withdrawing DFID funding altogether. It is possible to conceal political 
conditionality behind stricter accountability requirements: an allegation that has been made 
by implementing partner organisations - in particular with regard to DFID funding for 
humanitarian organisation working in Sierra Leone. - and that Clare Short has denied 
emphatically. 14z DFID furthermore gradually moved away from a project-based focus on 
conflict and rights issues to broader developmental and political goals such as the reform 
of the security sector and support for good governance. 
The following section analyses British New Humanitarianism's fulfilment of minimum 
standards two, three and four. It first discusses the origin of the British New 
Humanitarianism and its rationalisation and justification, that is its empirical and theoretical 
foundation (minimum standard two). The assumption is that New Ilumanitarianism was 
founded on contested theoretical assumptions that threatened to undermine its 
effectiveness within violent conflict. It then examines the policy's level of support both 
from the British internal governmental implementation bureaucracy and implementing 
agents (standard four). In conclusion, it weighs up the overall stability and predictability 
(standard three) of New Humanitarianism as a strategy. 
12 Refer, for example, to exchanges between Clare Short and Action Aid in 1997/98 and discussion in the 
International Development Committee over suspension of aid operations in Sierra Leone: Action Aid, 
SWmmary of Discussion; International Development Committee, Sixth Report), in particular the minutes of 
cvidcncc on Sicrra scone and the annexed memoranda by Action Aid and Clarc Short on DFID 
humanitarian policy in Sierra Leone; International Development Committee, Gouemment Rupoxre to the 
Sixth Report. fine! the Committee, Session 1998/99: Conflict Pncrntion and Post-Conflict Runnstnrction (London: 
House of Commons, 1999). 
Several aid agencies interviewed in the course of this project firmly believed that for political reasons, 
supporting Kabbah in exile, DFID in 1997/8 suspended all emergency aid to Sierra Leone. At least two 
aid agencies that were active parts of the NGO campaign against DFID's perceived application of 
political conditionality on emergency aid operations believed they had not suffered any lasting negative 
consequences, except a temporary more antagonistic working relationship. Repeatedly it was mentioned, 
that temporarily the ICRC was hurt for having disregarded DFID pressures when staying in Sierra Leone 
throughout the conflict. More so, ICRC confronted the distrust of the new government once Kabbah 
was reinstalled. None of these allegations could be substantiated. 
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4. Discussion of New Humanitarianism's Fulfilment of the Minimum 
Standards of Implementation 
4.1 The Rationale and Justification ofBritish Humanitarian Emergency 
Assistance 
DFID's New Ilumanitarianism in its early and later stages is premised on three primary 
assumptions: 
1. Violent conflict is an aberration from a national progression towards development 
and democratic governance. It is caused by poverty and the greed of a minority. 
Just as war is triggered by poverty, so does violent conflict cause poverty. As a 
consequence, democratisation and development assistance help to overcome 
violent conflict 
2. Humanitarian emergency assistance possibly does harm, just as much as it can 
support a vulnerable population. In a reverse logic, relief can do good if employed 
in support of conflict management and human rights. 
3. There exists a natural continuum from relief to development as both pursue similar 
objectives. 
DFID is not alone in following thcsc assumptions. On the contrary, thcy arc an 
expression of policy beliefs also formulated in part by the World Bank, the United Nations 
and the European Union (specifically the EC Humanitarian Office - ECHO). This study 
argues that these assumptions cannot be generalised across conflict and/or emergencies. 
They have distorted the design and implementation of the UK Government's humanitarian 
emergency assistance policy. In particular, they have led the British government to search 
for and apply blue-print solution to humanitarian complex emergencies. 
4.1.1 Assumption I" Root Causes of Conflict 
DFID assumes that poverty and underdevelopment, the greed of a minority and the 
lack of basic human rights - which include political rights - are the main causes and triggers 
of civil strife and violence. 1 In a reverse logic, violent conflict either deepens or causes 
poverty. It is assumed that `poverty can only be eradicated through the resolution of 
violent conflict' and vice versa. '" The belief is that violent conflict, while indicative of a 
143 DFTD, Code of Conduct, 2. 
144 Department for International Development, Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Arristance (London: 
Department for International Development, 
80 
Chaptcr III - The Departmcnt for Intcmational Development (DFID) and New humanitarianism 
longer-term structural deficiency, is an aberration of a general movement towards 
sustainable development and liberal democracy. War, despite its inherent transformative 
function, is understood as a destructive force. Following this logic, poverty reduction 
measures are regarded an essential aspect of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, 
just as much as peacebuilding supports poverty reduction. The following assumptions 
have been extracted from DFID public documents: 
" Violent conflict takes place within weak states. The weakening or `collapse is rarely 
sudden, but ariscs out of a long dcgcncsativc process that is characterised by 
predatory governments operating through coercion, corruption and personality 
politics to secure political power and control of resources'. "' The understanding is 
that greedy elites or predatory regimes abuse political authority to benefit from 
violent conflict. As they benefit economically and politically from so-called 'war 
economies' they are likely to block conflict resolution efforts. 
" Contemporary violent conflict in developing countries `rarely has a defined front 
line, and fighting is frequently opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low 
tech, self funded and small arms are the main weapons. Such wars are not costly 
and can easily be sustained without external support (m , particular 
in countries 
wealthy of natural resources). Factions will seek to involve, exploit and control a 
significant proportion of the civilian population in order to sustain the conflict'. '" 
Civilians are the main victims of such wars. Reform of the security sector and the 
restriction of the spread of light weapons are essential aspects of conflict resolution 
and, therefore, development policy. The UK Government assumes that `the 
development agenda and the security agenda are inseparable'. "' DFID intends to 
integrate conflict reduction objectives into all aspects of development policy 
including humanitarian emergency relief. "" 
http: //62.189.42.51 /D FIDstage/AboutD F ID/fdes/conflicLjnain. htm#71 be%20humanitarian%20respo 
nse, 6 January 2004,91. Also see: Department for International Development (DFID), Conflict Reduction 
Through B, itish Co-operation. A Briefing for4genaies Seeking Support for Conflict Reduction Actiutres (London: 
DFID, Junc 1997). 
ins Department for International Development (DFID), The Causes of Conflict in Ajrica (London: DFID, 
March 2001), 13. 
14o Ibid., 8-9. 
147 Clare Short, `Conflict Prevention', 1. 
148 Also see: Department for International Development (DFID), Conflict Reduction, 91. 
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" Economic and political inequalities between population groups and rising 
deprivation aggregate grievances. Through the manipulation of leaders, violent 
conflict often latches onto historical prejudices, hatred and a lack of identity. 
" Capacity building, including institution building, and a support for human rights 
represent two primary approaches to overcome a temporary crisis of governance 
and to strengthen development. 'a9 
Both the assumption that poverty is a root cause of conflict and vice versa (and 
therefore violent conflict as temporary) and that a minority's greed rather than a majority's 
grievance cause and prolong contemporary violent conflict (and therefore war as inherently 
destructive) remain disputed. They entail an inherent contradiction. "' They certainly 
cannot be applied across a wide range of contemporary conflicts. If greed is indeed a cause 
of conflict, poverty alleviation and capacity building programmes are not going to reduce it, 
rather, they allow factions to maximise their extraction of resources, including aid 
resources. Similarly, humanitarian emergency assistance in support of conflict resolution 
possibly causes conflict as those benefiting from chaos might attempt to disrupt local 
empowerment. If grievance rather than greed were an essential cause of violent conflict, 
then conflict reduction or containment measures might prohibit necessary and possibly 
beneficial political or socio-economic change. Nor are conflict or violence always irrational 
or illegitimate. 
A combination of parallel, overlapping and competing causes underlies most conflicts. 
A possibly violent political and economic transformation might well be part of a long-term 
phenomenon as societies adjust to the pressures and limits of modem economies and/or 
democratisation. The reshaping of a country's governance structures and the prolongation 
of war economies might well be in the interest of a large part of a war-ridden country's 
population. It opens alternative ways of resource accumulation. In the longer-term, war 
might lead to the creation of new governance structures that are different from Western- 
style and externally imposed democracy and means of accountability). 
'49 Ibid., 2. 
150 Refer to: David Keen, `Incentives and Disincentives for Violence', in: Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, 
Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Cinr! Warr (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 19-42; 
William Reno, 'Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil War', in: Mats Berdal and David M. 
Malone, Greed and Giiewnce: EconomicAgendas in Guy! [Parr (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 43- 
68; Mark Duffield, Global Governance. 
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The assumption that underdevelopment and poverty causes violent conflict is not a new 
one. On the contrary, it has shaped development thinking and practice for at least several 
decades. The North-South Committee of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, for 
example, concluded in a report published in 1980: 
history has taught us that war causes hunger, yet we pay less attention to 
the fact that widespread poverty causes war and may well end in chaos. 
Wherever there is hunger, peace cannot prevail. Those who want to 
outlaw war must also ban poverty. "' 
The concept of `conflicts of distribution' (`Verteilerkonflikte') was well developed 
several decades ago and renowned development and peace academics like Prof. Dr. Dieter 
Senghass frequently published on the connection of conflict and underdevelopment or 
poverty. "' It seems quite doubtful that today it suffices as an explanation of contemporary 
conflict and, more importantly, an approach to overcome it. 
An understanding of the causes of conflict and the nature of contemporary war is 
fundamental to the concept of the relief to development continuum and emergency aid's 
positive role in support of peacebuilding and human rights. The perception of a structural 
change in the nature of war and the role of emergency relief has significantly influenced 
relief strategies both in design and implementation. Within the framework of this chapter 
it is not possible to analyse contemporary conflict conclusively. Instead, chapter four 
provides an analysis of the war in Sierra Leone and its impact on and relationship with aid 
operations. Chapter four draws on several contemporary explanatory models of intra-state 
conflict. This facilitates an assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation of New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone in subsequent chapters. Also, it is inappropriate to 
generalise the causes of conflict globally and draw from this equally generic approaches to 
international intervention. Instead, effective policy is based on individual country conflict 
assessments. 
Vie Geschichte hat uns gelehrt, dass Kriege Hunger nach sich ziehen, aber weniger bewusst ist uns, dass 
Massenarmut ihrerseit zu Krieg führen oder in Chaos enden kann. Wo I Junger herrscht, kann Frieden 
nicht bestand haben. Wer den Krieg ächten will, muss auch die Massenarmut bannen'. Nord-Süd 
Kommission, `Das Überleben Sichern: Gemeinsame Interessen der Industrie- und Entwicklunsländer' 
(Köln: Nord-Süd Kommission, 1980), 23. 
152 Refer e. g. to: Dieter Senghaas, `Dissoziation und Autozentrierte Entwicklung. Eine 
Entwicklungspolitische Alternative für die Dritte Welt, in: Dieter Senghaas (I irsg. ), K italrrtische 
lVellökonomie (Frankfurt (M. ): Suhrkamp, 1979), 376-412. 
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4.1.2 Assumption II: Do No Hann 
In adherence to the public critique of the potential negative side-effects and inefficiency 
of humanitarian emergency assistance, the British Government assumes that humanitarian 
assistance can do harm in as much as it possibly causes economic dependency, fuels 
(violent) conflict and justifies predatory government. "' DFID has written, for example, 
that `the uncritical or unregulated provision of humanitarian assistance can create long-term 
dependency and, during conflicts, can even perpetuate crises by inadvertently supporting 
warring groups and fuelling war economies'. '5' It can also `discourage self-reliance and the 
pursuit of solutions for underlying problems'. "' `It is possible that humanitarian assistance 
becomes the key element in a resource-starved environment and therefore subject to 
predatory behaviour'. " Given that aid can do harm, DFID also assumed that it can do 
good if cmploycd to the bcncfit of widcr political objcctivcs such as rcconciliation, and the 
support for good governance and human rights. DFID assumes that to tackle both 
contemporary conflict and crises an explicit link between humanitarian assistance and 
conflict management objectives is required. "' 
Diary B. Anderson's book: Do No I Iarm: I low Aid Can Support Peace - or War (1999)' 
is one of the most prominent and influential arguments in support of a wider humanitarian 
emergency aid and development aid approach. "" On the basis of extensive comparative 
field research in a variety of countries and conflict situations, Mary Anderson has 
developed an analytical framework that helps development and humanitarian agencies 
analyse conflict and the possible impact of relief, and to gear their action proactively 
towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Her primary hypothesis is that any action 
within any given conflict, including development aid and humanitarian emergency 
assistance, has an important effect (either positive or negative) on conflict and peace 
structures. She argues that by carefully identifying so-called `dividers and connectors' (pro 
peace and pro war forces), and by strengthening those aspects of an intervention that 
benefit the pro peace forces, aid agencies can play an important role in support of 
peacebuilding and human rights. `Do No Harm' has influenced many aid agencies in the 
153 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm, Geoff Loane and Tanja Schumer (eds. ), The U7iderlmpacL 
154 Department for International Development (DFID), Conflict Rea'uciron, 93; also refer to: Department for 
International Development (DFID), `Code of Conduct', 2. 
tss Department for International Development (DFID), `Code of Conduct', 4. 
sý Department for International Development (DFID), The Causer ofConfc415. 
157 Overseas Development Institute, The New International Development Act, 5. 
I's Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm. 
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formulation of conflict-sensitive or conflict impact assessment mechanisms. `Do No 
Harm' continues to have a tremendous impact on the thinking of contemporary 
humanitarian policy. It has helped foster the merging of development, relief and 
peacebuilding and, inadvertently, humanitarian conditionality. 1S9 (sic) 
While humanitarian emergency assistance most definitely has some bearing on conflict, 
neither assumption, that emergency assistance projects do harm or good, is based on 
sufficiently substantial and thorough empirical evidence. On the contrary, as of now we 
still lack the necessary data to come to broader conclusions as how to redesign 
humanitarian emergency assistance projects to make them not only more conflict- and 
rights-sensitive but also allow them to promote conflict resolution or prevention and 
human rights. The negative impact of applying a wider humanitarian emergency approach, 
which might reduce the immediate availability of relief to a vulnerable population, quite 
possibly outweighs its benefit. As will be argued later on in this study (in chapter four), 
many contemporary wars (such as the one in Sierra Leone) are fuelled by and thrive on 
chaos and insecurity; in many cases local administrative structures tend to be part of the 
problem rather the solution. 
Despite this critique, it has to be recalled that for quite some time both academics and 
practitioners have called for a more informed and critical development aid and emergency 
policy. 160 Humanitarian emergency aid operations would benefit from greater politically 
informed and longer-tern impact analysis. However, this is presently not guaranteed as 
increasingly operations are selected on the basis of political opportunism and cost 
efficiency. 
4.1.3 Assumption III: Continuum Thinking; 
Underlying the Government's attempt to integrate humanitarian emergency assistance, 
development aid and peacebuilding is the belief in a natural progression from relief to 
development and the benefit of development in conflict: the so-called `relief to 
development continuum'. The assumption is that by adopting capacity building 
approaches within conflict, relief dependency can be avoided and root causes of conflict 
159 In an informal discussion at the CODEP Annual Meeting 2000 in London, Mary Anderson vehemently 
rejected the notion of humanitarian conditionality. Yet, DFID in Sierra Leone and the EC I lumanitarian 
Office (ECHO) in Afghanistan and Sudan, for instance, have suspended humanitarian emergency 
assistance arguing that aid threatened to do more harm than good. 
160 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes. 
-85- 
Chaptcr III - The Dcparnncnt for Intcmational Dcvclopmcnt (DFID) and New I Iumanitarianism 
addressed. Furthermore, taking on a developmental approach in the design and 
implementation of relief strategies is thought to maximise its contribution towards 
sustainable development and peacebuilding. Today, continuum thinking has cumulated in 
the assumed and practiced merging of security, development and humanitarian emergency 
assistance. '' In essence, this means that emergency assistance is subjugated to a general 
and possibly short-term developmental approach. In the last few years, many policy 
makers have withdrawn from active political engagement or unconditional emergency 
assistance in favour of a limited developmental emergency assistance. Consequently, they 
have taken on responsibility for vulnerable populations. Arc donors prepared to 
reconstruct war-tom societies in areas out of their immediate sphere of interest and far 
removed from local constituencies? 
Despite its own line of reasoning that - in comparison to amounts spent on 
development aid and trade - very modest and short-term humanitarian assistance can 
fuel 
conflict, DFID encourages humanitarian organisations to incorporate development 
approaches into their operational planning. "' This is premised on the assumption that 
humanitarian and developmental operational requirements are complementary. It is also 
based on the assumption that development during war is possible and does not exacerbate 
conflict, and that new post-war state institutions can utilise and build upon prior emergency 
assistance assets and infrastructure. DFID believes that humanitarian relief therefore has 
an important function in violent conflict situations. This means: 
" That humanitarian emergency assistance takes on an important function within 
an integrated policy approach to contemporary conflict and human suffering. 
" That emergency assistance alone is not a sufficient response to reduce human 
suffering and that a vulnerable population has no inherent right to emergency 
assistance. It might be more responsible to withhold emergency assistance in 
order to prevent a potential negative impact; that is, it might be more 
responsible to think of the long-term public good rather than individual 
161 For an in-depth analysis of the concept of the merging of relief, development and security see: Mark 
Duffield, 'I lumanitarian Conditionality Origins, Consequences and Implications'; Joanna Macrae, Mark 
Bradbury, Susanne Jaspars, Douglas Johnson, Mark Duffield, Conflict, the Continuum and Chronic 
Emergencies A Cntical Analysis of the Seere for Linking Rebef, Rehabibtatron and Dwelopment Planniq in Swdaiv, 
Paper prepared for the Department for International Development (London: Overseas Development 
Institute, 19 December 1996). 
162 Department for International Development (DFID), Code of Conduct, 5. 
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survival. This introduces an element of selectivity in the granting of 
humanitarian assistance. Rather than accepting humanitarian emergency 
assistance as a basic right, it is selectively granted on the basis of vague criteria 
towards a possible future benefit. Such an approach demands a case-by-case 
analysis of the wider impact of humanitarian aid interventions and an 
assessment of the chances for sustainable success. It was this reading of 
Anderson's `do no harm' approach that in 1998 led the British government to 
suspend humanitarian aid operations in Sierra Leone following the overthrow 
of the elected president. 
" It is politically plausible to work with governmental partners who arc interested 
in and capable of working towards peace and good governance to the benefit of 
sustainable development. In an inverted logic, it is also plausible to deny co- 
operation with regimes that are critical of UK political objectives or in areas 
where progress is unlikely, even in cases of severe need for international 
humanitarian assistance. 
" In order to prevent possible dependency on aid, emergency assistance must be 
small-scale and short term with a clear exit strategy. Emergency assistance must 
pave the way for longer-term development and economic and political 
independence, thereby benefiting both conflict management and sustainable 
development. 
" Emergency aid appropriations and structures can be utilised for longer-term 
social service provision. Not only is it appropriate to work closely with local 
governmental structures. Those structures arc also able to provide the 
necessary political guidance. This assumes that medium- to long-term 
developmental assistance and effective development is sustainable wthout 
substantial local political agenda setting. 
The UK Government is not alone in following these assumptions. It draws on 
influential international documents such as the United Nations' Secretary General's `An 
Agenda for Peace' and the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) 
guidelines. Both promote an integrated approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, 
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development and humanitarian emergency assistance. 163 Needless to say, many of these 
assumptions remain controversial. 
As noted above, continuum thinking is premised on the understanding of violent 
conflict as a temporary crisis and an obstacle to sustainable development and, ultimately, 
democratisation. The continuum model and the concept of development in conflict 
conceive of a progression from a situation of crisis through rehabilitation and 
development. The assumption is that by adopting capacity building approaches within 
conflict, relief dependency can be avoided, root causes of conflict and concerns regarding 
sustainable development and peacebuilding can be addressed simultaneously, and 
emergency assets can be utilised for future longer-term development. This is despite their 
short-term, rudimentary, externally maintained and designed, and essentially unsustainable 
nature. This is incorrect. Development aid, humanitarian relief and conflict management 
are based on distinct belief systems and working processes, which do not necessarily 
correspond and which require diverse levels of local administrative capacity. This was 
repeatedly pointed out during interviews undertaken with field personnel (both within 
donor organisations and humanitarian organisations) in Sierra Leone during the summer of 
2002 and 2003. Joanna Macrae demonstrates that the problem of feeble legitimacy and 
administrative weakness in transitional states `confines the forms of aid to those that arc 
least likely to meet developmental goals'. '` Development assistance is premised on the 
assumption of the existence of a benign government that has the capacity and will to set 
the political parameters of social services and to maintain social service administrative 
structures. This argument is discussed in much greater detail in the framework of an 
analysis of governance and its impact on and interaction with emergency assistance in 
Sierra Leone in chapter four. Development, furthermore, warrants a certain degree of 
security -a rather fickle concept within a war or post-war environment. Only local 
authorities, or local factions, can guarantee security. Relying on their support implicitly 
legitimises their actions. This was pointed out by DI+ID itself when denying the 
continuation of British funded humanitarian emergency assistance operations in Sierra 
163 OSCE, Conflict, Peace and De dope ent, 32; United Nations Secretary General Boutnos ßoutros Ghali, An 
Agendafor Peace, Pren'ntim Dplomay, Peawrniking and Peace-Keep (New York: United Nations, 17 June 
1992). 
16' Joanna Macrae, Aiding Remarry? The Cri is of Aid in Chmnic Political Emngendes (London and New York, 
Zed Books, 2001), 75. 
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Leone. 165 Very rarely - Sierra Leone is a possible exception - has the UK Government 
been prepared to invest sufficient force in order to provide such a security guarantee. 
By merging the approaches to humanitarian emergency assistance, development and 
security on the basis of continuum thinking, the concept of conditionality is implicitly 
transferred to the policy of humanitarian emergency relief. Also, by placing stricter 
guidelines on humanitarian operations and/or getting more directly involved in operational 
decision-making, DFID threatens `the impartiality and independence of humanitarian 
organisations and humanitarian action may be compromised'. " This, as much as donor 
selectivity gives local authorities (or factions) a veto-power project survival depends on 
their continued consent. mithin war, it is difficult to ensure basic local ownership of 
development projects and to guarantee that development projects meet local needs. 
Without a longer-term donor commitment, which cannot be guaranteed in a conflict 
situation, development projects lack sustainability. 
DFID, nevertheless, is a strong supporter of the concept of the relief to development 
iontitnium and development in io, f&t These assumptions and a belief in Mary Anderson's do no 
harm princzples underlie the UK Government's attempt to integrate humanitarian emergency 
assistance, development aid and peacebuilding in a coherent and co-ordinated policy 
approach to contemporary conflict. The continuum concept and its inherent 
contradictions have contributed towards vague and possibly weak policy principles, 
generating overly ambitious strategies and policy guidelines. This is clearly the case with 
DFID's New Humanitarianism and its application in Sierra Leone. 
4 .2 Collaboration of the Development Bureaucracyand 
Bureaucratic Competition 
Greatly expanded in personnel, budget and political influence in comparison to its 
predecessor the ODA, DFID became and continues to be a cause for institutional envy 
and competition. "' Some argue that the department was overwhelmed by sudden greater 
responsibility and funding It exhausted itself in a frenzy of activity and policy innovation 
ias International Development Committee, Sixth Riport.: Hoffmann, DFID Policy, 7; United Nations 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (SLHSR) 
(New York: United Nations, 24-30 June 1997). 
Overseas Development Institute, The Nein International Demlopment Act, 10. 
lay Discussion with Mark Hoffmann, author of: DFID Policy on Humanitarian Assistance: A Case of Politics as 
Usual? (London: LSE, 1999) at ISE, London, 4 October 2002. 
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before it had established sufficient capacity and strategic depth. ""' This might explain the at 
times inconsistent implementation and frequent reversal of policies. Bureaucratic tension 
and competition was not limited to inter-departmental relations. Given the complex and at 
times overlapping DFID departmental structure and different working styles between 
various DFID units, co-operation between the departments within the development 
ministry was not always forthcoming. This was aggravated by a high degree of staff 
turnover. The at times difficult relationship between CHAD, the senior advisors and the 
desks (and between DFID and other ministries) is a crucial aspect to understanding why 
DFID's New IIumanitarianism imploded, or at least was never defended and implemented 
rigorously. The administration never succeeded in forming a policy consensus and inter- 
departmental rivalry added to an inconsistent and competitive approach. 
Early on, DFID's geographical desks and the newly created CHAD started to compete 
for primacy in shaping and controlling programmes and policy in complex emergencies. '" 
The rigour and drive of key DFID personnel, in particular the former Secretary of State, 
Clare Short, and CHAD's previous director, Mukesh Kapila, and tensions within the policy 
establishment, clearly played a substantial role both in the enthusiasm and ambitiousness of 
policy development and implementation. This change and their assertive leadership style 
caused other parts of the internal and external bureaucracy to resist change and to compete. 
CHAD's relatively large and much more rapidly available budget and personnel - and 
allegedly less transparent but mostly fundamentally different working procedures - were a 
cause for intra- and inter-departmental antagonism. CHAD's responsibility for DFID 
Operation or Emergency Response Teams and its easier access to external consultants for 
16R Interview with Reinhardt Rummel, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (S\XT), 
Berlin, 19 September 2003. 
169 The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines a `complex emergency' as `a 
humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of 
authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that 
goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme'. 
Common characteristics include: many civilian casualties, and populations besieged or displaced; 2) 
serious political or conflict-related impediments to delivery of assistance; 3) inability of people to pursue 
normal social, political or economic activities; 4) high security risks for relief workers; 5) international 
and cross-border operations affected by political differences; 6) often triggered - though not causes - 
and worsened by a natural disaster, commonly drought. United Nations Inter Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC), `10th Meeting -9 December 1994', in: UN Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO), Field Programme Grrular 2 (1996). The UN Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Evas 
established in June 1992 in response to General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to serve as the primary 
mechanism for inter-agency co-ordination relating to humanitarian assistance in response to complex 
and major emergencies under the leadership of the Emergency Relief Coordinator'. 
United Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 
http: //www. reliefweb. int/iasc/Website/Background/Backround%20Top 2. htm, 24 January 2003. 
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rapid deployment to emergency operations offered the department - in comparison to 
other government departments -a greater degree of flexibility and operationality. no 
During the emergency and immediate post-conflict phase in Sierra Leone, some 
Emergency Response Teams (ERT) consultants controlled their own funds and were 
therefore in the position to respond flexibly to bottlenecks within project 
implementation. "' Given its responsibility for rapidly developing emergencies, CHAD's 
working style was considerably faster and more flexible. In interviews with policy makers, 
CHAD, in particular under the leadership of its first director Mukesh Kapila, was accused 
of a rather rigid and uncooperative style. However, British governmental field personnel 
and implementing agents in Sierra Leone praised CHAD for getting `things done' and 
being less bogged down by the internal bureaucracy than the rest of the department. 
Indicative of this competitive policy environment and of attempts to gain greater 
control over policy design and implementation are the publication of the 2002 audit report 
of humanitarian emergency assistance, the July 2002 Public Service Agreement (PSA) and 
the Service Delivery Agreement (SDA). 12 The audit report states that: 
The division of responsibility between geographical and CIIAD, 
however, has often not been formalised, with CHAD's role being decided 
in many instances on a case-by-case basis. A degree of flexibility in 
DFID's organisational response will always be needed but this ad-hoc 
approach creates a risk that humanitarian assistance will not be provided 
in a timely manner whilst roles are clarified. "" 
170 CHAD Operation Team (or Emergency Response Team) provides 24-hour cover for emergency 
response and undertakes needs assessment and analysis of conditions. It also manages DFID's vehicles, 
equipment and relief systems; provides training for other international agencies, including OCIIA, in 
such things as logistics and humanitarian information systems; and has also assumed responsibilities for 
disaster preparedness, contingency planning and civil-military co-operation. Adele I farmer, The Road to 
Good Donorship', 35. 
171 Interview with Tony Conley. 
171 These departmental Public Service Agreements (PSAs) established a set of objectives and targets that 
each department is working towards over the period 2001-2004. The implication is that departmental 
budgets will be linked increasingly to how well each department performs in relation to its Public Service 
Agreement. The Public Service Agreement reflects DFID's overall approach as set out in the 1997 and 
2000 White Papers on International Development and, in particular, their focus on the International 
Development Targets. The [new] Service Delivery Agreement (SDA) focuses on the processes DFID 
supports to ensure that the targets in the Public Service Agreement are met. Department for 
International Development (DFID), AboRt the Pxh/c Senice A'wtmnt and Sennice De/irrry 4yrrrrm'xt 
(London: DFID, 2002), http: //www. DFID. gov. uk/AboutlhisWebsite/fdes/AboutPubServ. htm, 24 
173 
January 2003. Neither agreement specifically mentions humanitarian emergency assistance. 
National Audit Office, Overseas Development Administration: Emergency Relief. Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Parliamentary Session 2001-2002 (I IC 739) (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2002), 5. 
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The report comments at length on a lack of formalised evaluations, impact assessments 
and common indicators across all emergency operations. "' It also calls for a greater 
integration of DFID emergency responses into longer-term development and criticises a 
general lack of transparency and communication in DFID's relationship with implementing 
agents. As of today, it is impossible to say whether the audit will serve as an instrument to 
enhance donor accountability and policy efficiency. 
Ever since 2002, DFID, and in particular those units responsible for humanitarian 
emergency assistance, have undergone a fundamental restructuring process. Mukesh 
Kapila, seconded to the UN in Afghanistan and later on Sudan, has been replaced with an 
up until now allegedly less assertive director, Michael Mosselmans. Clare Short, who had 
assertively fought to promote a development agenda throughout government, resigned in 
opposition to the conduct of the 2003 war in Iraq and the handling of the reconstruction 
phase - in particular the sidelining of the United Nations. 171 In terms of influence over key 
international operations and policy development, DFID appears to have lost some 
influence within the British Government. This, however, was not supported by interviews 
undertaken with UK administrative staff within the FCO. On the contrary, these 
complained that DFID was much more influential given its greater operational flexibility, 
budget and personnel structure. CHAD's areas of responsibility and capacity, including its 
control over external personnel on a consultancy basis, have since been reviewed and 
limited. CIIAD has since lost some of its influence to the benefit of DFID's geographical 
desks. It has yet to be seen whether the departmental restructuring represents a further 
streamlining of a conflict and rights-based approach - up to now centred within CHAD - 
across all DFID units. Today, conflict and humanitarian advisors are placed within all 
geographical departments and several field offices. Apparently, DFID has created a 
specialised policy division rather than situate strategic policy personnel in each unit. 
According to confidential interviews with DFID, there is a great degree of internal 
frustration because of the restructuring. As of mid-2004, DFID has retracted to 
implementing humanitarian emergency assistance in an ad hoc and compartmental rather 
than strategic fashion. 
" National Audit Office, Overseas Development Administration, 5f. 
I's She was replaced as Secretary of State for International Development first by Baroness Amos, then by 
Hilary Benn on October 5,2003. Mr. Benn had previously served as the Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State and then Minister of State at DFID. 
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43 Predictabilit3yand Long Term Policy Stability 
It was argued earlier on that DFID sets its policy priorities independently even though it 
has to co-ordinate with other UK ministries, in particular the FCO, the DTI and MoD, in 
order to safeguard British national interest and general strategic policy objectives. It has 
also been argued that DFID has established independent contacts with international 
political bodies such as ECHO, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and the International Red Cross (ICRC). Allegations have been made that the UK has 
asserted its position within international multilateral organisations to push for specific 
political objectives, such as the military intervention in Sierra Leone and economic 
sanctions against the Sierra Leone rebel government. 
The Cabinet Office, staffed by representatives from all departments, is intended to serve 
as a forum for consultation and co-ordination. Interestingly, several key players 
interviewed for this project stated that they thought it was the Cabinet Office that set the 
agenda with regard to UK policy in Sierra Leone not DFID or the FCO. 176 
Policy is, therefore, a compromise between a multitude of diverse actors. It must be 
continuously renegotiated and reconfirmed. Larger political objectives and programmes 
are almost always subject to inter-ministerial debate, coalition building and compromise, 
both politically and financially. A much larger political body that goes well beyond a 
particular governmental department and the Cabinet Office identifies and influences the 
broad concepts of British foreign policy. "' Ian Holliday defines this policy establishment 
as a melting pot of foreign policy objectives that can only function on the basis of political 
compromise and bargaining. "' Policy making and implementation is furthermore greatly 
influenced by public opinion and the media. Most often, DFID humanitarian 
interventions are embedded within a reaction to heightened public interest and media 
reporting. Indicative of this is that DFID rarely gets involved in any greater capacity in so- 
called `forgotten emergencies' in areas of lesser strategic interest and receiving little media 
176 Interview with Ian Stuart, 22 May 2002; Interview with Colonel Mike J. Dent (CBE FIMgt, Commander 
Joint Support Sierra Leone Army and Deputy Commander International Military Assistance and Training 
Team, BMAT/IMAT, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Freetown, 28 May 2002. 
In Ian Holliday, Executives and Administrations', in: Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Richard 
Heffernan, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds. ), Developments in British Politics, 6 edition (Tavistock, 
Rochdale: Palgrave, 2002), 88-107,89. 
178 James Naughtie presents an interesting description of the controversies and competitions within the 
Cabinet Office: James Naughtie, The Rivals. 
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coverage. '" It cannot be anticipated that given the necessary compromise and fluctuating 
constituencies and its general dependence on electoral success of its political leaders, DFID 
humanitarian emergency policy could ever be stable or fully predictable. DFID is not fully 
in control of its own policy and implementation. The Secretary of State for International 
Development was unable, for example, to prevent the UK sale of a high tech military air 
surveillance system to Tanzania, military equipment to Indonesia and Zimbabwe, and the 
use of the `Conflict Prevention Fund' to buy military equipment. This was despite her 
vigorous attempt to block such sales and to strengthen arms exports license controls in 
order to safe-guard human rights and a right-based development policy. 180 When 
confronting the DTI, MoD and the Prime Minister over arms sales and export licenses or 
issues of trade, time and again DFID has lost out, despite the government's declared 
priority of combating the spread of arms and promotion of human rights. "' The same 
argument applies to DFID's resource base. While DFID controls a substantial financial 
and logistic resource base, its budget must continuously be renegotiated and reconfirmed. 
It is subject to external control and to external political shock. Programme and project 
funding is internally negotiated and allocated. Both are inherently instable. 
Ministerial financial allocations are debated and allocated every three years when the 
government undertakes a Comprehensive Spending Review. Departments have to make a 
case to the Treasury for their financial requirements. In the last two Comprehensive 
Spending Reviews, DNID has managed to secure a budget that was significantly higher 
than originally envisaged. One has to assume that financially and politically DFID benefited 
from Clare Short and Gordon Brown's common objectives on poverty reduction and Clare 
Short's support of Gordon Brown's strategy of debt relief. Additional to its allocated 
budget, further funds can be obtained in response to extraordinary events and international 
crises throughout the financial year. The same procedure applies to DFID's internal 
170 Arguably, media coverage can be manipulated. If the UK government was to get engaged despite the 
lack of public interest it could be assured of media reporting. 
18° Refer to: Ewen MacAskill and Andrew Meldrum, `Labour in Retreat Over Ethical Foreign Policy', The 
Guardian (21 January 2000), http: //www. guardian. co. uk/zimbabwe/article/0,2763,191642,00. html, 17 
March 2002; Larry Elliott, David Hencke, Charlotte Denny, 'Cabinet Row as Defence Deal Delayed', The 
Guardian (19 December 2001), 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/guardianpolitics/stnry/0,3605,620901,00. htm1,. 22 May 2002; Patrick 
Wintour and Charlotte Denny, `Overruled: Short Loses in Aid Row', The Guardian (20 December 2001), 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,622012,00. html, 16 May 2002. 
181 For an analysis of Britain's arms exports policy refer to: David Mepham and Paul Eavis, T heA-liuij link 
in Labour's Foreign Polity: The CaseforTighter Controls oter UKArms E4ßods, (London: IPPR and Saferworld, 
2002). 
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funding allocations: departments and desks have to bid for funding which is allocated 
proportionately. Comparatively, CHAD controls a large budget and benefits from DFID 
reserve funds in response to emergencies. 
An innovative feature of the UK Government's policy of `joined up government' has 
been the so-called `Conflict Prevention Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa' that DFID 
administers (and the `Global Conflict Prevention Fund' managed by the FCO). Both 
provide integrated budgets for the FCO, DFID and MoD on issues in the realm of conflict 
prevention. The objective of these inter-departmental funds is to enable co-ordinated 
inter-departmental programmes and projects specifically addressing conflict. It was 
repeatedly mentioned in interviews undertaken in the course of this study that the FCO 
had originally envisaged the Conflict Prevention Funds as a means to secure extra funding. 
However, according to interviews undertaken in 2004 with FCO personnel, DFID rather 
than the FCO has disproportionately benefited from these Pools. '12 DFID field offices 
control further, though marginal, funds of their own. 183 
All these factors indicating a strong and independent DFID policy would seem to point 
towards a potential for long-term policy stability. Yet, in summary, given the multitude of 
implementing agents, competing and contradicting objectives and the department's 
dependence on national and international policy developments, DFID humanitarian 
emergency policy is neither predictable nor stable; quite the contrary. `This further 
undermines an already highly complex implementation environment, weakens 
implementing agents' and clients' trust, and time and again undercuts policy coherence and 
consistent implementation. Conversely, it upholds a degree of flexibility and localised 
decision making. Both safeguard against authoritarian or fundamentally 
misconceptionalized policy implementation. 
5. Conclusions 
A new approach to development, humanitarian relief and security is required if Britain is 
to maximise on their accumulated benefits. Undoubtedly, policy coherence, co-ordinated 
implementation and accountability must be strengthened. There is no `blueprint solution' 
to violent conflict and humanitarian emergency assistance operations. Yet, a `rights and 
conflict-based' humanitarian approach necessitates a long-term political and economic 
182 Confidential interview with senior FCO staff summer 2004. 
13 Interview with Colin Waugh; interview with Ian Stuart, 22 May 2002. 
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commitment that extends well beyond violent conflict and possibly short-term strategic 
interest. Through the application of conditionality to development aid and humanitarian 
assistance governments hope to alter the political and economic set up of other states.. In 
doing so they must take responsibility for supporting those states in seeing through 
externally initiated reform processes. 
The analysis of New Labour's New Humanitarianism undertaken here shows that it 
defies many of the previously defined minimum standards for successful policy 
implementation. According to the theoretical model employed in this study and on the 
basis of an assessment of DFID humanitarian emergency strategy and implementation 
structure, s consistent successful implementation of DFID's New Humanitarianism is at 
best problematic. This as such does not preclude successful implementation of policy 
aspects on the project level; nor does it call into question the underlying policy vision - the 
potential role of humanitarian emergency assistance in support of human right and conflict 
prevention or resolution -a vision that is yet to be implemented. 
From the outset, humanitarian policy was based on disputed assumptions and suffered 
from contradictory and often vague political objectives. The theoretical underpinnings of 
DFID's humanitarian emergency assistance policy were contested. They failed in 
sufficiently encouraging the support of implementing agents and clients. DFID has applied 
political conditionality to humanitarian relief in conflict situations in an inconsistent and ad- 
hoc way rather than in a policy-based, strategically focused manner. A fragmented, 
competitive, critical and at times -obstructive implementation bureaucracy undermined a 
coherent headquarter-driven policy and its implementation. A large personnel crossover 
from the former Overseas Development Administration (ODA) to DFID, and internal as 
well as external ministerial rivalry encouraged but also inhibited institutional and policy 
reform. Inter-ministerial confrontation, suspicion and rivalry undermined joined up agenda 
setting and longer-term planning. The following case study analysis shows that DFID 
funded humanitarian implementing partners proved unable to significantly influence DFID 
agenda setting. Nor were they sufficiently informed on DFID's broader and longer-term 
policy objectives. 
DFID humanitarian assistance policy and implementation lacked stability and 
predictability given its dependency on wider domestic and international political 
development, fluctuating policy objectives and constituencies. It is, however, a sign of 
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responsible policy making when particular policy areas, such as emergency politics, depend 
upon the consent of a larger policy constituency and the wider national interest. 184 Policy 
vagueness can be interpreted both as an attempt to reconcile differences and enable 
compromise. Alternatively, it can also be seen as a conscious or unconscious effort to 
shirk responsibility and accountability. It is a mechanism of checks and balances to the 
benefit of the majority or traditional policy responses. As such it can also stifle innovation 
and change. 
Disaster relief will continue to be at the mercy of a priority formulation 
process that is underscored by diffuse power and interests... Perceptual 
variables [and] institutional procedures and interests will inevitably define 
responses and dashes arising out of such conflicting institutional 
procedures and interests will leave all too many disasters as memorials to 
yet more inter-organizational struggles. 185 
Given the multitude of actors involved in its design, implementation and evaluation, 
DFID policy making and implementation suffered from unclear lines of responsibility, 
rules of implementation, lack of control, accountability and policy appraisal. It was further 
undermined by the detachment of those responsible for DFID humanitarian emergency 
policy from the implementation area, and the difficulty in assigning responsibility for 
success and failure. The immediate clients, the recipients of humanitarian emergency aid, 
were highly vulnerable and as such more inclined to be supportive of projects and 
implementing agents. Those targeted by wider policy objectives, the political and military 
establishment, were not. They had means to evade conditions attached to emergency aid. 
The impact of a wider humanitarian emergency assistance policy therefore threatened to be 
disproportional 
Ambiguity allowed for flexibility in the implementation of humanitarian programmes. 
Yet it also precluded coherence and co-ordination, two essential principles the government 
had set out to improve. The lack of clear policy objectives and longer-term, donor 
commitments put extra pressure on implementing agents. They were forced to make moral 
decisions in the midst of crises. 
DFID's humanitarian policy.. . lacks clear principles 
for action and 
resource allocation and creates "room for maneuver" [sic] for both 
politicians and bureaucrats to do what may be appropriate, opportune or 
"' See: Randolph Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Reß/ 119-122. 
185 Ibid., 178. 
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convenient... (The policy] can justify both large-scale humanitarian 
operations as well as the possible withholding of relief. ' 
Policy makers and implementing agents on the strategic and tactical level - and from 
one theatre to another - are subject to widely different political pressures and often pursue 
widely different objectives. They are stuck between the need for efficiency and the 
institutional requirement to perpetuate operations - and therefore influence future funding. 
Resultant policy responses are necessarily vague and tend to shift according to domestic 
and exogenous shocks. 
Some of DFID's difficulties in implementing a coherent humanitarian policy are due to 
inherent policy inconsistencies in the ministry's basic approach; others are clearly based on 
structural institutional weaknesses within DFID itself and within the wider humanitarian 
emergency assistance implementation network. Some of these inconsistencies and a 
general lack of control, co-ordination and common agenda setting, might well be aspects of 
bureaucratic policy implementation that cannot be overcome, given the complexity and 
diversity of humanitarian emergencies and international conflict and their implementation 
environments. Most of all, this study argues, it can be assumed that upon its set-back in 
Sierra Leone in 1997/8, the UK Government never meant to standardise New 
Humanitarianism beyond some general overarching policy objectives and/or its application 
in select areas of engagement. The early enthusiastic rights-based and conflict management 
rhetoric and assertive advocacy was clearly driven by a minority within DFID's and 
CI IAD's senior policy making leadership. It has since been dropped for a less public, more 
selective, impulsive and bilateral approach to humanitarian emergency assistance policy 
implementation and an assertive yet one-sided accountability agenda: It might be argued 
that the British Government has responded to and taken on board criticism within the aid 
community in response to its initially more assertive, conflict-oriented wider emergency 
assistance policy. DFID must be commended for investing considerable efforts in striving 
to obtain expert advise in support of improving operations and in developing effective 
responses mechanism. 
Political and operational flexibility allow for the necessary freedom for coalition building 
and implementation based on local circumstances. However, the lack of clear guidelines on 
'86 Alexandra Galperin, `Discourses of Disasters, Discourses of Relief and DFID's Humanitarian Policy. A 
Diagnostic Snapshot of the Crisis of Relief as a Legitimate and Universal Instrument in Contemporary 
Conflict, DFSTIN lVorkin8 Paper Se ies April 2002 (London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2002), 28-31. 
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how to deal with policy contradictions (both between UK departments and political 
objectives and during operations) puts undue pressure on implementing agents and 
precludes long-term planning. It also allows the government to shirk responsibility. The 
present drive to mainstream a conflict-sensitive approach to humanitarian emergency 
assistance and ongoing attempts to strengthen accountability and effectiveness of 
humanitarian assistance have yet to show positive results. As a public service provider, 
DFID itself is under increased public scrutiny and compelled to ensure both efficiency and 
accountability. I iow ever, given DFID's policy inconsistencies and the UK Government's 
structural inability to speak with one voice and to follow one overarching agenda, New 
Humanitarianism is expected to remain a weak compromise. New Humanitarianism 
nevertheless has an important impact on donor-agent relations and the future of 
humanitarian relief in complex emergencies. Furthermore, an analysis of the 
implementation of British humanitarian policy (even if it shows multiple inconsistencies) 
generates valuable lessons regarding the limitations of coherently executing public policy. 
The degree of the UK Government's current privatisation and militarisation campaign 
(that is the assumption that military forces play a central (and possibly primary) role within 
complex emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction) and its continuing attempt to 
integrate emergency assistance, development and military conflict management threaten to 
have an equally important impact on future emergency operations. They determine the 
relationship between the UK Government as a donor and civil society organisations as 
implementing service providers. 
In its second term, New Labour faces the growing criticism of both the British 
electorate and former European allies for its unequivocal stance alongside the 
US 
Republican administration and its bellicose posturing of you are either with us or against 
us' during and in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. "' The British Government has yet to 
define, as Anthony Giddens calls it, `a coherent interpretation of the evolving international 
order and the appropriate place of Britain within it'. 
" If the development aid and 
humanitarian emergency assistance bureaucracies are to improve New Humanitarianism's 
ýh President George Busk Paesident Says Coalition Pumas -Must Perform" (Washington DC: 
Government of the United Sam of America/Press Secretary, 5 November 2001), 
hnp: //w, w.,, hiW,, u, e. gov/netiss/,, I,,, s/2001/11/print/200itt06-4. html, 30 June 2002; 
President 
George Bush> 'You Are niter uith Us or Against Us' (CNN: Washington, 6 November 2001), 
ht $: //wmw. cnn. com/2001/US/11/U6/gcxismc. on. te rcx/. 30June 2002 iae Anthony Giddens, nvw No , 33. 
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efficiency, the presently calve `ethical dimension' of Britain's foreign policy will need to be 
replaced with clearer guidelines for content and implementation. At the very least, a 
common definition of what constitutes humanitarian emergency assistance.. a common 
interpretation of humanitarian principles, rules of implementation, and responsibility for 
action and individual accountability must be clearly allocated to ensure the support of an up 
to now reluctant UK bureaucracy and implementing partner organisations. If humanitarian 
emergency assistance is to play a role within peacebuilding, it must do so on the basis of 
dear objectives, a long-term political commitment to areas of operation beyond the 
provision of humanitarian emergency assistance, solid ongoing evaluation of its impact and 
a transparent communication process with implementing agents. 
These arguments and analysis are substantiated in the following chapters. The next 
chapter, chapter four, analyses the recent political and humanitarian history of Sierra Leone 
as relevant to this study's objective. It sets the background for the subsequent assessment 
of the contents of the British emergency policy in Sierra Leone (in chapter five) and its 
implementation (in chapter six). 
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IV. Sierra Leone: Agents of War or the Root Causes of Violent 
Conflict 
1. Introduction 
In 1991 a small group of fighters crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia triggering a 
protracted war that was to last until 2002. The Revolutionary United Front (RUI'), led by a 
former army sergeant Foday Sankoh, was formed from Sierra Leonean political exiles, 
disgruntled youth, economic refugees in Liberia and mercenaries. Ever since the mid- 
1960s Sierra Leone had suffered from coups and counter-coups, autocratic government 
and economic mismanagement. For the next decade it was to endure war and horrific 
violence, changing administrations and even further economic decline. A vibrant regional 
war economy fuelled and sustained the war, the essence of which is still in existence today. 
In an economic and political power struggle, rebels, soldiers, mercenaries, politicians, 
national and international companies and local and international governments benefited 
from the chaos: they maximised profit and influence by gaining access to or controlling the 
extraction and trade of Sierra Leone's abundant resources, in particular diamonds. 
Consecutive weak administrations were incapable of effectively managing the state and its 
resources, guaranteeing security and breaking out of personal and national patronage 
networks. "' 
Since the mid-1990s, the country has seen years of peace talks, international intervention 
and reconstruction initiatives, as well as their failures. The United Nations and the United 
Kingdom have invested extensively in the restoration of the 1996 elected government of 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the ongoing rebuilding of state institutions. The UK's 
subsequent unique, far-ranging, costly and - in terms of its other engagements 
in Africa - 
disproportionate commitment was to become a test case for a British New 
Humanitarianism, an integrated, approach to violent conflict and complex political 
emergencies and an ethically informed foreign policy. 190 
189 Patrimonialism is a political system that `involves redistributing national resources as marks of personal 
favour to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the 
leader 
represents'. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forrsfi War, Youth & Ruounw in Skim Leone, African 
Issues, 4t' cd. (Oxford/Portsmouth: James Currey and Heinemann, 2.001. ), 34/5. 
The role of the Sidra 
Leonean patrimonial state within the war and the post-conflict recovery phase will 
be discussed in 
greater depth in the next chapter. 
190 John Kampfner, Blair's Vass (London: Free Press, 2003), 65f. 
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The conflict has cost Sierra Leone dearly. Of a population of about 4.5 million, 
between 75,000-200,000 have been killed. Two thirds of the population (including 1.8 
million children) have been internally displaced; thousands of people were kidnapped, 
wounded or deliberately mutilated. An estimated 500,000 Sierra Leoneans have flcd to 
neighbouring countries. " Large parts of the country's infrastructure have been entirely 
destroyed. As a consequence, the resettlement and reintegration processes have been slow, 
and people still live in deplorable conditions today. The conflict has further undermined 
the government's already acute lack of capacity to govern effectively. It has also debilitated 
humanitarian, development and governance programmes. Today, Sierra Leone has one of 
the world's youngest populations, with youths comprising more than 50% of the country's 
population. 'There are no official figures on unemployment in Sierra Leone but it is 
demonstrably cxtrcmcly high with the economy in disarray. Very few Sierra Lconcans arc 
employed in the formal sector with much employment (or underemployment) in the 
informal and subsistence sectors'. "' The brain drain is extensive: the majority of educated 
Sierra Leoneans work for aid agencies (a phenomenon that has unnaturally and 
unsustainably exploded salary levels) or have left the country altogether. For many years 
and despite large-scale international assistance, Sierra Leone has been at the bottom of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) human development index. The 
country has been locked in a vicious cycle of destruction. Even as the present negative 
peace (that is the absence of violence) consolidates, the underlying causes and triggers of 
instability are far from removed. 
IIDI rank life Under-5 GDP per Adult literacy Population without Population below 
out of e: pecten mortality rate capita ("/o age 15 sustainable access to an income poverty Ism ('N. ) 
175 at birth (per 1000 life (PPP US$) and above) improved water source under 2$ 
births) 
175 34.5 316 470 36.0 43 74.5 
Most recent (2001) human development indicators for Sierra Leone. J Sources: UNDP, Human Dedupmenl 4 od2003 andJarne's, SenlneL Se, IAJüimerd lVejlAfka 
This chapter analyses the war in Sierra Leone, its root causes, its impact on 
humanitarian emergency assistance and peacebuilding programmes, and vice versa. Firstly, 
191 Comic Relief, htip: //www. comicsaid. org/texts /sierra. htm#4,6 January 2004. 
192 See: Janes, Janes' Sentinel Secwrity Assesrmenx West Africa September 2001-Febmary 2002 (Brighton: Jam's 
Information Group, 2002), 565. 
193 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Detrlapment Report 2003 (Geneva: UN'DP. 
2003). 
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it delivers a brief background to- the war and highlights important historical events in the 
context of this study. It then draws out key features of the war in Sierra Leone that 
impacted upon (or were affected by) the external aid intervention, such as the role of the 
military, external intervention and a breakdown of representative governance, the 
phenomena of violence, aid dependency and a regional war economy. Where relevant, this 
chapter draws some conclusions on the usefulness of influential analytical approaches to 
contemporary. conflict. Some of these, in particular the writings of such diverse scholars as 
Paul Collier, David Keen and Mark Duffield, have influenced present British Government 
thinking on development, humanitarian assistance and engagement in violent conflict. This 
was despite their fundamentally contradicting approaches. They have also influenced 
public perception and media reporting on the -causes and -characteristics of the war. 
However, British Government analysis of the root causes of war in complex emergencies 
has not been consistent or universal; while the Government drew on arguments provided 
by these and other academics, it did not necessarily follow their analysis consistently. In its 
search for policy responses and development of generic action plans (or blue-print 
solutions), it cherry-picked apparently relevant aspects only and disregarded 
inconsistencies. This is exemplified in the previous and later chapters. David Keen, for 
example, extensively wrote on the root causes of the war in Sierra Leone and the rationality 
of violence. Such a critical argument does not seem to have substantially informed British 
thinking and the UK intervention in Sierra Leone. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the origins of the war and the external 
intervention. An appreciation of the complexity of the war and the environment within 
Sierra Leone is deemed essential, in order to sufficiently understand the difficulties of the 
aid delivery process. The following analysis allows for an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the aid intervention, in particular emergency assistance' utility as a tool 
within the peace process in Sierra Leone. An understanding of the war in Sierra Leone also 
facilitates an appraisal of the viability of the objectives of New Humanitarianism. 
2. An Abridged History of the 1991-2002 War in Sierra Leone 
At the start of the war in 1991, the Sierra Leonean rebel movement counted a few 
hundred weakly traincd and poorly cquippcd soldiers. Somc had fought for Charles 
Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against the government of Samuel 
Doe. Unemployed youth, disgruntled military and mercenaries subsequently joined or co- 
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operated with them. Others, in particular children, were press-ganged or kidnapped into 
service. Through a combination of initiations (often involving atrocious violence including 
rape or murder against family members or friends), drugs, material and psychological 
rewards, the spreading of fear and an assertive education programme, the RUF leadership 
ensured the fighters' obedience and loyalty. 
In April 1992, a junior officer within the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), Valentine 
Strasser, toppled the Sierra Leonean Government of President Momoh. The military coup 
had started out as a protest by junior officers against poor conditions on the front. The 
apparent ease of the upheaval had a lasting impact on the public perception of government 
authority and military efficiency, or lack thereof. Drawing the armed forces into the 
government, Strasser subsequently established the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC), which initially received widespread public support. Between 1991 and 1995, the 
SLA was expanded from 5,000 to 14,000 soldiers, a growth which was achieved largely 
through the recruitment of poorly educated youths from the city streets, including children 
as young as 12. The forming of the NPRC administration was the first major set-back for 
the rebels, who until then had roamed the Sierra Leonean countryside relatively 
uninhibited. A second, more durable set-back was the formation of civil militias based on 
traditional societies such as hunters. They had formed in response to the RUF advances 
and an increasingly destructive campaign by renegade Sierra Leonean soldiers. These 
soldiers, who rebelled against years of mismanagement and poor service conditions, 
became known as soldier-rebels, or sobe/s (soldiers by day, rebel by night). Some 
unofficially co-operated with the rebels in exploiting the rural population, trading arms and 
avoiding an outright confrontation. Civil militias received much public and, later on, 
international support. In 1994 one of the militias, the Kamajors, repelled an attack on ßo 
by rebels and rogue government soldiers. This had a lasting effect on the morale of rebels 
and civilians, as well as the army's relationship with the civilian population. It also 
increased the perception that the central government was not only unable but also 
unwilling to protect its citizens. Subsequently (and with the support of mercenaries and the 
British government), the Kamajors were reorganised into the Civilian Defence Force 
(CDF) under the leadership of Ilinga Norman and drawn into the government. I Iowevcr, 
they were never fully controlled and they have always had an antagonistic relationship with 
the military. Their apparently preferential standing with President Kabbah caused 
antagonism within official army ranks. It continues to do so today. Eventually, the civil 
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militias themselves also became entangled in the conflict, especially the war economy's 
flourishing trade and the experience of power. As irregular fighters their status remained 
unclear and continued to be problematic throughout the eventual national disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration process. 
When the NPRC became entrapped in the same web of corruption as previous 
governments and lost some of their popular backing and internal cohesion, the RUF was 
able to reconfigure. The rebels subsequently engaged in a brutal campaign of terror that 
targeted civilians and the diamond rich southeast of the country. In 1994/5, as the RUF 
made advances on the capital, Strasser found himself increasingly dependent on foreign 
troops. In order to hang on to his crumbling regime and to support the counterinsurgency 
efforts (also against officers in his own ranks), in late 1994/early 1995 he (as well as 
subsequent governments) engaged a number of private military companies (PAIC) such as 
the British Gurkha Security Group and later on the South African Executive Outcomes 
and the British Sandline InternationaL 
Shortly before a general election in 1996, Brigadier General Julius Maada-I3io overthrew 
Strasser. Following intense international political pressure, general elections were held 
despite this coup on 15 March 1996. Amidst large-scale controversies, including allegations 
of fraud and violence, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) 
was elected President with 59,9% of the vote. In November of the same year, the 
government and the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Agreement. IIowever, it soon became 
obvious that President Kabbah's government was unable to assert control over the 
countryside. It had only survived with the help of Nigerian-led Economic Community of 
West African States (CCOWAS) peacekeeping troops - which had been deployed to Sierra 
Leone in 1993 - and foreign mercenaries. The peacekeepers had been drawn from the 
Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which had been 
fighting Charles's Taylor's incursion in Liberia. The regime's support through the armed 
forces was at best delicate. `Grievances were compounded by Kabbah's attempts (strongly 
encouraged by the International Monetary Fund) to 'downsizc' the army and cut rice 
rations'. "" 
194 David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog, Beware My Fangs: Beyond a 'Rational Violence' Framework in the 
Sierra Leonean War', Gish Slater Prognunme Workijg Pupeur 14 (August 2002), 13. 
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Heavily infiltrated by the RUF, in Open conflict with the CDF, humiliated 
by the successes of organisations like Executive Outcomes; the SLA of 
1996 was a demoralised, weak, ineffective army, disliked and distrusted by 
most of the . citizens of Sierra Leone29s 
The Government's relationship with the armed forces was fraught with rumours, 
misinformation, resentment and fear. In May 1997, a junior officer, Johnny Paul Koroma, 
ousted President Kabbah. Koroma was to win an almost cult-like following within and 
beyond the Sierra Leonean armed forces that was to last until his death in June 2003. He 
suspended the constitution, abolished political parties and established the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC). In the following days, soldiers, rebels and irregular forces 
ransacked the capital. In June 1997, the AFRC invited its former enemies, the RUF, to join 
the government. 
On 13 February 1998, Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeepers, backed by logistics and 
intelligence support from a UK-based PMC (Sandline) and civil militias, stormed Freetown. 
They toppled the AFRC/RUF junta, whose leadership was able to flee into the 
countryside. Subsequently, ECOMOG returned President Kabbah to power. On June 
1998, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL). Its objective was to monitor and advise efforts to disarm combatants, 
restructure Sierra Leone's security forces and to support the West African peacekeepers. 
Not even a year later, in January 1999 a mixture of RUF rebels, rogue Sierra Leonean Army 
troops and irregulars launched an assault on Freetown, seizing parts of the city and 
unleashing a rain of terror. `By this point, the identity of these two groups had fused to a 
large extent, and the term `rebel' was generally, used to refer to both. "* By the time 
Nigerian peacekeepers managed to retake control of the capital, at least 5,000 to 6,000 
people had been killed, many neighbourhoods were destroyed and thousands of people had 
been abducted. In the following days, Nigerian peacekeepers were witnessed taking 
ruthless revenge. Up-to today, the country is traumatised by atrocities, committed by all 
sides during the war. The unarmed UNOMSIL contingents were subsequently withdrawn. 
In July 1999, the government and the RUF signed another peace accord, the Lome Peace 
Agreement. Controversy surrounded a clause that provided a blanket amnesty for atrocities 
committed during the war. The accord provided for the establishment of a unity 
195 A. IL Freer, A Command and Leaderrhip Leaunr (Freetown, 4 April 2003), (unpublished paper). 
David Keen, `Since I am a Dog', 9. 
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government that included members of the RUF and former AFRC junta. The leader of the 
RUF, Fodoy Sankoh, was appointed the country's Minister for Mineral Resources - just the 
commodity that had . sustained the rebellion and the war. all. along. On 22 October 1999, 
the United Nations Security Council established another, much expanded and strengthened 
UN peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 
Doing so was a commitment entailed within the Lome Peace Agreement. This mission 
became the largest and most comprehensive UN peacekeeping mission in Africa at the 
time, at its peak deploying around 17,500 troops and civilian personnel throughout Sierra 
Leone. The mission was (and still is) intricately involved in all aspects of the rebuilding of 
the Sierra Leonean state. In May 2000, before the UN mission had become fully 
operational and had taken over from ECOMOG, the rebels startled the world by abducting 
500 UN peacekeepers. The peacekeepers were subsequently released, but the efficiency of 
the UN peacekeeping mission had been put into further doubt. The collapse of the Lome 
accord brought about a marked increase in human rights abuses by government forces, 
civil militias and rebels. These included rape, extortion, the Sierra Leonean Army's 
indiscriminate use of helicopter gunships, and the killing of RUF prisoners by members of 
the CDF. T97 
Also in May 2000,800 British paratroopers and military advisers were sent to Freetown 
with the objective of securing the airport and evacuating British nationals. The war, or 
more particularly the British engagement in Sierra Leone, took a fundamental rum in 
August, when one of the rebel splinter groups (the IVect Side Boys) took eleven British 
troops hostage. The detained soldiers were subsequently rescued and, in the words of one 
British soldier, British troops hunted down the remaining rebels. "' This incident 
essentially contributed towards the British military's invincible, no-nonsense reputation. 
Up to today, this perception form the basis of the respect (and apprehension) with which 
the British military is met in Sierra Leone. The British troops' apparent comparatively easy 
success contributed to the British Government's decision to prolong their stay and extend 
their mandate towards the support of the beleaguered UN and ECOMOG troops. " The 
United Kingdom became intricately involved in the war and the subsequent rebuilding of 
197 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001, http: //www. hlw. org/wr2k1/africa/siemlcone. html, 23 
January 2004. 
198 Confidential interview with a senior commander in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Civil 
Military Co-operation/International Military Advisory Team (IMATI) in May 2003. 
1ý Confidential discussion with British IMATT officer, London, 2004. 
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Sierra Leone (both militarily and politically). The same month, pro-government forces 
arrested Foday Sankoh, who was to remain imprisoned until his death in July 2003.11c was 
never prosecuted for war crimes- 
On 11 November 2000, the RUF and the government signed the Abuja Ceasefire 
Agreement. Skirmishes, however, continued throughout 2001 despite the gradual 
deployment of UN peacekeeping troops into rebel-held territory. The war was officially 
declared over in January 2002. In the elections of May 2002, President Kabbah won a 
landslide victory and was reconfirmed as President. The RUF suffered a devastating 
electoral defeat; having received just about 1.7% of the vote; the myth of rebel popularity 
within civil society was broken. Almost immediately, many rebels vanished across the 
Guinean and Liberian border, many of them taking up arms in the Liberian civil war that 
was to heat up in the coming months. " Some were killed in revenge attacks. 
It was not only the intervention by the United Kingdom and the increased strength of 
the UN presence that led to a scaling down of the war. David Keen, for instance, has 
argued that in 2000/2001 the new UN leadership (and British Government officials) met 
the RUF with a much higher degree of respect (and to some extent trust) as an important 
party in the . peace process. 
Simultaneously, they made is dear that a military solution 
would never be accepted. This might have convinced some rebels to engage more 
seriously with the peace brokers. '"' As the conflicts in Guinea and Liberia heated up, the 
rebels were increasingly squeezed out of their external bases and trading routes. Crucially, 
they also lost the financial and military backing of one of their most essential foreign 
supporters, President Charles Taylor of Liberia. 
Despite the consolidation of peace, Sierra Leone and the entire hfano Rhrr Union region 
remain inherently instable. The international donor community and the people of Sierra 
Leone have grown increasingly frustrated with stagnating reform and recovery. 2" 
a0° `Ex-CDF forces are said to be fighting with the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) forces fighting President Taylor, while ex-RUP combatants are said to be fighting in support of 
their former backer', although their numbers remain unclear and are likely to shift given the developing 
though highly fragile- peace process in Liberia. Toby Porter, The Inttn&týou Bets-ern Po4dwl and 
humanitarian Action in Sierra Leone, 1995 to 2002, (Geneva: Centre for I lumanitarian Dialogue, March 
2003), 61. 
201 David Keen, The Best of Enemies: Conflict and CoUxrion in Sima Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2004) 
(forthcoming, unpublished version), 291. This argument was supported in several confidential interviews 
with senior UN and UK officials in Sierra Leone in May 2003. 
212 See for example: International Crisis Group (ICG), Simla Leone: The Stute of Secwnty and Gotmraxn 
(Firetow. 
.. Inluxationa! Crisis Grwp, (2 Sept 2003). 
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Since the elections there have been at least five minor coup attempts. 
This is a powerful signal for continued unrest. Much depends on 
whether or not new opportunities can be created for the people and how 
the region is .. stabilised.. 
As much depends on whether the army will 
produce another charismatic leader. 203 
3. Root Causes of Conflict and Key Features of the War in Sierra 
Leone 
The immediate trigger of the war in Sierra Leone was the 1991 invasion from Liberia. 
The root causes of the conflict, however, lie much deeper. A complex web of often re- 
enforcing and modulating'factors characterise the war's background, eleven-year duration 
and distinctive character. Violent conflict certainly must be understood as an adaptable 
process. As-it progressed and the levels- of crime committed rose, all actors got trapped in 
a self-inflicted cycle of brutality, destruction, violent extraction and corruption. Paul 
Richards, David Keen and William Reno and others identify the following primary root 
causes of conflict and violence in Sierra Leone: 20` 
" The breakdown of representative governance, neglect of the countryside and 
marginalized groups, widespread corruption, collapsed infrastructure and high levels 
of unemployment. This caused a popular uprising (including student-led popular 
revolutionary populism) and a willingness to take up arms in defence of individual 
survivaL205 
" Entrenchment of a national and regional war economy that benefited the country's 
elite, local and international entrepreneurs and those with access to weapons. The 
benefactors of this shadow economy profited from political chaos and violence; as 
such they were less inclined to support the peace process. 
" International and regional intervention and expansionism as well as regional 
instability. The involvement of Liberia (and to a different degree Nigeria, Ivory 
Coast, Guinea and Libya), was certainly an essential and destabilising feature of the 
http: //www. reliefweb. int/w/rwb. nsf/O/f6e3e4585edfl8c485256d95006I823a? OpcnDocument, 18 
January 2004. 
ID Confidential interview with British soldier, Freetown, June 2003. 
Drawn fro m: Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Fores4 19-25; William Reno, Combtion and Stale Po1da in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); William Reno, 'Resources and the Future of 
Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone', BISA Conference London December 2002; David Keen, The Bert of 
bnemier, David Keen, 'Since 1 am a Dog'. 
215 See for example: Angela Mcintyre and Thokozani Thusi, `Children and Youth in Sierra Leone's Peace- 
Building Process', African Seanity Reurew 12,2 (2003), 73-80,73-74. 
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war. Not only did it allow the RUF to strike and retreat cross-border, it also 
supplied a stream of (war-experienced) regional mercenaries, supplied rebels (and 
. soldiers). with arms, facilitated cross-border smuggling and thus the . 
financing of the 
war effort, and destabilised the region through endless refugee flows. The spread of 
small arms throughout and beyond the region continues to haunt the African 
continent. ' 
0A psychology of violence (that is discussed in detail later on in this chapter). 
9 Militarizsation of the Sierra Leonean society, including the collaboration of rebels 
and the army and, as a consequence, the rise of civil militias. 
Without a widespread co-operation between various forces and society groups, the war 
in Sierra Leone would have been far less dramatic and lengthy. There was (and still is) a 
considerable group of actors that opposed or actively destabilised efforts aimed at a 
peaceful and sustainable consolidation of the Sierra Leone conflict. The destruction of the 
infrastructure and countryside and with it of other, not war-related, means of income, as 
well as their responsibility for large-scale war crimes, stopped perpetrators from diverting 
from their chosen criminal path. In the medium term, the same groups might well 
continue to contribute to the peace effort's derailment. 
Unlike the popular interpretations of African contemporary conflict, the war in Sierra 
Leone was not essentially fought along so-called ethnic lines. Only during and following 
the May 2002 elections did ethnicity (in terms of genealogy and religion) begin to feature in 
national and particularly party politics. For example, on polling day rumours spread 
throughout the northern and south-eastern provinces that voters were being 
disenfranchised and displaced on the basis of their cultural belonging. Furthermore, 
President Kabbah has been blamed for promoting the interests of the Mcndcs. With 
conflict having spread throughout West Africa, scholars like Steven Ellis have suggested 
that long-established differences between the cultural and linguistic families of the West 
Conversely, ECOWAS peacekeeping troops (mostly Nigerian) were crucial in preventing a rebel takeover 
of Freetown and in restoring the previous democratically elected government. ECOWAS, UNMMSIL 
and several international governments provided the platform and foundation for the present peace 
agreement and restructuring effort. 
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African region have begun to resurface (such as between the Mande and the t on-Mande), 
turn into rivalries that link up with present grievances. 07 
The following section expands on these root causes or key features of the war in Sierra 
Leone. It also draws conclusions as to how these impact on the external aid intervention, 
and vice versa. The objective is to develop the essential background for a subsequent 
assessment of New Humanitarianism's appropriateness, or the appropriateness of aid as a 
mechanism to further the peace process in Sierra Leone. It is not intended to present a 
conclusive evaluation of each subsequently discussed phenomenon. 
3.1 Governance and Aid Dependency 
The root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone he in decades of unrepresentative 
government and the marginalisation of the majority of the Sierra Leonean society, 
widespread corruption and the collapse of the public infrastructure' that gave rise to a 
flourishing shadow economy. 208 Ever since independence, international development aid 
and generous international credits had sustained the State's survival. 209 International 
humanitarian emergency assistance had substituted for a crumbling public welfare system. 
Together, they added to Sierra Leone's total dependency on foreign assistance, as aid 
became (and continues to be) the backbone of this fragile West African State. As such, 
international aid fulfilled an essential containment function, both before and during the 
war; it was, therefore, a collaborator in prolonging the war Gust as much as without it, the 
emerging peace process would collapse}. The state's ability to function was undermined 
further by international structural adjustment efforts that - with the objective of curbing 
corruption and public spending - weakened state bureaucracies and disabled leaders 
providing basic social services as well as servicing their clients. 
"' 
One of the primary causes of the war was the imminent disintegration of a patrimonial 
social system and the collapse of the once praised education system. Both pitched large 
207 ILecture by Steven. Ellis on. 'Con. flict in, Africa'. King's College Lan don (3 Marcb 2004). 
See for example: Paul Richards, Hghtipgforthe Rare Fonrt Steven Archibald and Paul Richards, 
'Converts to Human Rights? Popular Debate About War and Justice in Rural Central Sierra Leone'. 
., Vca 3,72 Qunc 22,200-1) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univcrsity Press, 2002); David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog'; David Keen, The Best of Enemier, David Keen, 'Sierra Leone: War and its Functions', in: Frances 
Stewart and Valpy FitzGcrald, lVar and Undeni'ezelopment, Vol. 2 Country Experiences (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 155-175; William Reno, 'Sierra Leone's Transition to Warlord Politics', in. 
William Reno, IVanloni Poldes and ff ican Statu (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 113-146. 
David Keen, 'Sierra Leone: War and its Functions', 159. 
210 Also see:. Paul Richards, Fiehtinoforthe Rain Fonts!, 51. 
-111- 
Chaptcr IV - Sicrra Lconc: Agcnts of War or the Root Causcs of Violent Conflict 
sections of society, in particular the youth, against an ever-weakening state and provided 
fertile ground for rebellion. Paul Richards has claimed that the RUF was run by a group of 
`. about 20-30 quite highly. educated dissidents, convinced that Sierra Leone has been robbed 
of its minerals and forest resources' and who initially argued (in 1995) that the RUF could 
be understood as `a people's movement for national recovery'. "' Isis argument is based on 
the RUF's public statements and publications and widespread interviews undertaken with 
former rebels: It is, also based on the groups' practice of running re-education camps in the 
forest, which civilians were forced to attend. While popular discontent at the 
mismanagement and undemocratic character of the Sierra Leonean State arc widely 
regarded as root causes of the war, Paul Richard's argument remains contested; in 
particular his apparent attempt to rationalise the rebels' extreme brutality and of the RUF 
having to be understood primarily as a pro-democracy popular movcmcnt. nz 
The social fabric of Sierra Leone and the present Government are still crippled by a 
tradition of client-based rule, personal entitlement and aid dependency. A recent study 
commissioned by DFID states, that even by2004: 
The organisational, technical, strategic and advocacy capacity of civil 
society is weak ... There 
is limited horizontal accountability or 
transparency between Freetown based organisations and the rural 
poor.. . Civil society organisations ... exist 
in a historical and political 
climate which perpetuates their weakness. Sierra Leoneans therefore 
have little experience of being citizens with universal rights. In general, 
they distrust the State, government, the judiciary and elected 
representatives. "' (sic) 
David Keen, however, stresses: 
The war has not simply seen the collapse of a system, but the creation of 
new systems - systems of profit, power, protection and even affection. 
Despite a catalogue of massacres and mutilations... not only did the 
majority of Sierra Leoneans reject the rebels and their atrocities; many 
have also been able to develop a new kind of political awareness in the 
context of mass displacement. "' 
211 Ibid., 1-4. 
212 See in particular: Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone 
War: A Critique of Paul Richards's Fighting for the Rain Forest' (sic), Africa Detelopment 23,3/4 (1997). 
117-148,120f and 125. 
213 Department for International Development (DFID) (Alice Jay, Paul Richards and Tennyson Williams), 
Siena Bone: A Framework for DFID Support to Crui! Soäety (London: Department for International 
Development (DFID), 2003). (unpublished report) 
214 David Keen, The Best of Enemies, 318. 
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During the war, Sierra Leone has seen several rudimentary alternative systems of 
governance, some of which drew on traditional systems of identification, representation 
. and justice,. such as traditional leaders (Chiefs and Paramount 
Chiefs) and so-called secret 
societies (in particular the Bondo, Sande or Poro Societies). Temporarily established youth 
councils might also have been a new form of authority that may well be worth studying 
before continuing to externally support the rebuilding of the former traditional state 
system, a system that contributed to- the outbreak of the war. Recent evidence of youth 
groups assisting (or opposing) traditional local authorities supports this argument. 211 
Ongoing reconstruction and state-building efforts have to carefully avoid recreating the 
pre-war political and economic system and focusing on the security needs of the state 
alone. Doing so would neglect addressing the long-term root causes of the conflict. The 
issue of patrimonialism and governance and their interaction with the provision of 
humanitarian emergency assistance is subject of a more in-depth analysis in the following 
chapter. 
3.2 War Economy 
The conflict enabled an intricate web of actors to reap economic and political benefits 
from a vigorous regional war economy. These included politicians, Sierra Leonean elites, 
soldiers (rebels, mercenaries and private military companies), local and international traders, 
regional and international governments and other profiteers. As the survival of these 
profiteers depended on the continuation of chaos, they had (and still have) little interest in 
supporting an end to the war and a consolidation of the peace process. The porous Sierra 
Leonean borders -allowed these groups to 
launder the proceeds from the extraction of 
valuable minerals, in particular diamonds, and the theft of international aid. It allowed 
them to finance the war. As a highly sought after resource in a resource starved 
environment, humanitarian emergency assistance and its providers became a cause of 
competition and distrust and a target throughout the conflict. Because of large quantities 
of alluvial diamond deposits, diamond mining in Sierra Leone is comparatively simple. 
Given the ease with which diamonds can be concealed, smuggling and illegal mining is 
difficult to control. It is estimated that the Sierra Leonean Government has lost tens of 
millions of US$ in diamond mining taxation revenues per year through illegal mining and 
21$ Also see: Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding!, 145. 
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cross-border smugglin 216 The mining region is swamped with people who, having little 
other opportunity to generate an income, hope to benefit from the diamond trade. 
As a possible explanation for contemporary violent conflict and the role of war 
economies within it, the greed and grievance debate has had a crucial impact on the 
understanding of - and policy approach to - war and development by many donors. This 
includes DFID. It some cases, it has led to the application of tighter donor development 
conditionality and the restriction of humanitarian emergency assistance within or following 
upon violent conflict. Paul Collier, the mastermind of the greed-and-grievance debate, has 
identified two polarised driving factors of violent conflict: greed, the aspiration of 
predominantly personal wealth or power, and grievance caused by, for example, unjust 
government or repression of rights and/or political, economic and social inequality. He 
assumes that while a narrative of greed overshadows contemporary conflict, the main cause 
of conflict is a minority's greed either for power or economic benefit lie also contends 
that a narrative of grievance might be upheld in order to. mobilise local and international 
support. Collier posits an almost deterministic and highly disputed set of indicators 
monitoring group behaviour and position within society to analyse conflict. Ills approach 
assumes the outbreak of violence to be based on rational choice. In order to overcome 
conflict, supporters of this approach call for a curtailing of the sales of the primary 
commodities that finance wars, assisting the diversification and deregulation of economics 
to overcome trade monopolies, and supporting poverty reduction strategies. "' The model 
largely ignores the impact of a globalised international economy on local markets. It fails 
to explain the causes of greed-driven behaviour and tends instead to focus on symptoms. 
Nor does it analyse whether or not alternative peaceful behavioural choices and 
opportunities for future development existed. Opponents of this approach, such as David 
Keen, Mark Duffield and Chris Cramer, have rejected Collier's econometric approach as 
too simplistic, based on incomplete empirical data and misleading in the choice and 
interpretation of the indicators for greed or grievance 21° I His set of indicators is limited and 
their assigned distinct impact appears mostly random. Keen points out that `stigmatising; 
rebels as. entirely illegitimate also carries the risk of legitimising brutal counter- 
216 Compare with: International Crisis Group (ICG), Sierra Leone: The State of Security'. 
217 Paul Collier, `Doing Well out of War. An Economic Perspective', in: Mats Berdal and David M. Malone 
(eds), Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Girl Warr (Boulder/London and other. Lynne Wenner. 
International Development Research Centre, 2000), 96 and 106f. 
218 Collier analysis was based on. case studies drawn im the majority. from the Cold War period (between 
1960 and 1999), which in itself questions them as a relevant analytical basis for contemporary conflict. 
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insurgency'... and Collier avoids the `difficult question of how reconstruction might lead to 
a society where grievances were less intense . 2" 
With regard- to the political and military conflict in Sierra Leone and the phenomena of 
war economies and war lordism, the analytical models on transformation, war economics 
and global governance are highly explanatory. They contend that those social groups who 
profit from political and economic instability, weak or failed governments and the 
widespread breakdown of security no longer depend on the consent of or accountability to 
society. Such groups operate across borders and often trade on the international financial 
markets. ' Mark Duffield argues that these so-called shadow states arc entirely new forms 
of political authority and economy, not just manifestations of individual or group survival 
strategies and traditional patronage networks. They function `through complex relations of 
collusion, complicity and competition with the north'. "' According to scholars such as 
Reno and Nordstrom, such new non-liberal, non-democratic types of legitimacy and 
authority are not territorial but capable of defending territory and authority without 
significant bureaucracies. ' Mark Duffield rejects the assumption that specific identifiable 
causes lead mechanically to breakdown and consequently can be `fixed'. IIe suggests that 
contemporary conflict is the result of political and economic adaptation by elites in the 
South to the process of globalisation, post-Cold War diplomatic and security adjustments 
and the spread of Western liberal governance through military and economic intervention 
in the South. High levels of violence and chaos, violent extraction and population 
displacement represent essential preconditions. for asset realisation and reflection of 
authority. Therefore, they arc intended processes as well as outcomes of violent conflict 
219 David Keen, 'Letter to Paul Collier/World Bank', cited in: Bretton Woods project, Daie, g ! Voll out of lVar, 
http: //www. brettonwoodsprojcct. org/topic/knowlcdgebank/k2614greedgicv. html, 10 March 2002. It 
also entirely de-legitimises genuine grievances and political processes. 
23D See for example: David Keen, The Benefits of Famine; Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, IVar and 
IIuner. Rethinking International R, Duns to Comlex geigender (Save the Children UK/Zed Books: London, 
New jersey, 1994); Alex de Waal, Famine Ginner, Paul Collier et al., 'Redesigning Conditionality'. Also 
refer to Philippe Le Dillon, The Pok'k'ca! Economy of War. Aa Annotated ßrblognz br (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2000); Christopher Cramer, 'Economic Inequalities and Civil Conflict', CDPR 
Disemssion Paper 1501 (London: SOAS, 2001). 
221 Paraphrased after. Mark Duffield, Global Goternance, 145. Also see: Kate Meagher, 'Informal Integration 
or Economic Subversion? Parallel Trade in West Africa', in: Real Lavergne (ed. ), Regionallst«rution and 
Cooperation in U7estAfiica (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, Inc. with International Development Research 
Centre Ottawa, 1997). 
12 Carolyn Nordstrom, 'Out of the Shadows', in: Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassirnir and Robert Latham 
(eds), Authority and Ietenentio, in A, ica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); William Reno, 
! Vai'ord Poetics acrd African Stater (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
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that are difficult to control. "' Humanitarian organisations are essential parts of this process 
of global liberal governance. The present debates on the impact on and role in 
contemporary conflict of humanitarian assistance and the discourse on humanitarian 
conditionality are witness to this. 
3.3 Atilitarisation: The SLA, So bels and Private Military Companies 
David Keen explains that `the military success of a few hundred rebels and the massive 
, destruction they inflicted on Sierra Leone was. possible in large part because a range of 
other groups ['m particular the army and political and traditional leaders] found it 
convenient to lend support to the rebellion for purposes of their own'. "' The military, for 
example, consisted of large numbers of irregulars, including children who had hastily been 
appointed. It never amounted to a professional and effective army, it was -never able to 
effectively uphold an environment of stability. Furthermore, neither the rebels nor the 
army were ever fully in control of mercenary elements. 
Significantly, soldiers often shared with the rebels a hostility to 
established politicians and a perception that the educated strata had 
betrayed their country (or their constituency) through corruption. As 
with the rebels, many government soldiers used the war to loot and mine 
diamonds illegally -a chance to rise quickly and violently above the lowly 
opportunities that peace had offered them.. . Whilst there were some 
clashes with the RUF (particularly in diamond-mining areas), the evolving 
war system allowed the RUF leadership to take credit for violence actually 
carried out by soldiers, while many soldiers (often backed by disgruntled 
politicians) used the existence of `rebellion' as impunity for their own 
abuses ' (sic. ) 
The RUF was unintentionally consolidated when the army executed rebel suspects early 
on in the conflict. Fighters that had been recruited or press-ganged from the rural 
population were now less likely to return to their home communities for fear of retribution. 
President Kabbah permanently damaged his government's relationship with the Sierra 
Leonean military when he engendered the army's fury and distrust by downgrading the 
armed forces and executing 24 members of the military on 19 October 1998 for their role 
in the coup of 25 May 1997. The fragile relationship between the government and the 
military became apparent following the 2002 elections. It became known that large 
223 Mark Duffield, Global Goumaa% 257ff. 
224 David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog', 3. 
225 David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog', 3-4. 
2Z Paul Richards, Fighhtingforthe Rain Fenrrt, 5. 
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sections of the military (80% of those 50% who voted on the special voting day for the 
armed forces) had voted in favour of the incumbent Johnny Paul Koroma, despite his 
reputation as a war. criminal and coup leader-" 
A significant factor in limiting the rebels' military effectiveness and, according to David 
Keen, `propelling the electoral process' was the military involvement of consecutive 
mercenaries, such as the British Gurkha Security Group in 1994/5, the South African 
company Executive Outcomes in 1995/6 and the British company Sandline. 223 'Under 
President Kabbah and with the facilitation of officials from the British Foreign Office, 
Executive Outcomes supported the government in reorganising civil vigilante groups into a 
militarily remarkably successful national militia force, the CIIF : 2, ' The mercenaries were 
rewarded for their services with lucrative diamond and other mining concessions. When 
evidence emerged that Executive Outcomes personnel were involved in illegal diamond 
trading and that the company received an exorbitant monthly salary to maintain less than 
100 personnel, public sentiment turned against them and their trading partners. The 
formal withdrawal of the mercenaries from Sierra Leone was one condition within the 
peace agreement signed in January 1997 between the government and the RUF. 
In October 1997, Sandline, a UK-based mercenary and logistics company that was 
affiliated with Executive Outcomes, supplied President Kabbah's allies with logistical 
support', including rifles - thereby breaking the UN arms embargo. After the story was 
published in a British newspaper (the Observer) the company claimed to have acted with 
the knowledge of the British Foreign Office and in particular the British High 
Commissioner in Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold. Subsequently, the war in Sierra Leone, 
Sandline's involvement, its breaking of the UN's arms embargo and the Foreign Office's 
knowledge thereof was discussed in the British Parliament and the Select Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. Peter Penfold was compelled to take early retirement. 27° In a confidential 
interview with a member of the British Foreign Office it was argued that: 
227 This was furthermore confirmed in several interviews in Freetown, Sierra Leone in May 2002. Also refer 
to: Amnesty International, 'Sierra Leone: l2xecutions of 24 soldiers after an unfair trial: a blow to 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone, http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGAFR510201998,12 January 
2004. 
2M See for example: David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog', 4. 
229 Steven Archibald and Paul Richards, 'Converts to I luman Rights? ', 14. 
210 See: House of Commons, Sir'l'homas Legg and Sir Robin Ibbs, Report of'the Sierra Leone Anxr lxusrtigatiox 
(London: house of Commons, 27 July 1998), John Kampfner, Blair'r Van, 66; Select Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Second Report, Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations, 
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The Sandline affair drew the UK in, so did the rebel hostage taking of 
UK troops. The UK felt obliged to take a stand and `do something'. 
Extreme human suffering hadn't sufficed. The Sandline affair and 
hostage taking finally raised personal interest at ministerial level. It was 
important that the UK was welcomed in by the democratically elected 
government, .a government it had positive relations with. The rearming 
of Kabbah was a breach of the embargo, but the embargo was not 
logical. " 
One outcome of the Sandline Affair was the publication of a Green Paper outlining 
legislative options for the control of private military companies that operate out of the 
United Kingdom. Private military and logistics companies nevertheless continue to play a 
significant and increasing role not only in the politics and technicalities of West African 
recovery, but also, British and US foreign policy. This was witnessed, for example, in the 
international intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Increasingly, PAICs and international 
military forces have taken over responsibility for the delivery of humanitarian emergency 
assistance on behalf of donor governments and humanitarian aid organisation's protection. 
This has had negative consequences for the public perception of aid agencies as neutral 
service providers. At least theoretically (and depending on aid organisation's degree of 
independence from donor governments), humanitarian non-governmental organisations 
are not per-se regarded as parties to the war, unlike the British military forces. The 
implication of the Sierra Leonean Army in the war and its present advantageous 
restructuring has had an important impact on the public's relationship with the armed 
forces, international donors and aid agencies. 
3.4 Violence 
The war in Sierra Leone became notorious for the recruitment and kidnapping of 
children into the military and the RUF, and its atrocious violence against deserters, 
suspected collaborators with the enemy and the civilian population at large, in particular the 
chopping off of limbs. Political economists and anthropologists, in particular David Keen 
and Paul Richards, have taken pains to analyse the rationality of both RUF and army 
violence. " They argue that violence and terror against civilians are highly strategic 
elements of war. Richards, for example, suggests, that the chopping off of limbs must be 
understood as- a warning to `stop from harvesting and voting' and a means to `spread 
http: //www. parhament. the stationery office. co. uk/pa/cml99899/croselect/cmfaff/I I6/11613. htm. 5 
April 2003. 
231 Confidential interview with a member of the British Foreign Office, London, 2003. 232 This analysis was not reflected within British (aid) policy on Sierra Leone. 
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terror' or rumours of an impending ambush. ' The horrified accounts of fleeing aid 
workers who flooded into the capital and across the border inflated the perception of the 
RUF. 's manpower, military success and brutality. Richards argues further that RUF 
violence can also be understood as a dramatic gesture of protest and an attempt to break 
with the `habitus of a population that is accommodated to a system of abuse and 
marginalisation . This line of reasoning has received some support but remains highly 
contested, in particular Richards' assumption that the RUF above all represented a political 
movement with the objective of bringing about political change. 23S 
Both Paul Richards and David Keen analyse the entrenchment of violence as a historical 
aspect of the West African history and society. 2`4 Violence has become accepted as a 
means to achieve economic and political change. Both scholars highlight the psychological 
rationale of violence or of committing violence against others: the quest for identity and 
belonging to a group, of self-worth in demanding respect from others, gaining pleasure and 
satisfaction in displaying power, resentment against an oppressor and perceived betrayal, 
possibly an impulse to `conform to the insulting description which this shaming person or 
group is attaching to the violent individual or group', fear, shame and guilt but also 
excitement. Not to mention revenge for colleagues who have been killed in the fighting 
and an inability to accept defeat (which would mean that people would have died for 
nothing). David Keen explains the soldier's violent behaviour against civilians at first as an 
attempt to raise personal gain in the light of readily exploitable resources. Iie argues that 
many soldiers' weak ideological or military training facilitated it. Once civilians turned 
against the army, they were perceived as `disloyal, ungrateful and a threat to the fighters' 
own security... there may also be intense feelings of shame and humiliation'. " The 
argument of possible rational explanations for the war's violence is persuasive. It does not, 
however, conclusively explain why human beings turned to indiscriminate violence, to the 
destruction of the countryside and eventually themselves, instead of either a more targeted 
233 Paul Richards, Fighting forThe Rain Form, roc and 6. 
234 Ibid., 27. 
"S See for example: Yusuf Bangura, 'Understanding', 129. 
2M David Keen, 'Beyond a 'Rational Violence' Framework: Psychological Causes of Civil War Violence', 
Cririr States Programme/DJ2STIN Bri n8 Paper 7 (May 2003); David Keen, 'Greedy Elites, Dwindling 
Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone', Internationale Poltk 
und Gesellrchaft 2 (2003), 67-94. 
237 David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog', 1-2 and 11. Comparable phenomena can be observed today in Ireland, 
where former paramilitaries undertake so-called 'punishment attacks' on former followers, or- civilians. 
Refer to: Peter Neumann, B, itarn'r Lod War British Strategy in the Northern Inland ConJid 1969.98 
(London: Palgrave, 2003). 
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aggression against enemies, oppressors or those with access to resources, or other, more 
profitable and peaceful actions. 
In the 1990s, the war's incomprehensible and seemingly indiscriminate and irrational 
brutality facilitated the proliferation of simplistic `primordialist' explanations. The 
Primordialist School warns of a `new dark age', the spreading of anarchy, chaos and 
barbaric violence that is `primordial, innate and irrationally cultural'. Such feelings are 
thought of as symptomatic of the waning of state sovereignty and weak or failed 
governments. They are thought to erupt within conflict and may lead to an anarchic and 
barbaric fight for survival. Samuel Huntington's book ' he Clash of Civilisations' and 
Robert Kaplan's writing on 'The coming anarchy' have had an important impact on today's 
explicit and implicit understanding of violent conflict. Even those who distance 
themselves from the authors' assumptions utilise their terminology of `ethnic strife' and 
`anarchy'. Everyday media reporting zooms in on chaos, strife and underdevelopment in 
lesser developed countries or regions. 38 Despite extensive criticism, Primordialist thinking 
has been influential in the international policy response - or absence of such - to violent 
conflict in the Balkans, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and a general disengagement from the 
so-called South. Both models fail to sufficiently analyse the effects of globalisation and 
neglect to consider the emergence of new forms of representation and legitimacy that arc 
distinctly different from medieval forms of authority, that stretch across nation states and 
governments (based rather on groups or networks), and are non-territoriaL Nor do they 
take into account very real socio-political, economic and psychological grievances as a 
possible rational explanation of violence. " 
Of much greater explanatory value and analytical depth are the Anthropological analyses 
of the Sierra Leone conflict and the rationality of violence by Paul Richards, William Reno 
and David Keen as discussed earlier; William Reno and Robert Jackson's work on so-called 
2 38 See: Samuel P. Huntington; The Clish of Crrliarliont and the Remaking of lVon / Onfer (New Yo& Simon 
and Schuster, 1997); Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: I low Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, and 
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet', The Allant eMonthly (February 1994), 44- 
76; Carl-Ulrik Schierup, 'Memorandum for Modernity? Socialist Modernisers, Retraditionalisation and 
the Rise of Ethnic- Nationalism', hr. Cari Sdrierup (ed. ), Siiwwble for-the Dalkanr: NaA'nna. &m; Globuii r, º acrd 
the Pohfical Ecnno#y of Reconsthuctron (London: Macmillan, 1999). 32-61. 
239 Refer for instance to William Reno, 'Humanitarian Emergencies and Warlord Politics in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone', paper presented at The Political Economy of IIumanitarian Emergencies' conference 
(I lelsinki: UNU/WIDER, 6-8 October 1996); Mark Duffield, Global Governance 109f; and Mary Kaldor. 
New and Old Warr: OganiZed Violence in a Global Em (Cambridge, UK Polity Press, 1999), 141ff. 
Regarding an analysis of contemporary conflict also see: John Mackinlay, 'Globalisation and Insurgency, 
Ade45by Paper 352 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002). 
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shadow or slates or quart-stater. and Mark Duffield and other's work on global governance and 
new political complexes. 240 Despite their differences, these approaches to contemporary 
conflict or war are in large parts complementary. Seen through their lens, the war in Sierra 
Leone was far from anarchic and random. On the contrary, it was based on very real 
grievances (political, social, economic and psychological) and the pursuit of political and 
social rights. It was not just destructive but also exceedingly profitable and successful, and 
highly strategic. 
3.5 External Intervention and Regional Instability 
From the very beginning of the war, the intervention of external actors and the political 
and economic interaction of local actors with the wider region were of primary importance. 
They were essential for the war's duration and its eventual resolution. Paul Richards, 
furthermore, claims that `Sierra Leone has'long been a measure of the sincerity with which 
the richer countries of the Atlantic basin regarded their global commitments . 241 
International aid appropriations and loans had long bolstered the fragile Sierra Leonean 
economy. They had also ensured the survival of the political regime. Initially, the 
insurgency was masterminded and manned from Liberia. Later on, the rebels used 
neighbouring states as the location for some of their bases and to escape a head-on 
confrontation with the Sierra Leonean army. The West African region also provided the 
rebels with new war-experienced recruits and easily available arms. The movement of 
refugees throughout West Africa added to the region's instability and the war's complexity. 
The fighting in Sierra Leone, on the other hand, provided regional powers with the 
justification and background for their own hegemonic objectives. As soon as neighbouring 
states such as Nigeria, Guinea, and international actors such as Libya, Israel, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America (USA) got involved, the war had mutated from 
a localised civil uprising to a regionally significant destabilising war. 
210 See in particular William Reno, 1Van'ord Po/ida and jftirax Stales (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999); William 
Reno, 'Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone', 
Internationale Politik und Gesellrcbafl2 (2003), 44-66; William Reno, 'Resource Wars' in the Shadow of State 
Collapse, Paper presented at 'Resource Politics and Security in a Global Age' University of Sheffield 
(26-28 June 
. 2003); . Robert 11. - Jackson, , 
Qua /. Stater Soaen{gaty, . Interwtronal R, h, t,, hs and the Third Woad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); David Keen, 'The Economic Functions of Violence in 
Civil Wars', Adelphi Papers 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); David Keen, The But of 
Enemier, David Keen, 'Since I am a Dog'; Mark Dufficld, 'Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the 
Power of Aid', paper presented at an ODI seminar on 'Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, 
Dilemmas and Dissension' (Commonwealth Institute, London, 1 February 2001). 
Paul Richards, Flghtingforthe Rmx Fores4 34/5. 
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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been involved in the 
war in Sierra Leone since 1993, when the regional hegemon Nigeria sent troops to support 
President Strasser 
. against the RUP rebels. 
With 
. support 
from the Nigerian peacekeepers, 
the government managed to win back significant territory from the RUR. ECONMOG 
troops were also crucial in retaking the capital, Freetown, in 1998 and reinstating President 
Kabbah, and in halting the rebel takeover of the Sierra Leonean in January 2000. Ever 
since, most Sierra Leoneans meet the Nigerian peacekeepers with both a sense of gratitude 
for their role in protecting the civilian population and bringing the war to an end, and with 
trepidation and resentment, given the troops ruthless revenge attack following the rebel 
storm on Freetown. 
Internationally, the coup against the democratically elected government of President 
Kabbah in 1997 was officially shunned. In July 1997. the Commonwealth suspended Sierra 
Leone. Then, on 8 October 1997 (after close involvement by the British Government), the 
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1132, imposing sanctions against the 
regime in Sierra Leone. It also authorised the ECOWAS to implement it. Predominantly 
Nigerian ECOMOG troops were subsequently deployed to guard the Sierra Leonean 
border. In practice, the embargo included barring the supply of arms and petroleum 
products. In addition, the embargo also meant only limited humanitarian assistance could 
reach the beleaguered capital; the majority was stopped by the ECOMOG peacekeepers on 
the Sierra Leonean border. 
Agencies were short of supplies, due to what they perceived as the quite 
deliberate policy of President Kabbah, ECOWAS, Ambassador Okclo, 
the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the UK Ambassador to use their 
influence to hold up relief supplies at the border ... 
The deposed Kabbah 
regime and their supporters launched vicious verbal attacks on `junta 
NGOs', the term they gave to NGOs maintaining headquarters in 
Freetown. This caused a deep loss of mutual trust that endured long 
after the end of this period 242 
Since October 1999, a United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAMSIL, has been 
authorised to establish and uphold stability in the country and to rebuild the fragile Sierra 
Leonean state. The comprehensive UN and UK involvement has been the foundation of 
the present albeit negative stability and rebuilding of the country. Both UNAMSIL, 
ECONIOG and the wider aid community have contributed to the distortion of local 
12 Toby Porter, The 1ntemaiox BunKea Polliral and f lumanitanan Action, 18. 
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markets, and both have been implicated in recurring scandals and allegations of sexual 
abuse. 
4. Conclusion 
The legitimacy of the state in Sierra Leone and the success of the ongoing recovery 
programmes are increasingly unclear. Large parts of the countryside continue to require 
comprehensive basic humanitarian assistance. Public service structures in Sierra Leone 
continue to lack political agenda setting and basic infrastructure. There is very little 
progress in terms of community empowerment and creation of employment opportunities. 
Despite this continuing high level of need, humanitarian emergency assistance is being 
phased out to the benefit of longer-term, though as of now vague, development 
programmes. The departure of UNAMSIL and many aid organisations is imminent. On 
31 March 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to prolong UNARMSIL's 
mandate for another six months and to `scale down the size of the peacekeeping force to a 
residual presence'. It cited the continued fragile state of the peace in Sierra Leone and the 
West African region and the GoSL's inability to guarantee security as reasons for this 
decision. Despite this perception, it is more than likely that the force will be reduced to a 
bare minimum by the end of 2004 and that aid organisations will continue to withdraw 
from Sierra Leone. This will have a severely destabilising effect on the fragile Sierra 
Leonean economy and state of governance. In the medium-term, much depends on the 
regional peace-process, in particular the future of Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea. 
This chapter presented the political and historical background to the war in Sierra Leone 
and discussed its root causes. In the process, it introduced key national and international 
actors and. discussed their role within the war, its eventual resolution and the present peace. 
The objective was to promote an appreciation of the complexity of the war and the 
environment in which the British aid intervention took place. This understanding is 
important for the following analysis of the appropriateness of the aid effort. It is essential 
if one is to determine the causes of the difficulties the intervention encountered (or if one 
is to understand the continuation of the conflict. This chapter has provided evidence that 
aid became a resource within a resource-starved environment While it was an essential 
asset for temporarily containing the violence and kick-starting the peace process, aid alone 
was not sufficient to buy stability and peace. The provision of aid did not sufficiently 
address the root causes of the war. Furthermore, aid conditionality was (and remains) 
-123- 
Chaptcr N- Sicrra Lconc: Agents of War or the Root Causcs of Violent Conflict 
unable holding Sierra Leonean leaders accountable and potentially preventing resurgence of 
the war. 
This chapter discussed several primary causes of the war, in particular the state of 
governance and Sierra Leone's dependency on the influx of external assistance (both in 
terms of security assistance and aid). "' It questioned the popular legitimacy of respective 
governments and local leaders. It then discussed the role of a vibrant regional war 
economy throughout the conflict. Cross-border resource extraction enabled warring 
factions to 'finance the war. Part of Sierra Leonean society continues to have a high 
personal stake in the upholding of these paralegal (economic) structures and quite possibly 
instability and weak governance. Furthermore, it remains to be questioned whether present 
restructuring programmes can successfully create alternative means for employment and 
resource accumulation. This chapter also discussed the role of the military and para- 
military forces (including foreign PMCs). Rogue soldiers played an important destructive 
role throughout the war. The relationship between the armed forces and the government 
remains strained. Despite the UK Government's extensive efforts towards reforming the 
army, their role within "Sierra Leone remains fragile and a potential source for concern. 
Mercenaries (fighting on behalf of the GoSL and at times with the support of the British 
Government) played a central role in containing RUF advances on the capital and 
eventually restoring the Kabbah regime. They were negatively implicated in being 
rewarded by lucrative mining concessions; a practice that promoted the depleting of state 
coffers and encouraged exploitation and instability. It was external military intervention 
(by ECOWAS, the UN and the UK) that proved essential in providing temporary security 
and the restoration of the elected government and the peace process. UN forces also 
played a key role during the 2002 and 2004 elections, providing much-needed 
infrastructure. The UN's encompassing recovery programme provided the framework for 
targeted donor assistance and the rebuilding of Sierra Leone. 
Last but not least, this chapter discussed the often-cited phenomena of violence and 
brutality as a defining feature of the war. It discussed the extensive literature on the 
rationality of violence (both as a strategic mechanism and a psychological phenomenon). 
Large parts of the Sierra Leonean population have been traumatized; some of them as 
us " lis theme will also be picked up in the following chapter. Chapter six discusses the state of governance 
today and its interaction with external aid organizations. 
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perpetrators of violence. Not only does this make national reconciliation, reintegration and 
recovery tremendously difficult. It also puts the ongoing peace process at risk: too many 
people are falling through the safety net of ongoing recovery programmes. There continue 
to be too few alternative employment opportunities. Formerly marginalized groups 
continue to be marginalized and only slowly begin to play a role within politics. The 
absence of representative government was a primary cause of the war. Once again it has 
become a feature of public discontent, now fuelled by the memory of over ten years of civil 
war. 
In summary: this chapter set this thesis in a historical context. It established the 
background for the following discussion of the role of one of the key players of the war, 
namely the United Kingdom. Chapter five evaluates the British humanitarian engagement 
in Sierra Leone in greater detail, its interaction with local governance structures (and extent 
of local ownership) and the UK's collaboration with international aid providers. This 
analysis facilitates a comparison between New Humanitarianism on the policy formulation 
level in London and its application in Sierra Leone. In other words, the following chapter 
assesses the coherence of New Humanitarianism as a consistent British humanitarian 
emergency strategy. Together, chapter three, four and five facilitate an assessment of the 
British (aid) intervention and in particular the effectiveness of emergency assistance. 
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V. Pax Britannica: The Application of New Humanitarianism to 
Sierra Leone 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the complex nature of the war in Sierra Leone. It also 
discussed the role of external actors and aid in fuelling or mitigating the war. It's objective 
was to investigate the contextual framework in which New Humanitarianism was situated 
and to discuss its appropriateness within the context of Sierra Leone. This chapter 
discusses the application of New IIumanitarianism to 'Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2003. 
It first introduces the contents and scope of the British relief intervention. It also discusses 
broader aspects of the British intervention to the extent they impacted upon emergency 
assistance. It then explores the present governance structures in Sierra Leone and their 
impact on and relationship with humanitarian emergency aid. This section evaluates the 
level of ownership and control on the side of the GoSL In conclusion, the last section 
discusses the significance of humanitarian emergency assistance operations within the 
overall British engagement in Sierra Leone. The primary objective of this chapter is to 
establish to what extent the British relief strategy in Sierra Leone drew on and promoted 
the concept of New Humanitarianism. This analysis contributes to the PhD's overall 
assessment of the policy's level of coherence (n terms of contents and application). A 
secondary objective of this chapter is to assess the feasibility and effectiveness of 
developmental emergency assistance in promoting conflict management and development. 
2. A British Marshall Plan for Sierra Leone 
Since its inception in 1998, the UK's financial commitments to Sierra Leone have 
totalled an average of £40 million a year. This figure would be significantly higher if 
assessed peacekeeping contributions and logistics (including armaments) support and 
training for the Sierra Leonean armed forces were taken into consideration? " Following 
the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement in November 2000, the UK embarked on a comprehensive, 
and, in comparison to its other engagements in Africa, widely disproportionate 
peacebuilding and reform programme. The majority of the budget for Sierra Leone was 
See for example: Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Department for International Assistance (DFID), 
Sierra Leone Medium-Tern, Strategy Action Plan (London: FCO/DFID, 2003); Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office/Department for International Assistance (DFID), Africa Conflict Pretention Pool - Conflict Preisfron Strategy 2002/03 Redew (London: FCO/DFID, 2003). 
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drawn from the cross-ministerial Africa Conflict Prevention fund. " `As a result of the 
scale of its investment in Sierra Leone, the UK's ability to finance conflict prevention and 
reduction work in other parts of Africa has been significantly reduced'! ' However, in 
comparison to its engagement in other regional areas, in particular the Middle East, the 
British financial commitment in Sierra Leone is still relatively small. "7 
The priority of the British intervention in Sierra Leone has been the restoration of peace 
and security as prerequisites for reconciliation, good governance and eventually 
development. The British programme spanned all -three phases of emergency relief in 
parallel: emergency, rehabilitation and post rehabilitation (development). '" In real 
numbers, emergency assistance constituted only a fraction of the wider British engagement 
in Sierra Leone, particularly in comparison to the wider UK foreign policy engagement and 
its military component. 'ß9 Yet even the rudimentary stabilisation of war torn communities 
through the influx of urgently required basic commodities and capital proved essential for 
the continuation of the peace process in Sierra Leone. Following an initial short-lived 
focus on humanitarian emergency relief, the UK concentrated on the reform of the security 
sector and a broad community reintegration and capacity building programme. The latter 
was situated between developmental humanitarian emergency assistance, development 
assistance and peacebuilding programmes. It was an expression of the merging of relief 
and development programmes and a British belief in the continuum-concept. The British 
Government has had a central role in retraining and rearming the Sierra Leonean army. It 
has to be highlighted that within that framework it has exported large quantities of so- 
called `small arms and light weapons' to a country that is as of today still considered to be 
highly instable250 
245 The overall administrative responsibility lay with DFID, yet specific programme aspects, such as the 
International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATI), reported to other British ministries as a 
first point of contact, in this case the MoD. 
216 Toby Porter, The Interaction Between Political and llumanitaian Action, 72. 
247 According to John Davison from Christian Aid, in October 2003 'the government diverted aid to fund 
reconstruction Iraq.. . totaling , 544 million' over a three-year period. That is -almost five times more 
than the money allocated to Sierra Leone. BBC News, `Poor Paying for War on Terror', 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/3696683. stm, 20 May 2004. 
? "" See: Randolph Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief, 12. 
Interview with Paul Jenkins, ICRC UK, West & Central Africa Desk Officer, London, 4 May 2003, and 
interview with Tim Shorten, Department for International Development (DFID), Desk Officer Sierra 
Leone, Africa Department, London, 25 April 2003. 
20 Official figures show that in 2000 the UK exported ammunition to Sierra Leone up to a total of $10,000. 
See: GIIS, SmallArmr Sanxy 2004 - Ri hts at Risk, Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva 
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Given its sheer breadth, the UK intervention is unique inasmuch as it attempted to 
holistically - and in large parts almost unilaterally - address all aspects of post war 
peacebuilding and reconstruction. It is an example of an inter-ministerial joined-up though 
not trouble-free, endeavour. Despite the fact that all programmes have been challenged 
and sustainable change in Sierra Leone is not forthcoming, the UK should be 
complimented for having made such a unique and uniquely generous and comprehensive 
commitment. The British intervention and longer-term political and financial commitment 
to the rebuilding of Sierra Leone was crucial to stop the fighting and initiate and uphold 
international donor interest. Between 1997 and 2004, the UK has supported (or led) 
programmes in Sierra Leone in the following areas: 
Security 
" Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) (lie UK initially 
supported the UN-led process but later withdrew from it. Instead, it 
established a British-run community reintegration programme and invested in a 
similar programme run by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). ); 
" Restructuring and training of the Sierra Leone armed forces (UK initiative); 
" Budgetary and logistic support for selected ministries (in particular the Ministry 
of Defence); 
" Re-establishing and training of the police force (parallel UK and UN 
programmes with some overlap since 2003); 
" Creation of a politically neutral intelligence service (in co-operation with the 
UN); 
Governance 
" Forming and maintaining of an anti-corruption commission (budgetary and 
personnel support); 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 128-129. For the complete period between 1997-2004 this figures is 
considered to be substantially higher. 
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" Capacity building of civil administration in providing social services and 
managing community based programmes (secondment of DFID staff to various 
ministries); 
" Support for the re-establishment of district and local authority (Paramount 
Chiefdoms, decentralisation and infrastructure rebuilding programmes); 
" Assistance to the national and district electoral process in 2002 and 2004 
(technical and logistic assistance to the National Election Commission); 
Recovery, Reconstruction and Reintegration (f iumanitarian and Development 
Programmes) 
" Humanitarian emergency and rehabilitation assistance (implemented primarily 
by UN agencies, selected large international NGOs and some local NGOs); 
" Community Reintegration Programme (CRP); 
" Civil Society Capacity Building; 
" Rebuilding of the infrastructure; 
Judicial 
" Re-establishment of the judicial system including rebuilding of the basic judicial 
infrastructure; 
" Limited support for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special 
Court's' 
Despite the original determination of this study to clearly differentiate between 
humanitarian emergency assistance and development aid, it proved impossible to do so 
when examining British sponsored aid programmes in Sierra Leone. There were three 
reasons for this - in addition to the a priori difficulty of clearly defining emergency 
assistance. "' : Firstly, a lengthy transition period from humanitarian emergency assistance 
to development led to a blurring of aid interventions. This was exacerbated by most 
donors' aims to quickly move towards establishing a bilateral relationship with the GoSL 
25' Compare to: Toby Porter, The Irteractron Between Political and 11wmanitanan, 70f. 
252 For a discussion of this intricacy of defining emergency assistance meaningfully see: James K. Boyce, 
'Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars', Adelpbi Pier 351 (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002). 
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and from the outset implement developmental relief programmes in order to stabilise and 
speed up the peace process. Secondly, the weakness of national and local governance 
structures necessitated the British Government and implementing humanitarian agents to 
keep control over social service programmes or to establish parallel quasi-privatised 
structures. As they were based on emergency aid structures and processes, they lacked 
ownership and sustainability. Thirdly, the breadth and assertiveness of the overall British 
engagement (in particular its military presence and its role as an actor within the recent war) 
had an important impact on aid interventions, either in real or perceived terms. The very 
essence of wider relief was its cooption into British foreign policy; just as much as the 
British intervention in Sierra Leone rested on the British commitment to a broad 
emergency assistance and state building programme. The implementation of humanitarian 
assistance in Sierra Leone, and the perception thereof, was implicated, both positively and 
negatively, by the broader British engagement. For this reason, this chapter focuses on an 
assessment of the British humanitarian emergency assistance policy in Sierra Leone. Yet it 
also introduces other aspects of the British intervention that directly impacted upon or 
grew out of the initial relief intervention. 
2.1 EmergencyAssistance 
Following the coup against President Kabbah, in June 1997DFID suspended direct 
funding of all British NGO-supplied humanitarian emergency assistance to Sierra Leone 
(but not its contribution to ECHO, which continued working inside Sierra Leone). The 
resumption of British emergency assistance was made dependent upon the restoration of 
the elected government. 25' Initially, DFID cited the insecurity of aid workers as its primary 
reason for suspending emergency assistance. Subsequently, `DIED claimed that the 
provision of relief and negotiations for humanitarian access would legitimise the illegal 
regime, i. e. send the "wrong' (political) signals. Later on DFID claimed that 'NGOs were 
unable to prevent the diversion and looting of humanitarian supplies . 25' Later that 
summer, DFID played down agency warnings of an impending crisis, blaming aid agencies 
for abusing the situation in order to maximise organisational gain. In contradiction to this 
253 In a confidential interview DFID personnel confirmed that Mukesh Kapila had publicly agreed that 
humanitarian emergency assistance was suspended for a brief period in 1997 as it undermined broader 
British political objectives. Yet he also stressed that Mukesh Kapila's comment had been misinterpreted 
as there existed very practical reasons for such a suspension. Confidential interview with DFID 
personnel 2003. 
ý* Alexandra Galperin, 'Discourses of Disasters', 22. 
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assertion, David Keen, for example, has argued that Sierra Leone experienced serious 
shortfalls in emergency assistance throughout the 1990s. Consecutive governments in 
Sierra Leone as well as donors had colluded in tolerating the misappropriation of relief 
supplies and the failure to sufficiently assess humanitarian need was never challenged. 255 
`During the period of May 1997 to March 1998, the volume of funding available for 
humanitarian activities fell sharply'. ' The UK Parliamentary Select Committee for 
International Development subsequently discussed this suspension and the allegation that 
DFID withheld humanitarian emergency assistance from Sierra Leone in order to pressure 
the rebels to reinstate the ousted Sierra Leonean Government. Although the case was 
subsequently dropped and no further action was taken on the matter of the suspension of 
relief and apparent application of humanitarian political conditionality, the Select 
Committee publicly criticised the UK Government for its humanitarian emergency 
assistance policy in 1997/1998. nß Despite continued widespread insecurity, the UK 
resumed and increased its humanitarian programme in March 1998 following President 
Kabbah's return to power. In doing so it acted against its own previous line of reasoning 
that no effective humanitarian emergency assistance was deliverable admits violence and 
instability. 
January 1999 saw the consequences of the politicisation of humanitarian 
action that had been encouraged and indeed driven by senior figures in 
the Government of Sierra Leone, donors and the UN figures in Conakry. 
After the RUF had entered Freetown in January 1999, several NGO and 
ICRC staff were verbally and physically abused by ECOMOG soldiers, 
and accused of helping the rebels to enter the capital The Government 
of Sierra Leone publicly repeated this allegation. 2' 
Prior to the signing of the 2001 peace agreement and the elections in 2002, few. new 
humanitarian aid agencies had entered Sierra Leone (several had suspended their operations 
during the war). Many NGOs had to re-orientate their existing programmes according to 
the level of security and donor interest. This led to a concentration of aid agencies in the 
south and west of Sierra Leone. `Access was the major constraint on humanitarian 
See: David Keen, The Bert of Enemies, 160ff. 
256 ECIIO's budget, though, fell to 3.7 million Ecus for 1997, and 6.5 million in 1998, representing the two 
smallest ECHO budgets of the period 1993 -2002. Toby Porter, The Interua ox Betnrex Political and Humanitarian, 19-20. 
11 International Development Committee, FUIh Repot, Departmental Report 20 July 1999, House of 
Commons, Session 1998-99 (London: DFID, 1999); International Development Committee, Fý Special 
ReDon; International Development Committee, Sixth Repent. 
258 Toby Porter, The Interaction Between Political and Humanitaian Action, 28. 
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assistance, due to insecurity. The situation throughout the country was made more 
complicated by poor discipline in army ranks. There were regular reports of the diversion 
of aid supplies in rebel-held areas. ' Prior to the 2002 election and the deployment of 
UNAMSIL troops throughout the country, most humanitarian NGOs followed the 
movements of UNAMSIL as it entered rebel-controlled areas. 
Apart from the military intervention, most British engagement throughout these years 
and in the immediate post-conflict phase (up to 2003) was administered via humanitarian 
emergency assistance personnel and budget lines. The following case study analysis shows 
that humanitarian emergency assistance bureaucratic structures and processes provided a 
greater degree of flexibility and donor independence from bilateral commitment than more 
developmental structures would have done. Humanitarian funds were more flexible and 
could be dispersed comparatively rapidly and with minimal bureaucratic oversight. Also, 
they could be reallocated more easily from one project line to the next. Conversely, they 
lacked coherence. In 2002/3, despite a strengthening of local governance structures and 
greater overall security, DFID and its humanitarian implementing partners continued to 
aspire to control the contents and implementation of aid programmes and projects. The 
objective was to guarantee a maximum of flexibility and independence. This was evident in 
the continued choice of emergency budget lines and procedures for project implementation 
despite a rhetorical call for a transition to development. Furthermore, many agencies were 
reluctant to work in close co-operation with the Sierra Leone Government. The lack of 
GoSL authority over the countryside and a high degree of insecurity severely challenged aid 
delivery. It also inhibited GoSL agenda setting and undermined developmental relief 
approaches. 
Following the cessation of violence and the 2002 elections, both the GoSL and the 
donor community were eager to strengthen the fragile peace by ensuring immediate 
improvement in terms of security and provision of social services. They were also eager to 
minimise financial responsibility for humanitarian programmes, broaden the donor base 
and available funding mechanisms, and hold the GoSL more accountable to prior 
agreements and good governance. This was despite the perception that Sierra Leone 
continued to require substantial levels of primary assistance given the extensive destruction 
of basic infrastructure. It was also despite a continued lack of absorptive capacity, an 
219 Ibid., 12. 
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extensive brain drain throughout the country and an inability of the GoSL to successfully 
execute public policy. Since the Autumn of 2003 and following the government's 
publication of the 2002/3 National Recovery Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP), implementing agents have been held responsible for meeting the 
government's recovery benchmarks. ' Already in mid-2003, there was a shortage of 
emergency funding and development aid allocations were slow to materialise. While more 
international NGOs than ever were present in Sierra Leone, overall there existed 
considerably less funding, with the exception of funding for specialized niche projects. 
In February 2003, the United Kingdom and the GoSL committed themselves to a 10- 
year partnership development programme. Between 2003-2005, the agreement commits 
the UK to maintaining its extraordinary support for the stability and rebuilding of Sierra 
Leone. Until 2005, the UK is obliged to provide at least , 0120 million 
in development 
assistance, X40 million of which fall into the area of humanitarian assistance and civil 
society development programmes. " In return, the GoSL must display real progress in 
terms of governance and regional development, progress that fulfils a wide range of 
mutually agreed upon benchmarks that are to be evaluated annually. The two countries' 
close bilateral relationship and the assertiveness of the British engagement have, on one 
hand, granted the UK Government a considerably greater degree of political and 
programmatic freedom. Conversely, it has multiplied its unilateral financial and political 
burden. Given the extensive British engagement, other international donors evaded 
supporting the GoSL comparatively significantly. By 2004, the UK Government depended 
politically on progress in Sierra Leone and the continuation and strengthening of the peace 
process. This reality and the perception thereof have contributed to the UK's loss of 
leverage over the Sierra Leonean Government's progress in constituting significant 
reforms. The United Kingdom had committed itself to the rebuilding of country and the 
government of President Kabbah. As such, politically and rhetorically it had accepted (and 
promoted) Kabbah's legitimacy and sovereignty. Ian Stuart, the first secretary of DFID in 
Sierra Leone, suggested that it was hoped the Memorandum of Understanding would 
increase the UK's ability to hold the GoSL accountable. Yet he also suggested that it 
260 The PRSPwwas developed in close consultation with both EJNAMSIL and DFID. It w"as a condition for 
future World Bank and International Monitoring Fund (IMF) funding and debt relief. 
211 Department for International Development (DFID) and the Government of Sierra Leone, Siemr Leone: 
A Long-Tenn Partneaho for Detelopment (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, February 2003), 3. 
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would be difficult if not impossible for the UK to withdraw in case of non-compliance. " 
The former British High Commissioner Alan Jones, furthermore, argued that a British 
withdrawal, or the threat thereof, would have a serious impact on the wider donor 
community and operations in Sierra Leone in general, leading to a mass withdrawal. This 
could well lead to a resurgence of violence. 
Throughout the war and in the immediate post-war phase, DFID's humanitarian 
priorities lay in basic service provision (in particular primary health services and shelter) 
and protection (security and human rights). Subsequently, DFID encouraged humanitarian 
agencies to integrate rights and rural empowerment strategies within their humanitarian aid 
programmes, such as CARE's rights based approach and the 2003 rural capacity building 
programme developed in co-operation with Action Aid. Yet, despite the UK's principles 
of a New Humanitarianism's rights based language, in Sierra Leone DFID merely latched 
on to rights and capacity building based programmes, rather than driving such a 
programmatic process forward. 
In a confidential interview a senior British Government official stated that, in principle, 
humanitarian emergency assistance in Sierra Leone was not burdened with political 
conditions as long as it did not jeopardize other wider peacebuilding and recovery 
objectives. ''0 Since the 2002 elections, however, DFID expected humanitarian aid to 
contribute to development and to complement other foreign policy objectives. Yet, the 
integration of humanitarian emergency assistance into wider political objectives was 
hampered by the UK Government's decision not to publicize a clear and transparent policy 
on Sierra Leone. Up to early 2004, DFID has not published a humanitarian strategy paper 
on Sierra Leone. DFID generally does not produce strategy papers for countries that are 
primarily recipients of humanitarian assistance, thus there is no single comprehensive 
document articulating DFID's aims, objectives and strategy in this field'. 
" 
As already discussed in chapter three of this study, British New Humanitarianism, in 
particular its ten principles and the integration of humanitarian emergency assistance into 
wider peacebuilding objectives, were developed as the crisis in Sierra Leone was unfolding. 
The British response must be seen as test case for future policy development. The 
262 Interview with Ian Stuart, 29 May 200; and interview with Alan Jones, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, British High Commissioner, Freetown, 15 May 2003. 
263 Confidential interview with DFID personnel 2003. 
'Adele Harmer, 'The Road to Good Donorship', 35. 
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"vagueness of the UK policy response [both with regard to the principles of a New 
Humanitarianism and the enfolding policy in Sierra Leone] `... must be understood in the 
shifting context and lessons of Sierra Leone: 's °I'he. policy experiment in Sierra Leone 
illustrates that human rights concerns may override `purely" humanitarian concerns and 
lead to a situation where the provision of relief becomes conditional upon "good 
government" (previously reserved to development aid) . however, this test case also 
showed that as of 2004, the UK Government lacks the appropriate mechanisms to 
effectively integrate humanitarian emergency assistance into wider political strategies and to 
implement and uphold conditionality. In the case of British humanitarian emergency 
assistance to Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2003, the UK Government has deployed both 
humanitarian conditionality and humanitarian political conditionality as defined in chapter 
one, albeit inconsistently and arguably reluctantly. 
New Humanitarianism and the mechanism of humanitarian conditionality were meant 
to contribute towards improving the livelihood of a population by not only addressing 
emergency need, but also a medium to longer-term structural need for change. In 
particular UK supported relief programmes in the latter years (2001-2003) were encouraged 
to include peacebuilding and governance strategies. The prior suspension of humanitarian 
assistance points must be interpreted as an effort to implement humanitarian political 
conditionality: democratic reform was set as a condition for the restoration of 
humanitarian emergency assistance. It was relatively quickly withdrawn. Instead, the 
British Government has selectively chosen relief programmes that fit within its overall 
foreign policy programme. It has outsourced developmental relief projects to a tightly 
controlled private service contractor (as is discussed in the following section). 
In summary, the British humanitarian emergency programme represented only a 
fraction of its overall engagement. From the very beginning, it was integrated within wider 
political objectives and implementing partners were encouraged to integrate rights and 
governance features within their humanitarian strategy. Most importantly, British 
sponsored humanitarian assistance policy in Sierra Leone remained vague and reactive. It 
is to be assumed that this had direct consequences for co-ordination, coherence and 
265 Mark Hoffman, DFTD Polity on Humanitarian Assistance, 5. 
266 Alexandra Galperin, `Discourses of Disasters', 29. 
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control. It is also to be assumed that it suffered from intransparent lines of 
communication. 
2.2 Reintegration, Reconciliation and Reconstruction 
The UK has supported two large-scale reconciliation and reconstruction programmes: 
the British Community Reintegration Project (CRP) outsourced to a private service 
provider, Agrisystems., and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) ReACT programme. `Both of these provide community reintegration activities in 
the form of job opportunities and short term skill training and education, with ex- 
combatants working alongside other war-affected people'. " Both were essential 
components of an immediate peace dividend; they were meant to persuade combatants to 
give up their weapons and reintegrate into society, and for society to welcome them. Upon 
widespread criticism regarding the UK's single-minded concentration on security sector 
reform and the limits of CRP, in 2003 DFID commissioned research on the need for 
future civil society and community governance programmes in Sierra Leone. This followed 
two primary approaches to local capacity building and rights issues. One favoured 
prioritising the reform of national governance structures. The other, strengthening civil 
society at the local level and enabling communities to hold national political structures 
accountable. Until 2004, DFID was not prepared to get engaged on the micro level and 
address political accountability issues. Instead, it addressed macro issues (such as setting up 
of court structures, building court houses, etc. ). "a The British approach might change in 
the near future as DFID becomes more involved in community based social programmes 
and, as -additional finds become available following- the 2003 ratification of the UK/Sierra 
Leone Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). According to a senior DFID London 
based official and the DFID first secretary in Sierra Leone, Ian Stuart, the recently signed 
MoU between the GoSL and the UK provides new and greater opportunities for recovery 
and civil society programmes administered by local and international NGOs' 
In order to maximise output with minimal organisational spending and long-term 
commitment, CRP focused on initiating projects rather than ensuring their positive, 
accountable and sustainable impact. Many of the projects undertaken have since been 
267 Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Department for International Assistance (DFID), , Wca Conflid 
Pr t ntion Poo4 7. 
218 Interview with Karen Moore, Care, Country Director, Freetown, 8 May 2003. 
219 Confidential interviews with senior London based Department for International Development (DFID) 
official, 24 April 2003; interview with Ian Stuart. 
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terminated, indicating a lack of local ownership and sustainability. According to other 
international humanitarian/development organisations, CRP also proved highly inflexible 
. 
beyond its own narrow project lines:. it did not co-operate with other humanitarian and 
development organisations or take on longer-term participatory approaches. Nor did it 
address any gender, rights or capacity building issues in a meaningful way. ' Under a 
strong need to spend (to justify continued financial appropriation and to fulfil output 
conditions) and -removed from policy -making- authorities (despite strict DFID reporting, 
requirements), CRP was tempted to set strategic objectives and develop and mend policy as 
it went along, rather than acting according to a clear and medium-term strategic concept. 27' 
The donor-imposed restructuring processes in Sierra Leone had encouraged the creation or 
extension of private monopolies. Given the limited local capacity to execute and 
administer projects and in order to speed up project implementation, CRP was resigned to 
repeatedly financing identical local and international private companies. Many of these 
were administered in Freetown or abroad, with little community participation. 72 
Because of its co-operation with traditional local authorities and local strongmen, CRP 
was criticised for sustaining local patronage networks and for reinforcing such private 
monopolies. Consequently, CRP was censured for promoting local competition and thus 
conflict by injecting resources into a resource starved environment with few accountability 
checks and balances. Despite the approach's obvious shortcomings and the continued lack 
of governmental capacity to administer programmes on the district or community level, the 
World Bank and multilateral -donors continue with a comparable approach to community 
development 
In contents and approach developmental humanitarian emergency assistance and 
community development projects as implemented by CRP in Sierra Leone were relatively 
similar. Both were primary aspects of the British wider relief policy. 
no This was supported by senior DFID personnel in Sierra Leone. Confidential interview with DFID 
personnel in Sierra Leone, 2003. 
271 Confidential interview with CRP field personnel in Sierra Leone, June 2003. In another confidential 
interview with DFID personnel in London, it was argued that within the next policy appraisal planning 
and assessment will be taken much more seriously and expectations are likely to be much greater. 
Possibly, this implies a much stricter future relationship between the UK and the GoSL Confidential 
interview with DI II) personnel, London, 2003. 
12 Confidential interview, Freetown, 14 May 2003. 
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2.3 Security and Security Sector Reform 
Ever since the 1996 elections and in particular the signing of the Lome Agreement in 
1999, the UK has been incrementally and extensively involved in restructuring the security 
sector in Sierra Leone. Ever since independence but in particular throughout the recent 
decade of war, the Sierra Leonean army and civil militias have been at the core of the 
political and military conflict. The Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Pmgramme (SILS'EP) is 
one of the most comprehensive donor-driven security sector restructuring efforts. The 
programme assists the GoSL in improving the governance of the military and intelligence 
services, strengthening civilian oversight and control and improving the armed forces' 
effectiveness. The security sector reform programme's objectives in Sierra Leone are to: 
1. Strengthen the supremacy of civilian control over the armed forces. Doing so 
involves instituting changes within the law and a restructuring of the civil and 
defence administrations; 
2. Transform the Sierra Leonean military into a reliable and efficient army that 
effectively upholds security and does not constitute a threat to the civilian 
government. Doing- so involves both facilitating change within the army as an 
institution as well as in terms of individual personnel's approach to and perception 
of their duties and rights; 
3. Support the integration of the various military and militia groups and previous 
recruitment clusters into one unified and equally well trained effective Sierra 
Leonean army; 2" 
4. Reduce the overall size and structure of the armed forces; 
5. Increase standards and remove unqualified soldiers or potentially troublesome 
personnel; 
6. Increase accountability to civilian authorities and transparency with regard to 
human resources (including promotions), planning, management and budgeting. 
Through the InternationalMilitaryAdvisoy Training Team (IAIITT), the Sierra Leone Army 
(SLA) has undergone a retraining and restructuring programme. The overall programme 
273 The inclusion of Civil Defence Force (CDF) Lighlers, largely civilians, into the DDR programme had 
caused unrest and competition between the various elements of the security forces and had severely 
disrupted the DDR process. 
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was an example of a joined-up effort by DFID (with its primary role being the support and 
restructuring of the Sierra Leonean armed forces and the police), MoD (advising on 
defence management and responsible. for training and equipment) and the FCO. 274 DFID 
has also provided support for a three-year Commonwealth Community Safety and Secutil, y Pi jest 
which focuses on community policing as an essential aspect of security sector reform (and 
in parallel to ongoing UNAMSIL-led efforts to support the police services). The British- 
led effort follows the 1998-initiated GoSL/UN-led Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme (DDR). The UK had first supported the DDR process by 
investing in the Multi Donor Trust rund, but later pulled out and started its own security 
sector reform and reintegration programmes Z'S 
The British security sector reform programme was deeply embedded within the wider 
British engagement in and approach to Sierra Leone: the conduct and progress of each 
programme (including security sector reform, community reintegration and development, 
humanitarian emergency assistance and governance) directly affected the others. The 
recent publication on security sector reform reads like a blueprint for future so-called post- 
conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention strategies. The British Government 
assumes that inefficient, repressive or corrupt security structures threaten the stability and 
independence of governments and undermine peace processes. The assumption is that 
security and stability are `an essential condition for sustainable development" and an 
important area of interest and engagement for DFID. "' In following these assumptions, 
the UK Government is not alone: Throughout the late 1990s, security sector reform has 
274 The former Secretary of State Clare Short argued that `the example of Sierra Leone illustrates the costs of 
not engaging... with this issue <security sector reform>'. Clare Short, Secretary of State for International 
Development, 'Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty', Centre for Defence Studies 
King's College London (9 March 1999), 
http: //62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/News/Speeches/files/sp9march99. html, 17 March 2003,3. 
275 The UK's decision to pull out of the trust fund further depleted the cash strapped organisation. Several 
interviewees expressed their lack of comprehension and frustration as to the British decision to act 
unilaterally rather than support existing international mechanisms. 
276 Department for International Development (DFID), Underrtandiag and Supporting Secwrily Sector Befonw 
(London: Department for International Development, 2002). Also see: Department for International 
Development (DFID)/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)/Ministry of Defence (MoD), Secwity 
Sector Reform, 3. 
2" Clare Short, -Secretuy of State for International Development, `Security Sector Reform and the 
Elimination of Poverty', 1. Also see: International Peace Academy, `Security and Development in Sierra 
Leone', IPA Workshop June 10-11,2002 (New York: International Peace Academy, 2002), 1. 
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become an important element of Northern peacebuilding, development aid and good 
governance policies 278 
By 2004, improvement in the effectiveness and behaviour of the armed forces is 
perceptible. The Sierra Leonean army has never been better trained and equipped than it is 
today. Assuming that the restructuring continues to plan, it has never been more 
effectively structured. A bloodletting of the armed forces upon reinstitution of the elected 
government comparable to previous events was, up to January 2004, prevented. Yet only 
following the withdrawal of UNANISIL and the UK-led IMATT will it be possible to judge 
the success or failure of the security sector restructuring process. If the definition of 
success in this case is nothing but the absence of failure, then early indications of progress 
achieved are nevertheless problematic. What remains uncertain is whether the 
restructuring and retraining has merely been cosmetic (which implies that the UK could 
have been training a future generation of coupists) or whether lasting change has been 
achieved. There are many reasons to suggest that recent changes might be severely 
challenged, if not reversed, upon withdrawal of the foreign troops and without a substantial 
improvement of the economy and strengthening of the civilian administration. 
From the very beginning, the programme has been plagued by problems and 
inconsistencies. The SILSEP leadership was obliged to compromise with the former 
military leadership in, order to secure the continued support of the government and the 
army. As a consequence, the army has been only partially reformed and resources have 
been wasted. Effective civilian authority over the security forces remains weak. There 
continues to be a high level of mutual distrust. Many of the former soldiers who revolted 
against civilian rule or who were included in the army for political reasons still remain 
within its ranks. Many continue to believe in entitlement and superiority. They are deeply 
suspicious of the present government and the reform process. Others continue to feel 
bitter about civilians' distrust of the armed forces. Not all accept at least partial 
responsibility for war crimes committed during the war. "' Many arc too established to take 
on present changes in terms of behaviour, perception, training and strategy. Young 
218 Refer to: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 'Security Issues and Development Co- 
Operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence', The DACJournal2,3 (2001), 33- 
68; N. Ball, Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches', Journal of CoflAa, 
Secanity and Development 1,1 (2001), 45-66. 
219 Some believe that stories of soldiers cooperating with the rebels and profiting from the war have been 
intentionally spread to discredit and weaken the army. Confidential interview with IMLATT officer, 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2003. 
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recruits, who often have considerable more fighting experience than their seniors, had to 
undergo a much more rigorous and competitive recruitment process. The inconsistent 
levels of training and perceptions of the armed forces' role and responsibility will continue 
to disrupt the army's conduct and might well lead to conflict both within its ranks and with 
the government. It might also eventually overturn early training successes once the 
international framework is withdrawn. What is yet to be seen is how the army manages the 
intended downsizing in 2004/5 and the continued reform process, in particular once the 
British led IMATT decreases further and eventually withdraws altogether. The winter 
2003/spring 2004 retirement of problematic senior personnel has begun without any 
immediate negative effect or unrest. 
The comparatively large amount of financial allocations to the reform of the security 
forces were met with considerable distrust, antagonism and competition from other 
administrations within the Sierra Leonean Government, society at large and the 
international aid community. With a high degree of unemployment, lack of employment 
opportunities (other than within the military) and lack of overall administrative capacity, 
large external appropriations towards the armed forces - which were seen as a primary 
cause of the instability and fighting - were met with envy and dismay. The programmes 
were accused by some civilians and aid workers of training and providing a welfare system 
for past and future killers . 
280 Effectively, the system set up a two-class society: those who 
are part of the armed forces and the restructuring programmes (and therefore had a chance 
to access money, jobs and training) and those who are not. Neither the DDR process nor 
the British security sector reform programme have sufficiently addressed the problems of 
those former soldiers who were not integrated into the new armed forces and the large 
group of people depending on or having been affected by the army (such as child soldiers, 
families and women and boys pressed into marriage or prostitution). 211 Up to today, many 
discharged soldiers remain trapped in Freetown. They are unable to return home to their 
original communities due to their destruction, the inability to find (or take on) local 
280 Interview with Charles Achodo, NCDDR (formerly GTZ), Reintegration Advisor, 23 May 2003 and 27 
May 2003. 
211 Not unlike CRP, the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reintegration 
(NCRRR) was meant to focus on civilians, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) and 
reintegration and community restructuring. It was meant to be demand driven and suffered a similar fate 
as other programmes. Many communities were to vulnerable to propose and administer programmes. 
Given the complete breakdown of structures, only a few communities and elites were capable of 
benefiting from these programmes. 
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alternative employment or for fear of retribution for atrocities committed during the war. 
Local alternatives in increasing security, such as community based policing or traditional 
defence mechanisms, have almost entirely been excluded from the present restructuring 
process. 
The British... took on the task of creating a new model army, properly 
trained, equipped and motivated, and also properly paid. But whether the 
country will be able to afford such an army after the British have left and 
aid support declines is an open question. It seems almost inevitable that 
the forces of law and order, commanding cheap modem firepower in an 
impoverished country rich in readily exploitable mineral resources, will be 
tempted once again to `live off the land', if and when government 
funding becomes tight. "' 
The Security sector reform -programme is not directly an aspect of a wider British 
approach to humanitarian emergency assistance and peacebuilding. It has, however, had an 
important impact, both negative and positive, on the local perception of the overall British 
engagement and aid operations in general. The British military presence and its work with 
the Sierra Leonean armed forces was crucial to establishing security and a sense of stability 
throughout the country. As such, it facilitated access to vulnerable communities and 
enabled humanitarian emergency assistance. Indirectly, it might have increased aid 
agencies' political strength vis-a-vis the GoSL. Conversely, in particular during the early 
post-war phase, aid agencies suffered from being implicated by and confused with the 
military 'forces. Co-operation with the military and possibly even with the British 
Government or its field presence (both being parties to the war) may have put aid agencies 
at risk as they were perceived as non-neutral and impartial. Most importantly, in financial 
and political terms the British support for the restructuring of the security sector was 
disproportionately more substantial than any other aspect of its engagement. The overall 
British intervention would have benefited from a more even approach and a greater focus 
on community capacity building and local ownership. 
2.4 Governance 
The reform of the security sector is only a primary clement of a governance reform 
programme. DFID assists the GoSL in strengthening line ministries and consolidating 
democratic authority through: 
Paul Richards, The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone', WonEh Per 21 
(Clingendael: Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, August 2003), 32. 
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" Sponsoring salaries in key social and security services, providing additional security 
expenditure and logistics, and assisting the GoSL to bridge delays in donor funding 
disbursement; 
" Seconding several consultants as advisers to line ministries and NACSA; 
" Assisting the restoration and strengthening of the legal institutional framework, in 
particular the update of the legal code in Sierra Leone, training of staff and the 
rebuilding of the legal infrastructure; 
" Supporting the creation and management of an Anti-Corruption Commission and 
secondment of a British Deputy Commissioner and a small tcam of Consultants; 
" Supporting media capacity building and providing a limited amount of equipment 
for efficient reporting 
" Furthering the reestablishment of local authorities by creating a mechanism and 
support package to enable Paramount Chiefs to retum to theirr, communities 
(Paramount Chief Project) and assisting decentralization. 
Despite large-scale donor support there has been very limited progress in terms of 
fostering good governance. Increasingly, this has led to donor fatigue. Publicly, fear has 
taken hold that things have returned to business as usual: unaccountable, corrupt and 
undemocratic public offices and an apathetic donor community that is more interested in 
containment than real change. According to the International Crisis Group there has been 
no significant progress on governance reforms since the elections in May 2002. ' There is 
no systematic plan for decentralisation and the DFID-supported Paramount Chief 
Programme has been fraught with inconsistencies and miscalculations. Elections for 
Paramount Chiefs and local by-elections have taken place in 2003/4, yet the system 
remains tainted by its origin in the colonial politics of `rule and divide' and the fact that 
most Paramount Chiefs are government appointees. Areas outside the capital, Freetown, 
remain essentially isolated: rarely do government ministers venture out into the countryside 
(partially inhibited by logistics) and local residents have few options for holding their 
representatives accountable. 
283 International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance'. 
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The British engagement on behalf of good governance was important for a wider 
approach to humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, as an aspect of policy coherence 
and, most importantly, political leverage over the GOSL. Aid organisations drew on 
British political support when negotiations with the GOSL over access and funding issues 
had broken down. ' 
25 justice 
The GoSL and the international donor community have set up two mechanisms to 
'further reconciliation and to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes. The UK 
Government has supported both, but has not taken on a comparatively energetic 
leadership position as within other programmes. 28' The Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee (TRC) is meant to foster post-conflict reconciliation through a public display of 
disclosure and admission. It also provides a forum for debating themes (regarding the 
conflict, rights and governance) that citizens deem to be essential for national reconciliation 
and the rebuilding of Sierra Leone. The Special Court `seeks to punish those identified as 
responsible for the brutality of the war-and to buttress national security by removing 
from circulation those who are in a position to destabilise the state . "p` The focus lies on 
those bearing the greatest responsibility. By mid-2003, neither exercise has received 
sustained support within the Sierra Leonean society. This appears to be due primarily to 
public confusion as to the two institutions' distinctive objectives and level of collaboration. 
It might also indicate that both are predominantly regarded as exercises in donor politics; a 
perception that was fostered by intransparent staffing procedures and continued wrangling 
for positions and exchange of personnel. 28' From its inception, funding problems have 
hampered the TRC in particular. Initial indictments of senior government figures such as 
the former minister of internal affairs and former leader of the CDF, Samuel Ilinga 
Norman, have caused a considerable amount of public unrest. It will have to be seen how 
the GoSL fares with the possible prosecution of other senior members closer to the core of 
the SLPP. It will also have to be seen whether the mechanisms will foster reconciliation 
214 Interview with Karen Moore, 8 May 2003. 
285 The UK has so far contributed £6.6 million to the court's total yet under-funded three-year budget of 
$57 million. Apart from somc start-up funding, no furthcr financial support for the TRC is anticipatcd. 
281 Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG), A Regrew of Peace Operation: A Case for Change 
(London: King's College, 2003). 
287 Refer to: International Crisis Group (ICG), `Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A 
Fresh Start? % Africa Briefing (Freetown, Brussels: International Crisis Group, 20 December 2002), 2-5. 
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and reintegration or lead to frustration given perpetrators' of atrocious violence continued 
impunity. 
The previous chapter analysed the protracted and complex nature of the war in Sierra 
Leone. This chapter has so far introduced the principal areas of the British intervention in 
Sierra Leone. The next section discusses the state of governance in Sierra Leone. It 
focuses on the role of aid within local politics and the degree of local ownership of the 
international aid intervention. The following analysis contributes to an overall evaluation 
of New Humanitarianism's effectiveness in "Sierra Leone and its level of coherence and 
stability. 
3. Maintaining the Myth of Progress: Working with the Government of 
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone has undergone not one, but a series of violent conflicts. Each of these has 
had its roots in internal political dynamics, the breakdown of public services, the spreading 
of a regional shadow economy, and regional and international interventions. The 
complexity of the wars both reflected and exacerbated the problem of governance: the 
inability to secure and redistribute the resources required to establish and uphold the state's 
legitimacy and to build and maintain efficient public administration and social service 
provision. The previous section discussed the British intervention in Sierra Leone and 
humanitarian emergency assistance's role therein. Significantly, aid was administered 
outside local government structures. The following section analyses the nature of 
governance in Sierra Leone between 1997 and today in as much as it is relevant to 
humanitarian aid politics. This study assumes that prior to 2004, the GoSL did not have 
sufficient and sufficiently effective means to set policy priorities and to manage external aid 
appropriations. The hypothesis is that this severely inhibited developmental humanitarian 
emergency assistance and undermined the transition to development. It also reduced the 
effectiveness of developmental relief programmes. The inadequacy of governance in Sierra 
Leone had a direct harmful impact on the implementation of New Humanitarianism and 
other forms of external intervention. 
3.1 Governance 
Despite a transition to relative peace and stability cumulating in the 2002 elections, 
Sierra Leone remains a `quasi state', that is a state 'whose capacity to govern its territory is 
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compromised to a greater or lesser extent by a lack of resources and institutional failure'. ' 
While the 2002 elections reconfirmed the formal structures of a democratic system, the 
degree to which democratisation is entrenched and democratic structures are accountable 
to the public and the rule of law remains doubtful. Governance on all levels remains 
bedevilled by corruption and malpractice. Political and administrative power is centralised 
in the capital and, to a large degree and in comparison to other governmental bodies, in the 
hands of a strong presidency. Both the judiciary and legislature remain powerless, crippled 
by endemic corruption. Line ministries, such as the Ministry of Development (MODEP) 
or the Finance Ministry, lack the infrastructure (administrative, financial and logistical) to 
set longer-term policy agendas, extend their control over the countryside and effectively 
execute programmes on the district or community levels. ' 
Although local elections were held in spring 2004, the credibility . and effectiveness of 
local and regional representation is fragile at best. This is no new development and this is 
only partially a result of the war. Indeed, the rural areas have historically regarded the 
central government with a high degree of distrust. Historically, district councils were 
means for the central government to effect control over rural territory. It was the neglect 
of the country-side that led to and facilitated the war. 
In order to boost community rebuilding and capacity building, the GoSL established the 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) in November 2001. It was originally set 
up to administer community reintegration projects in response to the partial conclusion of 
the demobilisation and disarmament processes. It was also meant to complete the 
remaining tasks of the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation' (NCRRR) in the areas of humanitarian co-ordination, reconstruction, 
resettlement and rehabilitation. 290 NACSA, furthermore, is responsible for overseeing 
donor-funded projects and helping to assure a transition from relief to development. The 
idea was to prevent donor funding being `lost' in the gaping national deficit. Working like a 
social fund, NaCSA funds community projects that build physical and social capital. 
NaCSA was originally set up as a temporary body, but given the bureaucracy's continued 
20 Joanna Macrae, Aiding Recoteg?, 4. Compare to: Robert H. Jackson,. Qnajj Slaltr. 
2' Interview with Simon Arthy, National Commission for Social Action (NACSA), Recovery and 
Reintegration Advisor (seconded by DFID) Freetown, 14 May 2003. 
NCRRR was a ministerial-level government commission that co-ordinated post-conflict humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction assistance. See: National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), 
http: //www. nacsa-sl. org/, 2 April 2004. 
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disproportional empowerment one must question the ability of both the government and 
donors to eventually and effectively disband NACSA altogether and return influence to the 
line ministries. 
In some areas of heightened national and international political interest, NACSA set up 
and funded District Recovery Committees to manage community capacity building 
programmes. In comparison to ministerial representation, these District Recovery 
Committees have proven relatively efficient. By working directly with communities in 
remote parts of the country, NaCSA is meant to support the GoSL's decentralisation 
strategy and rebuild local governance structures. In practice, line ministries and NaCSA are 
competing for capacity and responsibility. Information sharing and co-ordination have 
proven fraught with difficulties, due to the lack of infrastructure (e. g. communication 
technology) and training, as well as political and organisational competition. In many cases, 
communities have been overwhelmed by the task of accountably administering resources 
and effectively managing project implementation. This, just as in cases of comparable 
programmes run by DFID such as the Community Reintegration and Development 
Programme (CRP), has led to localised competition and increased corruption. The 
countryside continues to be politically and economically marginalized by the political elite 
centred in the capital. The GoSL is now caught between two seemingly contradicting 
policy agendas: on one hand decentralising and empowering the regions, on the other 
extending its capacity to govern throughout the country and building administrative 
capacity and control. 
At the local and district level in particular, traditional forms of leadership such as chiefs 
and Paramount Chiefs . continue to predominate 
in terms of both local political 
representation and judiciary. " During the last ten years, most Paramount Chiefs had fled 
to and been drawn into the capital and national political networks. During the war, their 
control over and legitimate representation of their districts had been weak. While they 
remain largely controlled by the central government, they are in the process of re- 
establishing themselves regionally. Local militias or defence forces and youth councils that 
291 In Sierra Leone, each province is split into several districts and chiefdoms. Each chiefdom is headed by 
a Paramount 'Chief, who resides over several chiefs, section chiefs and village-headmen. Traditionally, 
the Paramount Chiefs have played an important role as adjudicators and heads of the Chiefdom Courts. 
In 1993-4, the Governance Reform Secretariat of the GoSL has overseen the reform of the system of 
provincial governance. DFID is one of its greatest supporters. Elections for Paramount Chiefs are 
taking place throughout the first half of 2004. 
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were formed during the war and drew on traditional societal groups like hunters continue 
to hold some influence over the countryside. In some areas youth councils, some of which 
had temporarily assumed administrative and/or political responsibility during the war, have 
now been encouraged by chiefs to return into local politics. Their political weight is limited 
for the time being. As agents of the recent war and deeply fragmented, civil militias do not 
at the moment pose a positive alternative to political representation. Another historical 
and continually relevant (though vague) source of local representation and authority have 
been so-called Secret Societies and their belief systems. While donors and emergency aid 
organisations have co-operated with all these authorities in one form or the other, they 
have failed to tap into and work with these traditional forms of local leadership. 
The under performance of governmental institutions in Sierra Leone is not as damaging 
for the long-term as the absence of a. wider culture of democracy. The political culture is 
such that agreements and laws are neither respected nor observed - they are simply a 
temporary relationship to be adhered to while convenient. Personalities and not policies or 
institutions are at the heart of political life. It was charismatic leaders that instigated the 
coups and rallied mass support throughout the '1990s. It is personal relationships and 
patronage networks that control personal behaviour and politics. Just as before the war, 
Sierra Leone displays all the symptoms of a neo-patrimonial state. Tatrimonialism is a 
political system that 
Involves redistributing national resources as marks of personal favour to 
followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the 
institution the leader represents. Relatively few resources arc distributed 
according to principles of bureaucratic rationality or accountability. 292 
Neo-patrimonial states such as Sierra Leone display elements of modem state- and 
administrative structures. State institutions, however, are weak, with limited formalised 
responsibilities and working processes. They also tend to compete with one another over 
scarce resources (including budgetary and logistic allocations and trained personnel) and 
influence. Leaders ensure the loyalty of their subjects through material favouritism, by 
granting access to governmental positions and contracts, licenses, or by tolerating 
corruption and embezzlement. This facade-like official state is buttressed through external 
aid appropriations and revenues from the granting of concessions for primary resource 
extraction. Securing such aid resources was and still is critical to the survival of the Sierra 
212 Paul Richards, Fightingforthe Rain Forest, 34/S. 
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Leonean Government. The country remains heavily dependent on external aid to meet the 
shortfalls in public budgets. In contrast, bureaucracies of the modern Western 
democracies are, generally characterised. by unambiguous hierarchies and individual 
responsibility. Private and professional spheres are separated and the authority of leaders is 
limited through bureaucratic processes and laws. Generally, staff arc hired and promoted 
on the basis of competency and receive a fixed and regular income. 
William Reno and Paul Richards indicate that patrimonial states display elements of 
participation and public legitimacy as they depend upon a reciprocal relationship between 
leader and subject that entails a `duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and 
promote their followers and friends'. ' Indeed, failure to deliver on this protection has led 
to the breakdown of patrimonial structures in Sierra Leone and contributed to triggering 
the recent conflict. It is still undermining the GoSL today. 
Politics and the war have generated pluralistic debate but with the majority of the 
population still grappling with economic hardship and political and economic 
marginalization rather than political change, societies and their political leaders are only 
partially coming to terms with the notion that democracy means participation in decision 
making. Sierra Leoneans are tired of the war. The war has not resulted in substantial 
change or development apart from enriching a small minority. Far from this, it has cost 
the country dearly. Yet, whether civil society would be able to resist political reversal is 
uncertain, and so is whether and at what time the same groups who were instrumental in 
starting the war in the first place and who remain marginalizcd will pick up arms again and 
rally to the call of another charismatic leader. This is especially important given the 
disillusion with Western values in response to frustrations at the depth of socio-economic 
disarray and the flawed nature of regimes that the West has supported repeatedly. 
3.2 ImplementingAid in a Vacuum? 
Development aid and developmental emergency assistance lack the legal, institutional 
and operational tools necessary to engage effectively in such quasi-states, as aid is `premised 
on the assumption that a benign, sovereign government is in place within the recipient 
country that has the legitimacy and the capacity to distribute aid resources' and set political 
-'93 Ibid., 34/5. Also see: Steven Archibald and Paul Richards, 'Converts to Human Rights?, 13-14. 
Compare this definition of neo-patrimonialism with William Reno's definition of the shadow state. See: 
William Reno, ll7arlord Politics and African Stater (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 2. Also see: William 
Reno, C0m tiea and State Politics. 
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agenda" In her book `Aiding Recovery? ' Joanna Macrae demonstrates that the problem of 
feeble legitimacy and administrative weakness in transitional states `confines the forms of 
aid to those. that are least likely to meet developmental goals'. " It also determines `the 
bureaucratic or organisational channels through which it is being disbursed and 
managed'. '9" Humanitarian emergency assistance is by nature short-lived. Short-term relief 
and recovery programmes are designed to provide primary care for people in need. They 
also supply the hardware necessary to guarantee people's immediate survival (like drugs and 
basic shelter) when public service structures are either non-existent or incapable of 
providing adequate protection. Increasingly, developmental humanitarian assistance also 
provides basic training in, for example, food security and job development. Yet without 
the existence of stable political and administrative structures able to formulate medium- to 
long-term policy and guarantee and finance policy implementation, such aid is inherently 
unsustainable. During a complex emergency or in a post war situation there `generally is a 
perceived urgency of response that inhibits planning and long-term vision and 
sustainability'. "" Effective public sector rebuilding and reform requires political priority 
setting and corresponding mechanisms for resource allocation and policy implementation. 
Humanitarian emergency organisations are able to train doctors, but they are not able to 
rebuild the public health system. As all emergency assistance is provided by and 
accountable to external actors, it is inherently unsustainable. It can work in support of 
existing public structures, yet it cannot be easily integrated into long-term development or 
public service programmes and structures. 
Given the weakness of the GoSL, humanitarian emergency assistance distributed in 
Sierra Leone until 2003 was almost entirely independent of governmental control. During 
the emergency phase of the war, the government had just `rubber-stamped' NGO activities. 
In the words of one humanitarian emergency assistance organisation's country manager in 
Sierra Leone: `the GoSL is 100% under-funded and has got no meaningful management 
plan'. "" This increased the political vacuum and policy impasse as international support 
was being provided in a climate of considerable political uncertainty and incapacity to 
manage it efficiently. Until 2004, the country relied on emergency assistance to sustain 
21 Joanna Macrae, Aiding R otvg?, 4. 
21s Ibid., 75. 
296 Ibid., 6. 
217 Ibid., 144. 
'° Interview with Karen Moore. 
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public -services. Inadvertently, in some " sectors humanitarian - emergency projects became 
public policy. 
As a consequence, most humanitarian and development programmes implemented in 
Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2003 were donor driven. The provision of developmental 
emergency assistance allowed external actors to intervene in the affairs of the Sierra 
Leonean state without the consent and control of the domestic government. Whether as a 
result of scepticism regarding the efficiency and accountability of Sierra Leonean decision- 
making bodies or as a deliberate policy designed to control the GoSL and aid programmes, 
bilateral donors frequently bypassed the official channels. In doing so they undermined 
their own efforts to co-ordinate aid programmes and strengthen national authority. 
Between 2000 and 2002, this encouraged the influx of international aid agencies, yet Sierra 
Leone at no point attracted numbers comparable to other complex emergencies such as the 
Balkans. Even beyond Sierra Leone, ever since the late 1980s there has also been a trend 
towards dwindling absolute state sovereignty to the benefit of international intervention; a 
process accentuated in weak states and/or developing countries. In Sierra Leone there 
remains an acute power vacuum no one seems prepared or able to fill. 
Predominantly, the GoSL steps back and lets donors get on. This 
reinforces the lack of a strong political leadership driving the 
development agenda and therefore the lack of an integrated agenda, 
ownership and accountability. It remains unclear who is driving the 
process and it appears essentially unsustainable. This leaves an acute 
power vacuum, which again allows for corruption. ... Right now, things 
function on a false premise of stability and capacity. This is reinforced by 
the donors' drive to push the process forward and show progress 
through symbolic action towards a development aid process. All money 
is cushioned on a false development structure and is inherently 
unsustainable. ' 
Working outside state structures and with minimal involvement from the Government 
of Sierra Leone is a feature of humanitarian aid and, to a great extent, all external 
engagement in Sierra Leone. As was clearly evident throughout both research trips and 
within all interviews undertaken in Sierra Leone (irrespective of the type of international 
organisation being interviewed), the relationship between the international service 
providers and the government has been marred by ignorance, distrust, a lack of 
» Interview with Charles Achodo. 
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transparency, hostility, corruption and competition. "10 Most agencies, donors and the 
United Nations described any co-operation with the government and its bureaucracy as 
`intensely frustrating'? " This is despite the fact that, given the comparatively lean and 
easily accessible governmental bureaucracy, co-operation could theoretically be relatively 
simple. Others mentioned that it `required bulldozing through, otherwise there was no 
accountability and nothing happened'. " Some agencies mentioned that `at times it 
required severe diplomatic pressure from the UK Government to pass things through and 
guarantee progress'. ' Implementing agents were noticeably highly critical of and 
frustrated with the GoSL's capacity for effective management and co-operation. Some 
international humanitarian organisations even regarded it as their `right' to work 
independently of an `inherently corrupt, unaccountable and incapable administrative 
bureaucracy'. 304 As the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance is deemed a moral 
action, anything in its path is deemed immoral. "S Others just dismissed the GoSL 
altogether, both from a planning and management/implementation point of view. " By 
and large, most international NGOs throughout the emergency phase vp to 2003 restricted 
themselves to informing the GoSL of their geographical and contextual area of work, 
rather than asking for its consent or preferences? " Donor preferences, levels of security 
and access, and organisational expertise were more decisive for the choice of projects and 
project areas than government strategy. Co-operation and co-ordination with the GoSL 
remains a contentious issue, something that is destined to worsen the more the current 
transition phase deepens. Throughout the field research process the GoSL was unable (or 
unwilling) to provide an overview of development and humanitarian funds available in 
Sierra Leone. 
S00 While there appeared to be a consensus on the lack of domestic governmental administrative capacity 
and accountability, some aid agencies operating primarily in the health sector have pointed out the 
increasingly productive co-operation with the Ministry of Health on the project level. 
301 Interview with Colonel Mike J. Dent, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Civil Military Co- 
operation/International Military Advisory Team (IMATT), (CBE FIMgt, Commander Joint Support 
Sierra Leone Army and Deputy Commander International Military Assistance and Training Team, 
Freetown, 28 May 2002. 
Interview with Tony Conley,. 
Interview with Patrick Hammer, Community Reintegration Programme (CRP), Programme Manager, 20 
May 2003. 
Confidential interview with NGO country manager in Freetown, May 2003. 
Tony Waters, Bureaucratixiug the Good Samaritan, 67. 
306 Interview with Christophe de Meerschalk, GT2-International Services, Freetown, 30 May 2002. 
Various confidential interviews with NGO personnel in Freetown, May/June 2003. Some agencies 
pointed out their frustration with the `destructive behaviour' of others in sidelining the government and 
therefore inhibiting national capacity building. 
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Characteristic of this fraught and sceptical aid relationship with local administrative 
structures is the habit (and at times donor condition) of administering donor funded 
emergency and development aid projects through. expatriate personnel rather than local 
staff. 308 Another example of donor reluctance to trust and invest in local governmental 
capacity was the creation and maintenance of NACSA itself, heavily supported by donor 
and multilateral funding, which increasingly is in direct competition with Sierra Leonean 
line ministries for funds and influence. NACSA, as an implementing management body, 
has no power to set policy priorities and is being overwhelmed by the sheer number of 
projects it is responsible for. Nevertheless, the majority of ongoing recovery programmes 
are administered through NACSA and international NGOs or other private service 
providers. 309 
Given its lack of capacity and dependency on external aid appropriations, and as 
multilateral development aid flows more slowly than emergency assistance contribution and 
is more subject to guarantee of wider political conditions, the GoSL was initially eager to 
uphold this emergency state. The national and local administration of external aid 
appropriations subtracts vital state capacity in terms of personnel, logistics and even 
funding, infrastructure the GoSL could not spare. Yet, given the relatively high financial 
and policy making influence of humanitarian emergency assistance organisations, the GoSL 
has increasingly attempted to regain control of external development aid since its election 
in 2002. Just as prior to the war, the GoSL requires control over aid contributions in order 
to uphold and control public services, to make up for state public funds shortfalls and to 
service its clientele. Randolph Kent points out that a local perception of abnegation of 
responsibility or failure to deliver can be used to discredit the government at home and 
abroad. " Joanna Macrae argues further that the price of international legitimisation and 
Only one of the UK sponsored emergency and development aid NGOs mentioned that DFID had 
posited such a condition; indeed several UK funded projects and organisations are staffed exclusively by 
local personnel. USAID or US State Department funded organisations on the other hand repeatedly 
mentioned such a donor condition. Confidential interview with World Vision, Freetown, May 2003. 
Distrust of GoSL accountability is certainly not the only factor for the continuously high number of 
expatriate staff in aid organisations: expatriate salaries also represent the majority of costs and therefore 
essential income for aid organisations. According to some aid workers in Sierra Leone, between 30% 
and 90% of all aid expenditure frequently poured back into external GDPs either via domestic 
procurements, future contracts or staff salaries. Confidential interview with (3TZ International Services, 
Freetown, May 2003. 
309 Interview with Simon Arthy. The official objective eventually is to disband NACSA and to pass 
responsibility to line ministries. 
310 Randolph C. Kent, Anatamy of Disaster Reueei, 74-. 
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national governmental control was the resumption of state control over aid allocations. 3" 
Since its election, the GoSL has undertaken several futile attempts to regulate external 
assistance by creating various NGO co-ordination committees in the Ministry of 
Development (MoDEP) and NACSA. 312 The registration and taxation of international 
NGOs and MoDEP's attempts to assign geographical areas of responsibility, for example, 
have been a recurrent cause of conflict and confusion. This was aggravated through inter- 
departmental miscommunication and competition, in particular between the Finance and 
Development Ministries and NACSA. Most personnel interviewed experienced GoSL's 
attempts at greater co-ordination and equitable distribution as amounting to control and 
exploitation: `It appears as if MODEP doesn't want our presence, but wants our money'. 
It was mentioned that GoSL requirements at times contradicted donor procedures and 
conditions, therefore putting continued assistance at risk. A bi-weekly Inter Agency 
Meeting provides a forum to co-ordinate projects and programmes and to attain a common 
position regarding GoSL's attempts to regulate humanitarian assistance. It has allowed 
agencies to uphold a strong lobby against any GoSL attempts for greater control. 
Programmes face a real implementation dilemma. As the West African region continues to 
stabilise but as humanitarian need remains exceptionally high in Liberia, Ivory Coast and, 
increasingly, Guinea, several international humanitarian agencies have withdrawn from 
Sierra Leone altogether or relocated to neighbouring countries. 
Joanna Macrae has analysed the way in which the international policy move towards 
developmental relief and good governance has led to a sudden collapse of basic welfare 
provisions in some states. Donors increasingly blame states for ineffectiveness in 
managing social welfare and aid resources. In response they condition their engagement on 
the fulfilment of good governance benchmarks and decrease their overall spending on 
humanitarian emergency aid provided through NGOs. In doing so they extend additional 
pressure on already weak government and possibly bring about their collapse. "' A 
development towards stricter donor control and conditionality is dearly apparent in Sierra 
Leone in 2004. Randolph Kent has warned against donor criticism of the ineffectiveness 
of local government if not carefully assessed against local conditions. 
s"l Joanna Macrae, Aiding Recotry?, 92. 
312 Two examples of overlapping and unclear -responsibility for NGO co-ordination are the National 
Recovery Commission (NRC) and the newly established Development Assistance Coordination Office 
(DACO). 
313 Joanna Macrae, Aiding Rerncrg?, 103. 
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Outsiders are all too quick to point to what they regard as governmental 
callousness and indifference without attempting to understand the 
complexities and resource constraints that major disasters post for 
developing countries. Officials who are seconded to deal with relief 
operations leave gaps in ministries that at the best of times lack 
"adm. inistrative depth. Road, . rail and port . 
facilities 
. are requisitioned 
in 
activities that do little to ensure the country's economic survivaL.. While 
one may not agree with what governments determine as national 
priorities, one must nevertheless acknowledge the dimensions of 
domestic politics which overseas disasters bring into play. "" 
Just as the development and relief industry has changed into a global network that 
increasingly incorporates (and my even be dominated by) quasi-governmental and 
privatised or militarised actors, local governments emerging out of war might have 
transformed into similar, increasingly privatised networks beyond the realm of the state. " 
Yet international aid continues to expect to work through and depends upon traditional 
inclusive state structures. 
Ever since the presidential elections in 2002 the political situation and aid relationships 
in Sierra Leone have returned to business as umal, while substantial or sustainable change is 
barely forthcoming. The large-scale donor-driven reform and restructuring programme 
and the influx of international development money are premised on the faulty assumption 
of a successful nation building process. Inherent in this is the assumption that 
comparatively little humanitarian emergency aid and development aid contributions have 
the power to rebuild public service administrative structures, change the behaviour of 
public sector personnel and breathe life into. local economies. This has not materialised. It 
is also not likely to do so in the near future. 
Violence, insecurity, an acute lack of access to all those in need of assistance and mutual 
distrust and competition determined the relationship between emergency aid providers, 
respective governments, rebel factions and donors beyond the duration of the war. So did 
the political and administrative weakness and contested legitimacy of the GoSL. It further 
inhibited common agenda setting (or local ownership) and reinforced a culture of secrecy. 
This threatened to defeat donor reform objectives; it also threatened sustainability. As a 
consequence, aid agencies and donors, alike were encouraged and compelled to run aid 
programmes in Sierra Leone independent of local control and on the basis of limited 
s" Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of Disarter Relief, 73 and 79. 
su See: Mark Duffield, Global Gotrrnana, 8. 
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ownership. Furthermore, it led the United Kingdom and the United Nations to support 
the restoration of previous governance structures - structures that had been one of the 
root causes of the war - rather than to invest assertively in a publicly . 
driven process 
towards identifying and building new and publicly legitimate authorities. This is likely to 
threaten the stability and public legitimacy of the present administration and the peace 
process. 
The nature of the war, Britain's historical position towards Sierra Leone and the GoSL's 
limited capacity to govern effectively have all prejudiced international aid programmes and 
their implementation in Sierra Leone. At the national level, public welfare and 
reconciliation are the responsibility of the state, yet many states, in particular quasi states, 
are ill equipped to guarantee public service provision and facilitate conflict constructively. 
For a brief time, international humanitarian emergency assistance can fulfil some of these 
functions and mitigate the worst effects of human need. Nonetheless, without a long term 
political vision that also translates into effective public structures and mechanisms, there 
are no safe-guards against future humanitarian crisis. In that case a wider humanitarian 
policy approach to the benefit of conflict prevention will fail to make a lasting impact. 
In conclusion, this chapter assesses to what degree the British humanitarian engagement 
in Sierra Leone drew on and contributed to the development of British New 
Humanitarianism. It also discusses the significance of humanitarian emergency assistance 
within the overall British intervention. The objective is to evaluate New 
Humanitarianism's level of coherence, both in terms of contents and breadth of 
application. This analysis contributes towards an analysis of its effectiveness. 
4. Conclusions: Towards A Common Understanding of New 
Humanitarianism? 
In mid 2003, as the war in Liberia escalated and - upon the overthrow of President 
Charles Taylor -a solution suddenly seemed palpable, 
British regional objectives began to 
shift. According to the desk officers for Sierra Leone at the FCO (Caron Roehsler) and 
DFID (I'im Shorten), the Mano River Union as a region had now become much more 
important than Sierra Leone itself"' Simultaneously, the UK became militarily engaged in 
Iraq; withdrawing the government's attention from wars in Africa. UNAMSIL has already 
316 Interview with Tim Shorten; interview with Caron Roehsler, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Desk 
Officer for Sierra Leone, Africa Department, London, 24 April 2003. 
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begun to withdraw and by 2004/5 only a rudimentary international presence is to be 
expected. The comprehensive British peacebuilding intervention in Sierra Leone was both 
a product of structural reforms within the British administration and bureaucratic 
processes. It was also a test case of and trigger for policy development. sl' As was 
previously discussed, New Humanitarianism and the British engagement in Sierra Leone 
took flight as DFID asserted itself, both internally and with regard to other government 
departments. It entered its second, post conflict or development phase amidst an extensive 
DFID restructuring and as Britain struggled with redefining its global position in light of 
the in large parts unpopular war in Iraq and growing electoral discontent with the Labour 
Government. The government's efforts in support of public private partnerships for a 
wide range of social services and strengthening public service accountability had come 
under scrutiny. Such powerful political players as the Secretary of State for International 
Development, Clare Short, had resigned. The minister had been a driving figure in 
establishing and maintaining Britain's assertive engagement in Sierra Leone. Within Sierra 
Leone itself, the political and economic situation remained fragile and sustainable change 
did not seem to be forthcoming. 
The guiding principle of a wider humanitarian emergency assistance in Sierra Leone was 
that it was expected to fit into wider British foreign policy objectives. As such, it was to 
support the ongoing. peace and restructuring process and in the long-term contribute to 
overcoming the root causes of the war. Aid was utilized as an incentive for structural and 
democratic change. On the policy making level, the British New Humanitarianism had 
amounted to a vision of a more assertive, morally driven emergency assistance policy, 
despite its lack of clarity and detail. On the operational level, it fell far short of a coherent 
strategy. With the exception of the suspension of humanitarian emergency assistance in 
the Autumn of 1997/1998, British humanitarian policy did not consistently draw on the 
newly developed principles of New Humanitarianism. Neither was New I lumanitarianism 
supported by the British policy implementation bureaucracy in Sierra Leone. As the most 
assertively and extensively engaged Western donor, the UK acted almost with impunity in 
Sierra Leone. It received only hesitant and weak support and political direction from the 
GoSL. Nonetheless, the UK was unable to bring about effective co-ordination of donors 
317 David Scott supported the assumption that the British engagement in Sierra Leone was a test case for a 
possible integrated approach. Interview with David Scott, Department for International Development 
(DFID), Programme Manager for Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, West and North Africa Department 
London, 24 April 2003. 
-157- 
Chaptcr V- Pax Britannia in Sicrra Lconc and the International Aid Nctwork 
or humanitarian organisations. The British engagement in Sierra Leone has to be 
understood as a work in progress - or better a policy process rather than a policy per se. 
According to everyone interviewed in the course . of this study, the British government 
conjured rules and procedures as it went along. It did not deliver coherent and clear 
guidelines, nor did they transparently disseminate British policy objectives or hold 
implementing agents accountable to the principles of New Humanitarianism. As of 2004 
DFID has published no Sierra Leone country strategy paper apart from basic guidelines 
and numerous reports and briefings on aspects of the overall mission. Strategic 
headquarter-driven policy guidance remained weak throughout. 
The involvement of a large number of departments and individuals of several ministries 
in the design and implementation of the British policy in Sierra Leone had important 
consequences for the programme's cohesion and transparency, as well as its application to 
Sierra Leone. As was previously discussed, the British intervention is Sierra Leone had 
been a joined endeavour by several British Ministries, in particular the FCO, DFID and 
MoD. Individual ministries and departments became responsible for implementing aspects 
of the programme. DFID was given the lead in administering the programme. A working 
group at the Cabinet level and regular common meetings were meant to ensure cross- 
departmental co-operation and exchange of information. Yet, this separation of power and 
competing and overlapping responsibilities within the DFID bureaucracy, while allowing 
for a degree of necessary and welcome flexibility, undermined a coherent interpretation of 
and approach to DFID's principles of New Humanitarianism, as well as wider policy 
objectives in Sierra Leone. `Individual bureaucrats interpret differently the humanitarian 
principles laid out by the Secretary of State across the Department, reflecting not so much 
the different contexts, but rather the emphasis placed on the different elements . "A As a 
result, the British policy on Sierra Leone, in particular its humanitarian policy remained 
vague and reactive. The vagueness of the British New I Iumanitarianism and peaccbuilding 
strategy in Sierra Leone and the fragmentation of the bureaucratic implementation 
structure further weakened co-ordination. As a result, humanitarian emergency assistance 
programmes in Sierra Leone were driven by DFID as an administrative umbrella 
organisation, but any strategy was set by implementing agents or in some instances the 
GoSL. As long as it did not contradict British foreign policy objectives, humanitarian 
"'" Overseas Development Institute, The New Iatemationd Deaclopment Aet, 8. 
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-emergency assistance policy 'emerged by 'default 'through the process of programme 
implementation. This might be a necessary aspect of democratic and even locally driven 
policy making. Nonetheless, it puts into question the utility of humanitarian emergency 
assistance as a tool for wider political objectives. 
As previously discussed, the enormous task of providing emergency assistance to a 
distant clientele on behalf of local taxpayers is made possible by outsourcing it to a 
specialised bureaucracy. An ideal bureaucracy has a clearly defined overall goal and is 
structured in specialised departments with clearly defined power and the skills to achieve a 
clearly defined objective. Tony Waters has argued that the bureaucratic administrative and 
political compromises created to deal with short-term emergencies are incapable of 
generating broader and longer-term visions. "' With regard to British emergency assistance 
in Sierra Leone, the fragmentation of the aid bureaucracy undermined policy and 
implementation clarity. Its piece meal outsourcing to specialised departments and 
implementing agents prohibited common agenda setting, policy interpretation and co- 
ordination. This was accentuated by the latent antagonism of some of the actors involved 
and, in particular, the reluctance of humanitarian agents to be employed on behalf of donor 
foreign policy objectives. Its short- to medium-term scope undermined long-term policy 
development. 
Significantly, emergency assistance programmes were delivered outside formal state 
structures, largely through NGOs. Mark. Duffield, and Joanna Macrae have described this 
trend as the `internationalization and privatization of public welfare, whereby responsibility 
for the financing and provision of basic services has shifted from the domain of national 
state structures to that of international NGOs . 321 With regard to British sponsored aid in 
Sierra Leone, this trend has solidified and slightly shifted: public welfare continues to be 
internationalised, but also commercialised and privatised as international donors, such as 
DFID,, outsource development and wider relief policy and programmes to private, profit 
driven, companies such as Agrisystems. More focused on their own organisational 
survival, most aid organisations operating in Sierra Leone appear complacent and little 
interested or able to actively pursue influencing donor policy. As a result, despite its 
3'9 Paraphrased after Tony Waters, Bu auaadi ing the Good Samaritan, 8. 
31 Joanna Macrae, Aiding Bsa t y?, 18; Mark Duffield, The Privatization of Public Welfare, Actual 
Adjustment and the Replacement of the State in Africa', paper presented at the conference on 
'International Privatization: Strategies and Practices', St. Andrews College, 12-14 September 1991. 
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rudimentary political control, British emergency assistance in Sierra Leone at least in theory 
remains donor driven. 
Despite some success and Sierra Leone's comparative small size and total dependence 
on the British Government, by 2003 many of those involved in the British reconstruction 
effort in Sierra Leone interviewed in the course of this study spoke of likely failure. 
Overstretched on several fronts and without a clear vision as to the future of humanitarian 
emergency assistance and peacebuilding, the United Kingdom is unlikely to undertake 
another comparatively comprehensive endeavour in the near or medium-term future - 
despite its 2004 assertive rhetoric commitment to the peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. "' Instead of running its own programmes, it is 
likely to opt for outsourcing policy implementation to an even greater degree than it is 
doing already. "' To some extent this breaks with the UK's previous strategy of either 
running programmes themselves (with the support of contractors) or outsourcing them to 
private service contractors. It also appears to break: with the trend of delegating authority 
to field offices (like the newly empowered field offices in Freetown and Kinshasa). 
Overall, a perception has taken hold that the UN and UK in Sierra Leone have mostly 
engaged in state building and have allowed the resurrection of former governmental and 
social structures. They have addressed the symptoms but not sufficiently the root causes 
of the war. Through the use of short-term palliative mechanisms like humanitarian 
emergency assistance they have kept the peace process afloat. At the same time they have 
also inhibited change. They have been unable to sufficiently involve those who are 
marginalized and to guarantee mechanisms to hold governmental officials accountable. 
Instead, despite its unique vision of ensuring coherence and comprehensiveness the 
international engagement has been a patchwork top-down process. It lacked strategic 
clarity, transparency and overall control. It also lacked the active support of both an 
321 Comments by David Batt, Deputy Director Africa Division, Department of International Development 
(DFID), DFID and FCO Meeting with NGOs to Discuss the Democratic Republic of Congo', 16 June 
2004. 
This was confirmed in various interviews with officials in the British government working on or in Sierra 
Leone. In DFID's Memorandum for the International Development Select Committee on Iraq, DFID 
stated that 'in post-conflict situations, the international humanitarian organizations are usually capable of 
operating in a far more effective and coordinated way than donor countries pursuing their own 
individual programmes. Their independence from national donors also reduces the risk of their activities 
being perceived as being politically motivated'. Department for International Development, Atemomndurx 
for the faternatiand DetwGpmest Select Cammittec Iraq from Uumaeitwax Re &f Tonrrdt ReýnarhxctioR (20 June 
2003), 5. http: //62.189.43.51/DFIDstage/News/News/files/idc_comni_tnemo. htm, 3 January 2004. 
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effective policy implementation bureaucracy and implementing agents. DFID, like other 
donors, got lost in a `provision culture'. Now it is reaping the negative effects with the 
result of continued failure (or insufficient progress) and fragility. Interviews showed that 
the UK Government and its personnel in Sierra Leone were deeply conscious of this. They 
were nonetheless helpless to instigate change. In the absence of identifiable alternatives, 
the UN and UK have stormed ahead, resurrecting faulty structures and imposing their own 
version of statehood. In 2004, the entire country is getting back to business as usual. 
Despite the present absence of physical violence, the state of war and peace in Sierra Leone 
are worryingly similar: Both display a prevalence of `high unemployment or 
underemployment, debureaucratised and fragmented systems of public administration, high 
degrees of autonomy among political actors, dependency on an extensive transborder 
shadow trade and non-territorial networking' and similar levels of structural violence. 123 
Although even such a negative peace has provided a bit of breathing space and therefore 
created some new political realities by default, it is likely that at some stage in the medium- 
term future some people will attempt to change something once again, or at least to 
increase their personal opportunities. A resumption of hostilities and continued unrest 
seems likely. 
In April 2002, Garth Glentworth argued that DFID had drawn two interesting 
conclusions from its involvement in Sierra Leone: 1. ) that it was not yet capable of putting 
together a sufficiently extensive and well co-ordinated pattern of assistance, and 2. ) that 
conventional legal and operational limits of donor involvement in assistance had to be 
reconfigured `if there is not to be cherry picking by aid agencies of what is possible rather 
than what is needed'. " Two years down the road and with the UK embroiled in a messy 
and intractable war in the Middle East, the situation has not changed. On the contrary, 
today it is less likely that the UK will once again get involved comparably comprehensively 
in another foreign adventure such as Sierra Leone. 
This chapter discussed the contents of British relief policy in Sierra Leone. It also 
explored the role of aid within Sierra Leonean politics and the level of local ownership 
guiding external aid programmes. Following this chapter's analysis of the content of the 
an Mark Dufficld, Global Governance, 88- 
324 Garth Glentworth, Port-Conflict Reconstn, ction: Key Issues (London: Department for International 
Development (DFID), April 2002), 72. Quoted after Toby Porter, The lateractron Betiren PoGdaa, and 
humanitarian Action. 
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application of New Humanitarianism to Sierra Leone, the subsequent chapter six assesses 
the effectiveness of its implementation. The following chapter presents a detailed analysis 
of the administrative process of implementing New Humanitarianism. It does so 
according to previously defined criteria of successful policy implementation. The 
objective of both chapters five and six is to evaluate New Humanitarianism's effectiveness 
and level of coherence. The objective of independently analysing the contents and the 
implementation process of New Humanitarianism is to learn whether it was the weakness 
of the policy implementation process rather than a lack of policy clarity that undermined 
New I Iumanitarianism, or a combination of both. 
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VI. Implementing New Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone 
1. Introduction 
The previous three chapters analysed the policy contents of the British New 
Humanitarianism and its application in Sierra Leone. Th5following rue study analyses the 
implementation process of British-funded humanitarian emergency assistance programmes 
and the wider British policy engagement in Sierra Leone between 1997 and today. It does 
so by evaluating selected aspects of the complete project cycle of UK sponsored wider 
emergency assistance projects in Sierra Leone. These might enable or inhibit successful 
implementation of donor-led policy (according to the indicators of successful policy 
implementation developed in chapter two of this study). The key objective of this chapter 
is to assess the effectiveness of the policy implementation process of British emergency 
policy. The aim is to determine, whether the administrative process of implementing relief 
aid undermined the policy in terms of coherent interpretation and execution. This is 
irrespective of the policy's overall clarity and appropriateness. A secondary objective is to 
contribute towards an appraisal of implementing a wider and or conditional approach to 
humanitarian emergency assistance in a post war environment. This study, therefore, does 
not only analyse the contents and level of success of specific emergency assistance 
interventions. Rather, it concentrates on the process of policy implementation in order to 
identify why the UK emergency assistance policy and the policy output at the field level in 
Sierra Leone diverged. This study anticipates that the fragmentation of the implementation 
coalition and the pervasive lack of donor control over the implementation process 
precluded effective execution of the British New Humanitarianism policy. This was 
exacerbated by the absence of clear and coherent donor objectives. 
The following analysis was drawn from extensive interviews with key informants in 
significant bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, donor organisations (including personnel 
of both DFID, FCO, MoD and ECHO), and the Government of Sierra Leone. Interviews 
were undertaken both in London and Freetown, Sierra Leone, between 2001-2004. This 
interview material was complemented by primary and secondary sources provided by aid 
agencies, DFID, FCO and the GoSL. 
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2. Transparency 
The previous analysis has shown that British policy on humanitarian emergency 
assistance and Sierra Leone lacked clarity. The donor/implementing agent relationship, 
furthermore, suffered from a lack of transparency, standardised information sharing and 
continuously erratic communication. This is not unique to Sierra Leone, but a common 
feature of aid relationships, in particular in emergency settings. Within this first section, 
this chapter evaluates the level of policy transparency and predictability by discussing a) 
agent's comprehension of the British policy in Sierra Leone; b) the mechanisms and 
processes of donor/agency communication and co-operation in setting policy parameters 
and identifying projects; and c) the process of common agenda setting: is it a top-down or 
bottom up process. It does so by firstly, highlighting aspects of the environment that 
undermine the donor/agent and inter-agency communication process; and secondly, 
assessing existing fora of donor/agency co-operation. The objective of this section is to 
facilitate an assessment of the level of coherence and co-operation a British wider 
emergency policy has attained with implementing organisations. 
2.1 Agency Perception ofDonor Policy and the Impact ofBritish Policy 
Few of the organisations interviewed in the course of this study professed to 
comprehend the British humanitarian and peacebuilding policy or to have an overview over 
the British engagement in Sierra Leone. Several stated that there did not appear to be a 
primary British strategy, but lots of strategies. All of those interviewed had broad and at 
times conflicting views on why the United Kingdom was engaged in Sierra Leone, and on 
who exactly benefited from such an engagement. Over and over again, British 
humanitarian policy was criticised for having been too foreign policy driven. Few 
organisations, however, were able or prepared to explain this argument in greater detail. In 
fact, most took pains to stress their cordial and successful relationship with DFID staff. 
The vast majority of implementing organisations maintained that in terms of humanitarian 
emergency programmes there had been very little British donor interference at the 
programme level, notwithstanding donor selectivity. There seemed to be a consensus on 
four general prerequisites for obtaining British funding and political support: 1) 
programmes were not meant to contradict the wider British policy objectives in Sierra 
Leone, and organisations were not to be too overly critical of donors (or other large 
emergency organisations) in order to uphold cordial partnerships; 2) programmes were to 
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fit into the wider British strategy; 3) programmes were to aid the peacebuilding and 
development process; and 4) programmes should entail rights and conflict-sensitive 
components. 'u Yet despite extensive interviews, this study was unable to establish whether 
there was a general agreement on humanitarian emergency assistance's capacity and 
responsibility to take on wider political objectives. On the contrary, both agencies and 
donor field representations seemed more concerned with successfully executing those 
projects that were already funded than thinking about their wider and longer-term impact. 
The majority of those interviewed in the course of this study thought the British 
engagement in Sierra Leone had been essential in order to ensure a halt in the violence and 
to enable people to get back on their feet. They also felt it was important in order to 
encourage other donors to get and remain involved, and, most importantly, to hold the 
Sierra Leone Government accountable. `If the United Kingdom pulled out of Sierra 
Leone, there would be chaos'. " `DFID acts much more as the Government of Sierra 
Leone than the Government itself... It is involved in every aspect of the country'. 3n In 
spite of this, very few of those interviewed thought the British humanitarian engagement 
was particularly strong, innovative or indeed successful. There was an overwhelming belief 
that the United Kingdom had been important for halting the fighting and establishing the 
vital aspects of a reconstruction phase, but had then almost disbanded emergency relief and 
recovery altogether when it started concentrating exclusively on security sector reform. 
There is great frustration in the NGO community. DFID is dealing with 
soldiers only, not with communities. Security has to be established first: 
no question about this. But the UK has been particularly weak up to now 
on social issues. ' 
Some of those interviewed also voiced their regret that the UK had failed to accept an 
essential responsibility for donor co-ordination on humanitarian emergency assistance 
issues; a role it was uniquely able to play given its broad engagement in Sierra Lcone. 
Several agencies argued that this vague British strategic framework had undermined 
agency agenda setting, reduced strategic analysis and the ability to draw lessons for future 
325 Conversely, several organisations mentioned that only informally had DFID shown itself to be 
supportive of rights and accountability programmes. 
ýý Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Richard Thwaites, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Civil 
Military Co-operation/International Military Advisory Team (IMATI), 27 May 2002. 
31 Interview with Christophe De Maerschalck, 30 May 2002. 
31 Confidential interview with a country director of a DFID supported humanitarian emergency assistance 
organisation in Freetown, 2002. 
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engagement. Attempts at standardising mechanisms and approaches were considered weak 
or had not filtered down throughout the humanitarian network, or even the British field 
bureaucracy. Any form of wider strategic agenda setting was clearly considered a top-down 
process with marginal input from the field level. This was confirmed in several interviews 
with DFID field personnel in Sierra Leone. Some other humanitarian assistance 
organisations pointed out that this vague donor agenda setting also allowed implementing 
organisations a higher leeway for flexible policymaking. Most, however, believed donors 
were capable of putting demands on implementing partners and `hassling them'. Yet they 
rarely had the means to drive project processes and, therefore, control implementation and 
policy setting. Implementing agents argued that given field representation's physical 
remoteness from donor headquarters, they were more likely to successfully resist any such 
donor attempts at controlling project contents and implementation. Donor funding was 
rarely considered flexible or substantial enough to enforce a particular agenda setting or, 
conversely, to enable long-term or wider approaches. 
Most of those organisations that were interviewed assumed their staff involved in the 
implementation of DFID funded projects comprehended donor requirements to the extent 
that they directly concerned in-house projects. Donor requirements were negotiated in the 
original project appraisal and are written into the contract. In theory, all contract staff had 
access to the original funding documentation. As such once funding had been agreed upon 
donor conditions regarding specific projects were considered relatively transparent. They 
did not, however, necessarily comprise of donor strategy at large, or wider political 
objectives. 
Karen Moore, then country director of Care in Sierra Leone, mentioned that for at least 
two years some of the bigger aid agencies like Care had asked DFID UK and Sierra Leone 
for a country strategy paper and clearer guidance on objectives and benchmarks. At the 
time of the interview, she hoped that this would soon be available (as had been suggested 
by the head of DFID in Sierra Leone, Ian Stuart). She expected such a strategy paper to be 
distributed to partner organisations and other NGOs, 'if DFID does not get bogged down 
in politics again'. She believed that DFID would share their strategy if they had one, and 
when approached. ' 
" Interview with Karen Moore, 8 May 2003. 
-166- 
Chaptcr VI - Implcmcnting New Humanitarianism in Sicrra Lconc 
Repeatedly, agencies criticised the donor-driven early and lengthy transition phase from 
emergency to development; arguing that Sierra Leone still lacked the most basic social 
standards. Some assumed that the donors' drive to move from an emergency to a 
development phase originated in their desire and objective to take control over aid 
expenditures and policy in Sierra Leone. They expected DFID and other donors to 
`become much more controlling very soon. '-' Several humanitarian staff accused the UK 
reintegration programme of being in-transparent and un-participatory, and of having set up 
a `two class society and were now washing their hands of the resulting conflicts. "' They 
claimed that while today there was comparably more stability and less corruption, neither 
would last unless communities were given a voice to hold their politicians accountable, and 
unless public officials were guaranteed their regular and sufficient income. Up to now, the 
UK has followed a top down approach that focuses on rebuilding the main political and 
administrative structures according to a Western understanding of democracy rather than 
building the capacity and access to decision making of the electorate. However, several 
NGOs gave credit to the new DFID-led attempt to get involved in community based social 
development and rights programmes. This approach has been developed in co-operation 
with some of the humanitarian emergency organisations present in Sierra Leone. 
Repeatedly, it was mentioned that ever since the British involvement with Sandline, its 
controversial stand regarding the continuation of humanitarian emergency assistance in 
1998, DFID's reputation had been tarnished. This was aggravated given its apparent 
inability to hold the Government of Sierra Leone accountable to prior agreements. The 
assertive and broad British engagement and DFID's politically driven humanitarian 
approach was seen to undermine neutrality, impartiality and independence as the United 
Kingdom had become one player within the conflict in Sierra Leone. As a consequence 
and in order to maintain their neutrality, a few humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone had 
consciously resisted accepting British funding. Other organisations that were sponsored by 
the British Government mentioned they had to make a conscious effort to remain 
independent (working on the basis of common objectives only). This was considered 
important both in order to uphold their legitimacy and to prevent breaking with other 
organisations that were more critical of a dose relationship with the British government. 
Confidential interview with a country director of a DFID supported humanitarian emergency assistance 
organisation in Freetown, 2002. 
331 Confidential interview with senior aid workers of several NGOs in Freetown, May/June 2003. 
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22 Communication and Co-ordination 
2.2.1 Issues 
Fragmentation: Repeatedly interviewees argued that the British decision-making and 
implementation structures seemed disjointed, erratic, and lacked transparency. Various 
staff, both from the aid community and DFID, pointed out that there were dear 
operational and programmatic differences between DFID departments. While several 
praised the professionalism of DFID/CHAD personnel who were involved in the early 
emergency phase, many criticised the British Government for failing to co-ordinate across 
departmental lines and to ensure transparency, stability and basic access to decision makers. 
Several of those interviewed regretted the discontinued presence of CHAD in the field. 
`Now there is no real programmatic DFID focal point in Sierra Leone.. . Right now, DFID 
implementation in Sierra Leone is ad hoc. With no money, oversight, or linkage. "' This 
fragmented decision making process was thought to make consultation and co-operation 
with the UK time consuming and unstable. This criticism was well summarised by Wael 
Ibrahim, then the country director of Oxfam in Sierra Leone: 
While the UK administration is meant to be `joined-up', the reality is that 
all is under an umbrella organisation, DFID, but internally. DFID is very 
fragmented with unclear lines of communication, responsibility and 
control. In Sierra Leone, we deal with about 15 individual DFIDs: CRP, 
Ian Stuart, WINNAT, but within WINNAT various desks including the 
desk officer for SL, governance people, security sector reform people, 
those responsible for social programmes, economic programmes, etc. 
We find it hard to identify who is in charge for specific things and where 
to get reliable information and decisions. Also, there does not appear to 
be an overarching strategic framework for DFID's engagement in Sierra 
Leone. 
Improvised processes of communication: Implementing agencies at the field level 
had to rely on mostly impromptu meetings or personalised contact with British decision 
makers to discuss project parameters and strategic objectives. More often than not, 
understanding of donor strategies was subject to random information and interpretation; it 
also differed from organisation to organisation. 
Information: Repeatedly, it was stressed that during emergencies information did not 
flow fast, often it was a critical asset and many organisations were reluctant to share it. 
DFID's limited field presence and lack of understanding of the processes underway in 
332 Confidential interview with DFID consultant in Freetown, Sierra Leone contracted by CHAD). 
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Sierra Leone compelled the donor organisation to rely on implementing partners' 
information and advice. Given the asymmetric donor/implementing agent relationship 
and possibly contradicting objectives and working processes, information that was obtained 
was likely to be distorted or misinterpreted. Time and again, DFID and implementing 
agents' personnel stressed that information simply was often not filtered through the 
bureaucratic system. Given implementers' responsibility for every day project sustainability 
and overall success, they were more likely to act in response to events rather than unclear 
or vague long-term strategic objectives. 
Contradicting mandates and work processes: All interviews displayed a frustration 
either with the general lack of co-ordination or donors' (and some organisations') 
continued attempts to enforce it. A quasi consensus emerged that meaningful co- 
ordination beyond the project or, in rare instances sector level was mostly impossible, due 
to conflicts of mandates and working procedures and the fast rushed environments in 
which situations could change from one day to the next. When pressed, some organisation 
conceded that, at times, OCHA fulfilled an important co-ordination function. In Sierra 
Leone, however, it was considered to have acted almost like a service unit, a source of 
information and a mediator only. Given its closeness to UNANISIL (and therefore the 
military) and implementing agents' general antagonism towards being controlled, OCIIA 
was thought to face significant distrust and a lack of co-operation. 
2.2.2 Mechanisms and Processes of Communication and Co-o erb 
Several agencies mentioned that in the earlier phases of the conflict, until 1996, there 
had been frequent consultative meetings between Mukesh Kapila, the former head of 
CHAD, and NGO partners at headquarter level in London and at times in the field in 
Sierra Leone. They believed Mukesh Kapila had used NGO information and projects and 
approaches to influence DFID/CHAD thinking and approach. In addition, in preparation 
of these donor/agency meetings, a selection of aid agencies (including many of the large 
British emergency and development NGOs like Care, Oxfam, Save the Children Fund 
(SCF), Action Aid) had formed an informal co-ordination group to co-ordinate their 
positions, agree on advocacy strategies and exchange information. It was on this informal 
platform that British NGOs raised their claim of DFID having applied political 
conditionality to humanitarian emergency assistance to Sierra Leone in 1997/8. Some 
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organisations, like the British ICRC, had opted out of this informal discussion dup. "' 
Between 1998 and today, such a formalised consultative process has been lacking, both at 
the strategic level in Britain and in Sierra Leone. 
On the national macro-level in Sierra Leone, the UN has attempted - with marginal 
success - to put into operation a standardised communication process of all major players. 
On a bi-monthly basis and co-chaired by the representative of the World Bank, the Deputy 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance and Stabilisation, Alan 
Doss, and the Sierra Leonean Vice President, this assembly brings together all ministers, 
representatives of national and international NGOs and representatives of key UN 
agencies. According to several organisations interviewed in Freetown, the format is not 
conducive to an open discussion of programme details and future developments 3M Even 
on the micro-level (or internal agency-level), communication and co-operation was not 
always forthcoming. Departments (often accountable to divergent superiors or mandates 
and regularly overworked, understaffed and under-financed) failed to sufficiently exchange 
information or agree on common objectives. 
Bi-monthly inter-agency meetings of international NGOs served as a (weak) official 
forum for consultation and complaints. However, not all organisations were represented 
or, indeed, seemed to take this forum seriously. In mid-2003, UNAMMSIL disengaged from 
these meetings. Donor participation had always been sporadic. 
The majority of implementing non-governmental organisations interviewed in the 
framework of this study assumed that DFID representatives in Sierra Leone, in particular 
Ian Stuart, significantly influenced British strategic decision-making and were familiar with 
British humanitarian policy. Those organisations that were funded by DFID, that claimed 
to have a close partnership with the UK, and that had the capacity to engage in political 
advocacy considered the DFID field office to hold an essential function in providing basic 
information on British political objectives and humanitarian strategy. Some doubted that 
the DFID chief representative in Sierra Leone was aware of decisions taken in London. 
333 The reasons for the Red Cross's absence in this co-ordination/advocacy group are contested. Some say 
that the ICRC was not welcome due to its close (funding) relationship with DFID and its hesitation to 
criticise the British government for political conditionality. Others claimed it had opted out, as this 
group was considered to be too politically motivated, having acted on the basis of too little substantiated 
information and with limited competency. They also argued that this group had displayed a picture of 
competition and disparity in British aid circles, a fact that had influenced DFID's rather negative attitude 
towards and impression of relief agencies. Confidential interviews with aid agencies in London, 2003. sx Interview with Karen Moore, 28 May 2002 and 8 May 2003); Interview with Colin Waugh. 
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One country manager suggested that `maybe there is no control, transparency and co- 
ordination of the entire British endeavour full stop . 335 The head of DFID in Sierra Leone 
nevertheless represented implementing organisations' most direct contact with DFID (also 
as at least officially all funding decisions/project proposals had to be approved by Ian 
Stuart - even though decisions were taken in London). The vast majority of staff 
interviewed valued DFID's field presence and wished it was expanded. In comparison to 
other donors, its presence was assumed to allow a higher degree of decision making based 
on local realities. It also facilitated donor/agency transparency and co-operation, as it 
made the donor organisation much more accessible and improved relationships between 
local NGOs. Some believed that through this direct contact they were more likely to 
influence DFID policy. Others warned that DFID field offices were capable of 
monitoring project implementation, a fact that could have both a facilitating and restraining 
aspect, as donors were more likely to interfere in everyday project implementation. This 
was seen to threaten the independence of humanitarian assistance. 
Almost all field-level implementing organisations claimed that formally, field-based staff 
only rarely officially consulted with donors at head quarter or field level Most strategic or 
funding related issues were dealt with via regional or international agency headquarters. 
Country offices were still able to initiate contact with donor representatives and frequently 
did so, yet often this took place on an informal level Ilowever, field based staff met with 
DFID officials at field project sites: for monitoring and evaluation purposes donor 
representatives frequently travelled with agency staff to project sites. As such there was an 
ongoing informal field-based donor/agent dialogue. Some asserted that, given DFID's 
fragmented decision making and general lack of strategic policy setting, such informal field 
based dialogues might well have been influential. 
2.3 Top-Down or Bottom-Up Agenda Setting 
All of those organisations that DFID supported financially claimed that DI? ID 
personnel apparently listened to a partner organisation's advice - therefore they were much 
more in keeping with the concept of partnership than some other donors. Yet, DFID was 
also considered to have been slow to respond and, with some important exceptions, had 
rarely taken on better-informed partner analysis in developing a humanitarian strategy. 
Several organisations considered the new DFID social programme that was developed in 
ass Confidential interview Freetown, Sierra Leone May 2003. 
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1993 to present a diversion from the norm. It had been developed on the basis of civil 
society organisations lobbying and in partnership with NGO's actively engaged in Sierra 
Leone. A senior DFID headquarter based executive claimed that rights-based programmes 
were another area that had been developed in consultation with partner organisations. 
They were considered examples of a `bottom-up approach' and a test case for future policy 
making 336 
There seemed to be a general feeling that partner influence on donor strategy was 
possible, however only at a fairly limited project level and most often in a spontaneous 
rather than formalised manner. Donors were considered more interested in output 
indicators, cost recovery and short-term responsibility rather than sustainable impact on 
the basis of needs and longer-term political stability. The relative political weight of larger, 
established British national headquarters (such as Oxfam) and their capacity to raise 
independent funds was thought to determine the closeness of the donor/agency 
relationship and to raise agency advocacy opportunities. Wael Ibrahim (Oxfam Sierra 
Leone) argued that, as a major British NGO, Oxfam was at least theoretically able to 
influence the government and DFID through public and media campaigns. Yet, at the 
time he was unable to provide a specific example of cases in which Oxfam reliably caused 
DFID to change its position. He suggested that donors might incorporate partner advice 
into their own programmes without officially acknowledging doing so"' Several large 
NGO's mentioned that as both their own organisation and DFID as a donor were 
interested in getting and keeping each other involved in programmes in Sierra Leone, they 
would not do anything that might substantially threaten their long-term relationship. 
Several organisations, including representatives of the British Community Reintegration 
Programme (CRP), mentioned that because they were extensively involved in local 
programmes and had relatively more expertise, they wert able to influence DFID's 
appraisal of the situation on the ground. This was particularly the case, if they had the 
chance to take DFID headquarter representatives to programme sites and were in control 
336 Confidential interview with senior DFID executive in London, 2003. 
3.17 Two possible cxamplcs of this wcrc: 1) NGO complaints rcgarding the hiring of formcr RUF 
combatants into the new Sierra Leonean army without proper background screening. Subsequently, a 
screening mechanism was installed prior to recruitment. 2) Complaints regarding the Poverty Reduction 
Strategic Programme (PRSP) as being too complicated. Subsequently it was agreed to simplify the 
document and a consultation process with NGOs was started. 
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tof their own evaluations. 3' -Given the British commitment to a new 10-year memorandum 
of understanding with the GoSL, several organisations suspected in the future there would 
be less opportunity to influence the British agenda. 
A few organisations were much more critical of the present, as they saw it, `master and 
servant' agency/donor relationship. They complained that donors hardly ever 
acknowledged partners' contributions and almost never listened to local organisations' 
assessments and advice. Interestingly, the same organisations welcomed the idea of 
entering into standing partnership arrangements with donor organisations, as they would 
serve as a basis for guidance, transparency and trust, and a medium term funding 
relationship. They thoughts this would also raise the accountability of both implementing 
agents and donors. The latter might be seen to undermine earlier critical statements, which 
might as well be a reflection of organisational discontent or jealously of others enjoying a 
closer relationship with donor organisations. 
Several humanitarian organisations mentioned their at times relatively close co-operation 
on community-based projects, in particular regarding rights, conflict-sensitive and 
governance issues. However, none judged DFID to have been particularly strong on these 
issues up to now. At the field level only few humanitarian organisations undertook policy- 
focused advocacy with the objective of influencing humanitarian policy implementation or 
future donor policy making. In particular large, well-established British (and one or two 
American) NGOs were leading advocacy and government/NGO consultations. They 
thought they had the means, influence and therefore a responsibility to go beyond 
implementing projects and influence future policy making. Some stated that highly public 
advocacy did not work but threatened to harm relationships with donors and other aid 
agencies. Quiet diplomacy, on the other hand, had proved much more successful 
According to their experience DFID had a very close definition of advocacy, namely 
`influencing policy'. As DFID primarily promoted operational activities (not policy work), 
it would accept advocacy only if undertaken in the course of project implementation. 
However, this did not appear to amount to a rule, as DFID policy merely amounted to a 
collection of individual staff comments. In general, most international emergency NGOs 
had degenerated into service delivery units. 
Interview with Patrick Hammer, Agrisystem, CRP Community Reintegration Programme (CRP), 
Programme Manager, Freetown/Sierra Leone, 20 May 2003. 
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2.4 Conclusion on Transparcncp and Coherence 
In summary, the research undertaken showed the rather limited level of transparency 
and co-operation with implementing organisations that the British New Humanitarianism 
has attained in Sierra Leone. Few implementing organisations felt they sufficiently 
understood the British country strategy. Donor/agent communication was sporadic rather 
than formalised. 
3. Control 
The following section assesses the level of control DFID as a donor organisation had 
over implementing organisations in Sierra Leone. In order to do so, this chapter analyses 
a) existing mechanisms for pursuing common objectives; b) the comparative content and 
process of identifying projects and project partners; c) the process of obtaining funding; 
and d) the system of monitoring and evaluating British funded programmes and 
organisational learning. 
3.1 Mechanism ofPromotingNewHumanitarianism 
This study interprets humanitarian programmes in support of broader political 
objectives (like human rights, reconciliation or conflict management, and development or 
capacity building) as manifestations of New Humanitarianism. They are also interpreted as 
supportive of, or at least in accordance to, the British political engagement in Sierra Leone. 
The following section assesses their level of support through implementing agents in Sierra 
Leone. This analysis is based on extensive interviews with humanitarian organisations in 
Sierra Leone and an evaluation of their publications. However, as most staff were 
astonishingly reluctant to discuss these issues, it must be understood as a qualitative 
assessment of staff support rather than a quantitative assessment of country programmes. 
The aid community has invested extensive efforts into investigating a possible link 
between emergency assistance, conflict management and the support for human rights. At 
least at headquarter level, many organisations have formulated so-called conflict-sensitive 
or rights based strategies that are meant to inform country strategies and project 
implementation. However, despite a general interest in re-conceptualising and 
strengthening humanitarian emergency aid policy, such efforts remain confined to 
individual aid agencies. No network-wide strategy incorporating any of these principles 
could be identified at the headquarter or local level in Sierra Leone, nor has DFID pushed 
. 174- 
Chapter VI - Implcmcnting New Humanitarianism in Sicrra Lconc 
for one. The research undertaken for the purpose of this study, furthermore, identified a 
surprising lack of awareness of such policy efforts at the tactical level: many field-based 
staff were either unaware of these concepts, reluctant to give away possibly controversial 
information, or critical of their feasible application. Others appeared generally disinterested 
or even hostile to broadening relief mandates beyond need (that is beyond the provision of 
basic means for immediate survival). They argued that emergency aid delivery was already 
complicated enough. In particular throughout emergencies, a broadening of the mandate 
and objectives of humanitarian emergency assistance was thought to put people at risk and 
threaten to cause the antagonism of stakeholders and local leaders. They also doubted that 
establishing a consensus on the objectives of such a broader mandate was feasible. 
Despite this overall reluctance, many of the agencies that have been supported by DFID 
have pursued strategies involving rights and capacity building initiatives. Some have done 
so predominantly at the headquarter level or purely rhetorically, but most have also 
implemented wider programmes at the community level in some select areas of operation, 
like CARE, Action Aid, Oxfam, Christian Aid and the Sierra Leonean Red Cross Society 
(in co-operation with the British ICRC). 
3.1.1 Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding 
In its White Paper on Development and within its principles of humanitarian emergency 
assistance, the UK Government and DFID have committed themselves to an approach 
conscious of the wider impact of humanitarian emergency assistance, in particular its effect 
on and role in violent conflict. DFID has also committed itself to coherent and co- 
ordinated policy making, arguably across ministerial and implementing partner level. The 
assumption of this thesis was that humanitarian emergency assistance might not necessarily 
actively support wider political objectives, but would definitely not contradict them. DFID 
has published several policy papers on humanitarian emergency assistance and conflict; 
including a manual on conflict impact assessment. This effected the assumption that 
DFID would strive for promoting a conflict-sensitive or rights-sensitive approach to 
humanitarian emergency assistance. It also brought about the assumption that it would 
encourage or even demand application of its guidelines on conflict impact assessment. 
However, these hypotheses could not be substantiated, neither at the strategic nor local 
level, neither within the DFID bureaucracy itself nor at the NGO-level. Far from it: 
chapter three has previously argued that on the level of policy formulation there was no 
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consensus on the impact of humanitarian emergency assistance on conflict and its role in 
support of conflict prevention. DFID staff across the board did not support or promote 
the criteria for conflict impact assessment identified by CHAD or a conflict-sensitive 
approach to humanitarian emergency assistance. In Sierra Leone, a conflict-sensitive 
approach to humanitarian emergency assistance was certainly far from ubiquitous. None 
of the DFID supported humanitarian agencies claimed to know of or follow such DFID 
strategies. 
Some agencies, at least at headquarter level, have undertaken independent efforts to 
integrate conflict indicators into project appraisal and evaluation. llowever, such an 
understanding of emergency assistance mandates had filtered down to few of the 
organisations' field operations that were interviewed in the course of this study. Not only 
did agencies seem to be reluctant to share information regarding their guidelines on 
conflict-sensitive approaches, some staff were not even aware of the existence of any such 
internal or international strategy papers or endeavours. Some organisations that were 
actively engaged in Sierra Leone meant to address the root causes of conflict and analyse 
reasons for communal strife within their work, but had not formulated universal 
programme standards to that end. Others, in particular more development-oriented 
agencies, had listed conflict prevention as one of their strategic crosscutting goals; yet not 
all of these organisations were able or willing to show evidence of such programmes. 
None acknowledged that they were aware of DFID's manual on conflict impact 
assessment, or had ever before been approached on this matter by the donor organisation. 
Several mentioned they thought their presence and work as such were a `bridge for peace' 
and by default entailed peacebuilding objectives; conflict sensitivity, therefore, did not 
necessitate a specific approach. Through their work these organisations claimed to have 
provided a forum for exchange of needs and experiences, as well as advocacy against war. 
They also cautioned that not all staff members were equally trained to address conflict or 
rights issues. 
Several organisations voiced outright concern with regard to mixing humanitarian 
emergency assistance with peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives. They warned of 
the vagueness of the British peacebuilding agenda (and its likely short-term commitment) 
and the possibly harmful effect of extending relief mandates. As an example, several cited 
the Sierra Leonean ICRC's position of working on all sides of the conflict. At the height of 
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the war, this had caused concern in Sierra Leonean Government circles and had eventually 
led to the ICRC's temporary expulsion. According to ICRC staff, at the height of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, `there was clearly a white and black conception of the conflict, and 
neutrality was misunderstood and misinterpreted . 339 It is conceivable that any greater 
involvement in the war in the context of humanitarian emergency assistance that entailed 
conflict resolution objectives might have caused considerable unrest. Mindful of attacks on 
aid agencies in Iraq, like the attack on the Red Cross, and many organisations' subsequent 
withdrawal, some organisations including the International Red Cross arc currently in the 
process of reviewing their neutrality and impartiality policies. "" 
Most organisations showed themselves to be doubtful of the aid community's ability to 
identify a network-wide common agenda. Some also mentioned they thought few donors 
were prepared to fund programmes beyond limited emergency objectives. A few were 
outright doubtful of any donor organisation integrating humanitarian emergency assistance 
into wider peacebuilding strategies or setting conditions to that effect. They argued that 
often such work depended on the availability of donor-independent private funding. 
One country director mentioned that his organisation had dropped any further 
engagement on behalf of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Sierra Leone, when they 
realised that their incomplete understanding of conflict and the complexity of conflict 
prevention had caused crucial mistakes in its operations during the genocide in Rwanda. 
However, he did not suggest that conflict sensitivity was not required for appropriate 
engagement within conflict-ridden environments. Another organisation argued that it was 
essential to support local NGOs in training their staff on conflict issues. It was important 
to develop early warning mechanisms, such as how to identify conflict spots and how to 
alert those people responsible for taking preventive action. However, despite a real need 
for conflict-focused projects, there was only limited donor money available for such 
projects. 
At the community level, today there is a much stronger will to talk about 
issues and to express the desire for change, as long as either doesn't 
threaten stability. No one seems to want to return to war. This creates 
an opportunity to work towards political and societal change, not just to 
provide the basic facilities or training. Therefore Sierra Leone is in a 
Robert, MSF-Belgium, Bead of Mission, 21 May 2003. 
ý0 Confidential interview with ICRC-UK staff, London, 2003. 
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critical transition phase.. . it has yet to 
be clear whether donors are 
prepared to maximise on progress to date and to sit it out. " 
Without a strong donor commitment to conflict-sensitive humanitarian emergency 
assistance, the incorporation of conflict and rights issues into humanitarian emergency 
assistance policy remains bleak. This is especially the case if increasingly private (profit- 
driven) service providers are funded in the field of emergency assistant. Experience in 
Sierra Leone showed that profit driven companies shied away from undertaking efforts that 
went beyond their immediate contracts or that required additional expenditure and time 
(also refer to chapter VII). 
3.1.2 Do No Harm 
Do No Harm thinking and programming was certainly not a commonly pursued 
strategy across the majority of aid organisations engaged in Sierra Leone. Most aid 
personnel interviewed were reluctant to discuss the potential broader and/or negative side- 
effects of their organisation's emergency assistance programmes. Only some were 
interested in working more with Do No Harm indicators and few had received any formal 
training in this field. Few could see how to effectively incorporate the approach into their 
every day work. However, almost all of the organisations interviewed felt compelled to 
ascertain and prove accountability to both their donors and stakeholders. To some extent, 
ensuring accountability included undertaking ongoing project impact (and conflict impact) 
assessments. In response to questions regarding their project's impact, however, most 
organisations provided quantitative data that responded to output, such as the number of 
workshops held, patients treated, sacks of rice being dispersed, etc. These criteria were part 
of programme contracts established with donors. Few of the field staff interviewed 
thought it necessary to evaluate the broader bearing their aid intervention had on a society's 
condition and future (political) development. All of those available and willing to discuss 
their work's impact and conflict impact assessment methodologies complained of their lack 
of financial capacity to undertake conflict impact assessment in a meaningful way. 
3.1.3 Rights-Based Programming. 
A rights-based approach to humanitarian emergency assistance assumes that the 
protection of human rights (including political rights) is a priority of humanitarian 
Confidential intcrvicw with a humanitarian aid organisation's country dircctor of a DCID supported aid 
organisation in Sierra Leone May 2003. 
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emergency operations. In some of the publications and public statements on humanitarian 
emergency assistance, DFID has assumed a rights-based rhetoric. There remained a high 
level of confusion, misunderstanding and disagreement in the humanitarian emergency 
community concerning the meaning of the term and its impact on operations. Some 
organisations, including the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), have 
sought minimum rights-based criteria for the delivery of humanitarian emergency 
assistance. DPA writes that the objective of a rights-based approach is to `provide the 
human rights framework necessary to find long-term solutions to the root causes of 
conflict and to ... facilitate the successful transition between peacekeeping operations and 
humanitarian emergency assistance to long-term peace-building and sustainable 
development'. 342 (sic) According to this definition, human rights are understood as the 
crucial binding element between humanitarian emergency assistance, development and 
security. 
In Sierra Leone, rights issues were widely considered to be an instrument for ensuring 
local ownership of emergency and development programmes and a mechanism linking 
relief and development. In some cases addressing rights issues was also seen to strengthen 
community capacity building and conflict prevention. The limited success of community 
reintegration and community capacity building programmes had pushed rights-based and 
social programmes into the forefront. This was reflected in DFID's investment in a new 
civil society programme. " Several humanitarian organisations engaged in Sierra Leone 
(though not the majority) undertook integrated programmes addressing human rights in 
the framework of, for example, food security programmes. The objective was to use the 
opportunity of food delivery to sensitise the population to their legal rights and, therewith, 
to empower them to hold their political leaders accountable. Before implementing projects 
in Sierra Leone, Action Aid, for example, undertook so-called participatory reviewal 
processes to get feedback from the community regarding their needs, expectations and 
capacity (or lack thercof). The objective was to train people making demands, analysing 
their situation and working as a community not as individuals. 
3'Z United Nations Department of Political Affairs, `Human Rights and Conflicts', in: human R{gbts Today: 
A United Nations Priority (New York: United Nations, 1998), 
http: //www. un. org/rights/I-IRToday/hrconfl. htm, 10 May 2004. 
w Department for International Development (DFID), Sierra Leonc A Frameurork for DFJD Suppen. 
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-Speaking out against rights -abuses or the suspension of aid programmes in protest 
against abuse are other examples of addressing rights issues by humanitarian emergency 
assistance. MSF-Holland, for example, speaks out and withdraws if necessary in cases of 
grave violations of humanitarian law, not simply incidents of human rights abuses. s" All 
agencies had a general policy on how to deal with such misuse. Yet, interviews showed 
that interpreting mandates on how to respond to the abuse of human rights or 
humanitarian principles was often down to personal or staff interpretation. One country 
manager said it was more important to `stay and do our job'. Most stated they preferred to 
pass on information on human rights abuses to human rights groups rather than take 
action themselves, or advocate a broadening of organisational mandates. Several pointed 
out that it was important to act only on the basis of information they themselves obtained 
in their work. Often this demanded specific investigation organisations did not have the 
capacity to undertake. They warned that it had proved insufficient to rely on information 
on rights abuses provided by local partners, as such information was often tainted by 
rumours, fears and personal prejudices. 
Most humanitarian personnel interviewed in the framework of this study did not fccl 
sufficiently competent to get involved in rights issues. Overall, rights-based principles 
certainly were not a commonly pursued strategy in Sierra Leone. I Iowever, the impression 
was that such principles were becoming more widespread, also as donors were perceived to 
be increasingly interested in funding socially- or community-oriented programmes. One 
DFID executive in London stated that that rights-based programmes were considered `a 
plus', but not a condition for entering into a funding relationship with organisations 
engaged in Sierra Leone. Ile also mentioned that DFID had only just begun to get 
engaged in that line of work. 3`s 
3.1.4 Impact of a wider Approach to Humanitarian Assistance 
In the context of this study it proved impossible to obtain sufficient and sufficiently 
meaningful data that allowed an assessment of the impact of humanitarian emergency 
assistance. Doing so would have necessitated a comprehensive and resource-consuming 
evaluation of aid programmes. It would also have required the full co-operation of 
humanitarian organisations involved in Sierra Leone. This was beyond the means of a 
3" Interview with Rebecca Golden, MSF-Holland, Head of Mission, 30 May 2002. 
xS Confidential interview with DFID personnel in London, 2003. 
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single study and it was not an objective of this thesis. However, the following preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn: 
" During the height of the violence, those humanitarian organisations remaining in 
Sierra Leone, including the Red Cross, found it difficult to uphold their neutrality 
and impartiality, or the perception thereof. The concept of impartiality was actually 
frequently misunderstood: Organisations working on all sides of the war zones were 
often judged to operate in support of specific factions. This caused hostility and 
eventually led to the suspension of some humanitarian aid projects. At this stage of 
the war, any greater involvement in support of peacebuilding or human rights was 
likely to complicate or threaten humanitarian access and aid delivery. 
" Humanitarian emergency relief in Sierra Leone frequently suffered from a lack of 
information. This caused, and was caused, by weak co-ordination and pooling of 
resources. This reduced its efficacy. Without far strengthened co-ordination 
mechanisms and co-ordinated and cross-cutting mandates, wider humanitarian 
projects have little leverage to initiate substantial political change. 
" Headquarter and field representation essentially differed in their interpretation of 
conflict-sensitive and rights-sensitive theory of emergency assistance. However, 
many field staff, although critical of the language of New fiumanitariani: cm and Do 
No Harm, were actively (and often passionately) engaged in wider humanitarian and 
development projects. Their direct interaction with local communities encouraged 
their involvement in political affairs. 
" The failure of DFID's Community Reintegration Project to substantially and 
sustainably address community empowerment and capacity building caused criticism 
within the broader humanitarian community and to some degree DFID itself. This 
led to the assumption that DFID in theory was in favour of promoting rights- 
sensitive or conflict-sensitive programmes, and prepared to invest in this. This 
assumption could not be substantiated in the process of this thesis' research in 
Sierra Leone. 
None of these hypotheses suggests that a conflict-sensitive or rights-sensitive 
humanitarian approach in Sierra Leone was counter-productive or futile. On the contrary, 
wider humanitarian projects seemed to have benefited from greater political and conflict- 
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sensitive or human rights-sensitive awareness. Humanitarian emergency projects that went 
beyond the immediate delivery of emergency aid and addressed issues of human rights, 
peacebuilding and community capacity building, had involved a greater proportion of the 
local population. These were thought to be more sustainable and effective then many 
other programmes. 
3.2 Choice ofProjects, Project Areas and Partner 
The rationale for and process of selecting projects and programmes demonstrate the 
level of symmetry and common objectives within donor/agency relations. Consequently, 
they also affect and reflect the strength and ease of policy implementation. The 
assumption being that projects resemble the practical output of policy. The following table 
provides an analysis of DFID and implementing NGO organisations' indicators for project 
selection. It also shows implementing partners' perception of DFID's rationale for project 
selection and discusses the data's significance. The following analysis was drawn from a 
multitude of interviews with policy makers and practitioners undertaken in Sierra Leone in 
2002-2003. The majority of personnel interviewed supported the following indicators; 
others that were mentioned by only some interviewees were dropped from this list. 
Nonetheless, the list should not be taken as exclusive or complete. Programming decisions 
depend on circumstance, organisational or political necessities and personality. Neither did 














Security Security DFID perceived as A minority of agencies mentioned 
very worried about that security was an indicator very 
security, more so than much secondary to need. 
some other donors 
Programme focus programme lies Fits into donor's main The large majority of interviewees 
fits DFID's within donor's main strategic objectives stated their organisations made an 
strategic strategic objectives effort to understand donor strategic 
objectives or in area where objectives and would attempt to 
donor funding work on like-minded projects. Many 
seems available stated that they would be compelled 
to accept donor geographical and 
contextual direction. 
Several blamed other NGOs for 
`running after the money'. 
Most suggested that donor goals 
were based on political objectives 
rather than local need and implied 
that this was objectionable. 
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Within institutional Some interviewees implied that 
strategic objectives NGOs were too tied up in 
organisational ethics and too 
reluctant to co-operate with aA actors 
including the military. 
Repeatedly NGOs pointed out that 
only independent or private funding 
(and the availability of core funds) 
enabled organisations to solely work 
on the basis of assessed needs and 
internal objectives. 
Need and number Need and number While almost all agencies stated 
of people of people benefiting perceived need as a primary factor 
betiefitiiig from (possibly based on for undertaking projects, nwiy were 
intervention community unable to explain needs assessment 
assessment) strategies. Prior and post assessment 
including impact assessment was 
rarely standardised. 
Some agencies mentioned OCI IA, 
UNAMSIL or GoSL assessments as 
a basis for project allocation. 
Accessibility of Access Donors and implementing partners 
area including blamed one another for shop 
quality of local fronting (that is not moving out of 
infrastructure (or safe areas into those newly liberated) 
need to improve but focusing on strategically valuable 
accessibility) or more comfortable regions. It was 
not possible to substantiate these 
claims. Nevertheless, a clustering of 
agencies and projects in selected 
areas was perceptible. 
Likelihood (or Likelihood of This indicates risk-averse 
cvcn guarantcc) succcss organisational bchaviour. 
of success 
Visibility Visibility Visibility, high output This substantiates claims that both 
and visible peace donor interest and/or media interest 
dividend as quickly as have an elemental effect on the 
possible choice of projects and project areas. 
Level, duration 
and success of 
previous funding 
Availability of Availability of Given the often volatile and obscure 
information information implementation environment, the 
lack of information introduced an 
element of chance and possibly 
partiality into the selection of 
projects and project areas. 
Cost recovery and Cost recovery and Both the reality and the perception of 
comparatively comparatively cheap a necessity for cheap projects with 
cheap but high output high output caused over. 
ambitiousness, under-funding of 
projects and introduced a likelihood 
of failure in terms of reaching project 
benchmarks. In order to overcome 
negative results, it encouraged an 
element of simplification or 
deception in project appraisals. 
Interesting Reactive DFID as a donor organisation gave 
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approach that the impression of being reactive yet 
supports strategic interested in terms of rights-based or 
objectives (e. g.. a conflict-sensitive emergency 
rights based approaches. Instead of standardised 
approach, guidelines, such an interest appeared 
community to depend on personal rather than 
capacity building, institutional concern. 
etc. ) 
Longer-term Short-term There appears to be a contradiction 
projects/funding responsibility that cannot easily be overcome 
between DFID's perceived interest in 
longer-term funding relationships 
and their short-term emergency 
Preference of Increases the burden of lengthy and 
funding aspects of complicated application processes on 
larger implementing agents. 
programmes At the same time, guards against 
funded by other sudden project collapse upon a 
donors rather danor's withdrawal. Partial funding 
than funding furthermore leverages supplementary 
100% of project contributions. 
Personal interest It was repeatedly suggested that as a 
result of a rather fragmented 
operational environmcnt driven by 
DFID as an umbrella organisation 
but lacking strategic control, any 
strategy is determined by wider 
national foreign policy objectives and 
personal interest. It was also 
perceived to be often manipulated by 
the CoSL 
Several country managers stated they 
believed their good reputation with 
high-ranking UK personnel and the 
relevant personnel's personal interest 
in a specific approach enabled them 
to receive and urhold fundine. 
Area in which no 
other project is 
running or large 
donor is active 
Ability to work 
independently from 




Large, well- Assumed and Cause of emergence of NGO 
known perceived preference oligarchies. 
multilateral for large British perception of upsurge of private 
organisations or bilateral organisations (including military) companies in the 
NGOs it holds a or private companies implementation of developmental 
framework emergency assistance. Experience of 
agreement with technicalisation of relief to the 
detriment of integrated, community 
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baled and sustainable pruggranutlew 
that go beyond the immediate 
delivery of aid. 
I listory of Completed Simplifies application and 
partnership and partnership agreement implementation processes. Increases 
perception of stability and to some extent long 
accountability. term planning ac it introduces an 
Completed amount of guaranteed and possibly 
partnership un-earmarked funding. 
agreement Depending on symmetry of 
relationship, possibly introduces a 
degree of control and donor agenda 
setting. 
Nationality This leads to the setting up of 
multiple national offices in lead 
donor countries, adding to the 
fragmentation and competitiveness 
of the international aid network. 
Expertise and Expertise Expertise It was repeatedly suggested by 
perception that interviewees (in particular 
organisation governmental ones) that many 
controls the NGOs were too slow and lacked the 
required recourses necessary broad expertise, ability to 
to undertake and pre-finance and essential logistics. 
implement the This raises questions regarding the 
project privatisation and militarisation of 
successfully emergency aid and, more generally, 
emergency preparedness. 
Keeping in mind previously defined indicators of successful policy implementation, this 
analysis promotes the followingobsenvations: 
" There appeared to be a high degree of antagonism and mutual mistrust between 
DFID (and donor organisations in general) and field based implementing NGOs. 
This was in spite of the NGOs extensive positive feedback and general support for 
and interest in DFID; 
" There seemed to be a conviction that donor and agency indicators of project 
selection essentially differed from one another. This is not necessarily correct; 
" Interviews led to the impression that implementing agencies believed that they 
needed to mould themselves and their operations according to donor objectives and 
demands, but did not necessarily have sufficient knowledge to do so; 
" Project selection looked as if it was subject to chance, circumstance and personality 
just as much as strategy; 
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" Identification of projects in the interest of both donor and implementing 
organisations and on the basis of need demanded a high degree of transparency with 
regard to political and organisational objectives and requirements. This is not 
always forthcoming 
" Organisational headquarters and field offices pursued widely differing objectives, arc 
subject to divergent needs and report to different superiors. Both lack information; 
" The majority of implementing agents stated that they had received mixed and at 
times contradicting messages about priorities from various DFTT) pcrsonncl/offces. 
There did not seem to be an internal DFID consensus or clear lines of 
communication, and the various desks were not always informed on each other's 
work, 
" Given the breadth and vagueness of indicators, there remained a high dcgrce of 
contents flexibility. At the same time, there appeared to be a lack of common 
political strategic principles guiding project development and direction; 
" Humanitarian need and local necessity were but two indicators of several. This 
suggests asymmetry of aid relationships, a vulnerability of the target group and a 
lack of ownership. 
" The selection of projects and programmes, in summary, looks like a compromise 
between divergent interests. 
3.3 Process of Funding Submissions 
The process of project appraisal and funding applications shows a lot about internal and 
external lines of communication, transparency and awareness of essential (project) 
objectives. Most of all, it demonstrates implementing organisations' and donors' capacity 
to initiate programmes and, therefore, to control programme selection. Df1D has worked 
with a great variety of agencies in the implementation of wider UK humanitarian assistance 
and development programmes in Sierra Leone. Funding for external implementing 
agencies was either multilateral block funding or, more frequently, earmarked bilateral 
funding. Multilateral funding is block funding either for a multilateral organisation, for 
example the European Union or the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCIIA). It is not tied to specific projects or programmes and can be used by 
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implementing agents at their own discretion. Bilateral funding is funding for national or 
international humanitarian organisations that is reserved for specific programmes, projects 
or locations. Increasingly, DfID grants bilateral humanitarian relief funding to selected 
larger international humanitarian implementing partner organisations In this case, funds 
are earmarked for specific programmes or projects (or part of projects as for example 
funds for water and sanitation projects within a specific refugee camp in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone) some of which are part of a UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP). 34' 
Bilateral Development Aid are transfers from one government to another. It is generally 
assumed that bilateral funding enables a higher degree of donor control. 
The following graphic displays an analysis of the most common funding relationships 
and project appraisal processes: 
346 Interview with Ian Stuart, First Secretary for Aid and Development, DfID SL, UK I iigh Commission, in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 22 May 2002. 
xt CAPs are agreed upon by UN agencies involved in humanitarian assistance in consultation with non-UN 
international humanitarian organisations and humanitarian NGOs. The Consolidated Appeals Process 
summarizes country- or region-wide humanitarian need and lists funding proposals. According to the 
UN, the Consolidated Appeal `should be seen as a strategic plan, including situation analysis and system 
priorities, for the region/countries covered ... <It 
includes> field-driven, country-level analysis of the 
humanitarian context and definition of relevant goals and indicators of progress. ' UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCIIA), United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 
for the Southeastern Europe Humanitarian Operations January-December 2000 (New York: OCI [A, 
November 1999), 1. 
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There were two most common project appraisal processes: 
" An implementing organisation's field manager, at times together with local 
communities, develops a project proposal and sends it to his/her line manager for 
support. The regional line manager passes it on to the organisational country director. 
Following an internal consultation and negotiation process, the completed proposal is 
submitted to the organisational international headquarter (at time via the regional 
headquarter). In most cases the international headquarter must approve funding 
requests before potential donors are being addressed, as projects need to comply with 
organisational strategic objectives. By and large, the international headquarter itself 
then approaches possible donors, in particular, if funding sources are based in Europe 
or overseas (funding relationship III). 
In some cases, in particular when regional or local funding is sought, the country office 
may approach donors directly (funding relationship IV). 
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" It is more common for international organisational headquarters to identify strategic 
objectives and areas of engagement. On this basis, they draft a project proposal and 
submit it for funding to international donors. At times, such proposals are discussed 
with in-country teams; more often country-teams are not deployed prior to receiving a 
funding commitment, as most organisations are not able to pre-finance operations. 
Following a donor/agency consultation process, donors allocate funding to agency 
headquarters on the basis of clear project terms of references. These arc then shared 
with in-country field offices and the international agency headquarters allocates funding 
to the field. In particular larger implementing agencies that held a partnership 
agreement with DFID were allocated bulk funding that was often not earmarked to 
specific country programmes. In this case, projects were identified and funds were 
dispersed at the national headquarter level on the basis of medium-term strategic 
objectives and need. (funding relationship I) 
" In some cases, a donor headquarter (or even more seldom a donor country office) 
either writes a proposal and invites applications (or directly asks partner organisations 
to develop a project) or publishes a tender. According to interviews conducted with 
DFID personnel in Sierra Leone, this process was very rare. DFID Sierra Leone 
retained very limited funding (an exception would be a temporary small grant scheme 
and a limited infrastructure recovery programme). This was likely to change, once the 
Sierra Leone DFID country office became a full DFID representation. Exceptions 
were the limited funds that were held by CHAD operational field consultants. These 
could be used to the disgression of field personnel (up to a certain limit) and could be 
dispersed quickly and informally in the field. 
" DFID London has outsourced the British CRP to a private contractor, Agrisystems. 
Agrisystems controled a large amount of project funds and held operational control. 
As such, it was responsible for contracting other agencies and/or NGOs to implement 
projects in Sierra Leone. It did so from its operational headquarter in Freetown. CRI' 
was widely regarded as another DFID wing. As such, it gave the impression that DFID 
published tenders and gave out contracts at the local level. 
In all cases, the international donor headquarters (DFID London) determined funding 
conditions and output requirements. Depending on the donor/agency relationship such 
contracts were more or less open for negotiation. The higher the degree of private 
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funding, the greater was an implementing organisation's independence from donor 
conditions. Funding negotiations were rarely put on paper prior to completion of project 
terms of reference. " 
DFID made decisions on programmes, projects and funding relationships. DFID was 
also implementing these decisions. It did not, however, independently set the strategic 
policy framework. It was compelled to co-ordinate and compromise with other British 
political departments. Necessarily, strategic political objectives were watered down. At no 
point did DFID act as a unitary actor. 
All project appraisal processes lack an institutionalised direct communication between 
donor headquarters or policy makers and field level implementation offices. This does not 
imply that field offices never communicate directly with donor headquarter personnel. In 
fact, direct donor/agency communications are not uncommon. They are, however, not 
institutionalised and often in-transparent. Given the high fluctuation of staff, such 
contacts are rarely sustainable or reliable. This at once decreases transparency and 
awareness of donors' strategic political objectives and field requirements, as well as 
increases project independence once funding has been received. 
Most agency country directors interviewed stressed that all those involved in a project or 
programme had been consulted throughout its design, negotiation and implementation 
phase. Therefore, they were aware of agency and donor objectives. This is highly unlikely, 
given the long term and far-removed appraisal and negotiation process and, at times, the 
rather different level of education and communication skills of those involved in project 
implementation. 
In most cases, funding is granted for periods of 6-12 months; as such it is not flexible or 
substantial enough to enable long- or medium-term strategic planning. Several DFID 
personnel stressed that between 1998-2001 the UK focused on the provision of 
humanitarian emergency assistance, without placing any further conditions on their 
contents or area of implementation. However, DFID was highly selective in the choice of 
implementing partners, with a bias towards multilateral organisations (in this case it would, 
most often, still earmark its funding) or well-established bilateral NGOs CHAD had a 
346 Confidential interview with humanitarian aid organisation personnel in London, 2003. 
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framework agreement with. This standardised selectivity, however, was softened by 
multilaterals' ability to outsource programme aspects to bilateral NGOs. 
3.4 Programme Evaluation, Monitoring and Organisational Learning 
The withholding or suspension of funding is a donor's only effective instrument in 
controlling, albeit not directing, programme implementation. In order to do so once 
funding has been granted, donors have to rely on the mechanisms of programme 
evaluation and monitoring. Programme evaluations and impact assessments arc also the 
basis for most programming decisions. They essentially guide the scope and approach of 
wider humanitarian emergency. The processes of evaluating and monitoring programmes 
are determined within programme contracts and differs substantially (depending, for 
example, on the type of organisation, programme scope and country of implementation). 
The following analysis provides an evaluation of DFID/implementing agents' most 
common approach to programme evaluation and monitoring in Sierra Leone. 
3.4.1 Mechanisms of Prior Project and Needs Assessment 
Pre-mission needs assessments are an essential aspect of project appraisal. Most 
implementing agents undertook an assessment of some sorts before they designed projects 
and applied for funding. However, according to staff interviewed in Sierra Leone (and 
analysing their appraisal documents) many organisations tended to promote and pursue 
those projects they knew they could get funding for or that fell within primary 
donors' 
strategic goals, and that at least vaguely fell into their own organisation's strategic 
objectives. 
As previously discussed, the United Kingdom tends to finance NGO proposals that 
support specific British political interests, or that generally fit DFID objectives. 
DPID also 
tends to support well-established partner organisations. As of today, DFID 
has not 
published or promoted a specific pre- (or post-) mission appraisal and assessment strategy. 
Although, at the Cabinet level, the UK Government has published material on programme 
evaluation and accountability. CHAD's conflict-sensitive approach 
has not, as yet, been 
standardised across programmes, nor is conflict-sensitive impact assessment a condition 
for obtaining programme funding. 
Contrary to agents' public rhetoric, strategic conflict and impact analysis as preparation 
and contingency planning was not standardised. The research showed, there was only 
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limited direct pre-mission needs or impact assessment apart from those undertaken by the 
local government, multilateral organisations (like the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs-OCHA) or donor consultations. This was the case in particular in 
fast-strung emergency environments. In particular with regard to the emergency and early 
transition phase, most organisations interviewed professed a distinct distrust towards (and 
lack of consideration for) GoSL needs assessments or programme plans. 
None professed to undertake pre-programme impact assessments, meaning none 
attempted to assess the likely impact of their intervention prior to deployment. It was 
argued that pre-mission appraisals and needs and impacts assessment often faltered due to 
the lack of funding and time. Almost all organisations needed to receive their 
headquarters' approval before beginning a project; almost all had to apply for funding once 
programmes or projects had been identified; a process that could be very time intensive. In 
the intermediate time situations threatened to change fundamentally. This required new 
needs and impact assessment appraisals. A small minority of organisations mentioned they 
were able to commence programmes following a needs assessment and sufficient local 
security guarantees but before they had received their headquarters' approval. "9 Most 
external emergency programmes in Sierra Leone, therefore, were based on effectiveness, 
sufficient security, and a cost benefit analysis (or in other words, they needed to be as 
cheap as possible). 350 
3.4.2 Project Monitoring and Evaluation. 
Simon Arthy (who is seconded by DFID to NACSA) argued, 
DFII) is the most socially aware donor I have come across. They 
constantly ask for input and evaluation and whether this is the right way 
to go. DFID constantly sends consultants from London to assess our 
work and to consider where to go next in terms of policy development. 
They are always trying to learn lessons 351 
Several emergency-agencies supported "Simon's statement and mentioned that the DFID 
London headquarter frequently sent consultants to monitor and evaluate projects. These 
319 MSF, for instance, may request funding also after a decision is taken to get involved in this specific place 
with a specific type of project. This occurs even if it falls outside of the agreed upon MSF action plan, 
and even if they have not yet received a mandate from the local government. The objective is to enable 
projects throughout the fast strung and intransparent emergency phase and to base project mandates on 
needs alone, not the availability of funding. Nevertheless, commonly agencies do not have the capacity 
to act without their headquarters' consent; and even if they do they do not often do so. 
350 Interview with Karen Moore, 8 May 2003. 
351 Interview with Simon Arthy. 
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evaluation teams tended to be small and short-term; their assessment, therefore,, often 
based on data provided by the implementing agencies themselves. Nevertheless, over the 
last few years DFID has made an effort to increase its in-house capacity to monitor and 
evaluate programmes. This was done mostly by enlarging it base of affiliated consultants 
and, therewith, strengthening departmental operationability. 
In almost all cases, programme evaluation rested on agents' self-evaluation. Many of 
those organisations interviewed had some form of evaluation as part of their project terms 
of references. Some organisations had standardised these procedures across all sectors. 
However, many stated that donors were hesitant to finance mission evaluations and impact 
assessments. Most agencies mentioned that evaluations were undertaken in-house through 
local (and at times headquarter based) evaluation teams. Few distinctly focused on 
programme impact assessment. In Sierra Leone, Action Aid and Oxfam stated they 
undertook programme evaluations, on the basis of local workshops and assessments, as a 
standardized approach for project appraisal and implementation. The objective was to 
increase local ownership and project sustainability. This, however, was an exception. 
Rarely were evaluations and impact assessments standardised. Even more rarely were they 
filtered into local, regional or international databases that would facilitate and encourage 
inter-agency lessons learned and early warning mechanisms. In the words of one aid 
worker in Sierra Leone: lessons learned are a joke, so far. We have got neither the time 
nor the money to undertake the necessary assessment. If evaluations are undertaken, they 
are often donor driven and financed . 352 
Most importantly, evaluations were frequently based on prior project outlines, or terms 
of reference. These assessed overall change according to quantifiable contractual 
indicators, such as medical statistics. The danger was that such an approach to programme 
evaluation over-attributed quantitative indicators (saved lives) and remained weak on 
comprehensive impact assessment that is meaningful beyond limited project outlines. The 
danger, furthermore, is that quantitative evaluations based on project success or failure 
disregarded the overall project value or relevance. All interviews undertaken clearly 
displayed a focus on inputs and outputs comparisons, rather than local change. 
Programme success was, therefore, assessed in terms of fulfilment of contracts indicators 
rather than real and substantial change in the circumstances of a vulnerable population. As 
352 Confidential interview with regional manager of humanitarian aid organisation in Freetown, 2003. 
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a result, programme success could easily be `guaranteed' to a donor. As one aid worker put 
it. `generally DPID cares less than other donors who implements what projects and how, as 
long as audit figures are ok and accountability can be assumed'. " 
Wael Ibrahim mentioned that as an essential part of their impact assessments, Oxfam 
analysed, for example, who were the main benefactors of the intervention, who suffered 
through it. It also regularly assessed programmes' impact on conflict. These assessments 
were elements of their strategic accountability as they involved analysing what alternative 
strategies might be pursued. Oxfam mentioned it had a clear interest in moving towards 
'best practices' and re-informing strategies. This, however, also was an exception. Most 
agencies interviewed professed they had not standardized impact assessments; often such 
evaluations were not undertaken at all. ' Interviews also showed that there was a high 
degree of misunderstanding or disagreement regarding the contents of and rationale for 
impact assessment evaluations. As one aid worker put it: `impact assessment is a sexy 
trend, but what else'. "' 
3.4.3 Mechanisms of Donor Evaluation and Monitoring 
According to all interviewees, DFID required frequent project evaluations. It was also 
repeatedly mentioned that DFID had displayed an interest in assisting organisations in 
reporting on and evaluating projects. DFID's reporting requirements were considered to 
be extensive but more straightforward and flexible than other donors'. The donor did not 
request implementing agents to assess their programmes' impact on the ongoing peace 
process. According to the head of DFID in Sierra Leone, Ian Stuart, at times DFID paid 
external contractors to assess funded work's impact on the peace process. Such 
evaluations, however, were usually not part of the project contracts with implementing 
organisations. '5' Most agencies interviewed argued that donors, including but not 
exclusively DFID, regularly visited projects in Sierra Leone, and that donor oversight was 
tight. However, most also argued that donors rarely had a clear understanding of project 
content and processes. Several pointed out that such monitoring was both a chance to 
"' Confidential interview with humanitarian aid organisation, Freetown, 2003. 
35' Confidential interview with humanitarian aid organisations and private contractors, Freetown, 2003. 
sss Confidential interview with humanitarian aid organisation, Freetown, 2003. 
356 Interview with Ian Stuart, 29 May 2003. 
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introduce donors to local realities and project successes as much as a liability and burden as 
it hindered ongoing work and sometimes led to donor interference. "' 
None of those interviewed was aware of DFID-specific evaluation or guidelines. Most 
professed to have a vague memorandum of understanding with donor organisations on 
every project. All of these contracts entailed clear output indicators that an organisation 
had to live up to for audit purposes. Each agency had to account for those objcctivcs and 
report on the programme status on a frequent basis. 
DFID reporting guidelines were thought to have become much stricter and demanding 
once the emergency phase had passed, irrespective of the obvious continuing need for 
emergency goods. Some organisations mentioned that it was 'very hard to justify funding 
now'. This argument was substantiated in a public lecture by a British Government official 
who argued that donor funding often did not match up to the cycles of need. Most 
donors, including the United Kingdom, tended to be too late to intervene in a 
humanitarian emergency as well as too eager to exit again (most often within two to three 
years). 358 Given the lack of clarity regarding the grey area between emergency and 
development, agencies and donors alike appeared confused with regard to the applicable 
rules, regulations and emphasis of process ss9 
Several interviewees argued that it was much easier to work with DFID compared to 
some other. donors. 360 The majority of those interviewed assumed that DFID as a donor 
organisation was comparably flexible and lenient, despite its demand for complex 
reporting. During the emergency, it was thought to have been comparatively easy to alter 
project foci once funding had been agreed upon, as long as the implementing organisation 
made a formal request and justified their decision. '' Some organisations complained that 
standards did not apply equally to all organisations funded through the British 
Government, and that DFID itself did not comply with its own guidelines. All criticised 
that DFID rarely gave meaningful feedback on project evaluations and negative funding 
requests. 
357 Confidential interview with a multilateral humanitarian emergency organisation, Freetown 2003. 
358 Jonathan Marshall, Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office, Government of the United Kingdom, lecture at the 
Peaceworkers UK Annual General Meeting (21 May 2004). 
3" Confidential interview with large bilateral humanitarian emergency organisation, Sierra Leone, 2003. 
3,0 Confidential interview with large bilateral humanitarian organisation, Sierra Leone, 2003. 
361 Interviews with Tanja Zulevic, International Medical Corps (IMC), Country Manager, Freetown, 8 May 
2003; and interview with Christian Smida, GTZ-International Services, Freetown, I May 2003. 
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Most also argued that the British policy formulation and evaluation processes appeared 
poorly integrated. In particular the fact that most evaluations were based on organisational 
self-evaluation limited the ability to aggregate comparative data that could have informed 
future policy making and project implementation. This allowed implementing 
organisations greater independence, but also enabled them to avoid programme impact 
assessment and reduced donor control A DFID consultant mentioned: 
It is completely unclear how many international civilian advisors there are 
within the GoSL. There are very confused reporting lines to London, in 
particular as the responsible line managers constantly change. I report to 
DFID in London on a monthly basis, but I never receive any feedback. I 
send a copy of my report to Ian Stuart. There is no central strategic 
control or formalised meetings with everybody, even though about every 
two weeks there is some sort of DFID meeting. I have also got ad hoc 
meetings on and off whenever required. Despite this lose control, I work 
off very clear DFID guidelines, yet am forced to overstepCing these all 
the time as about 80% of our work is pure trouble shooting. 2 
This argument was supported by a bilateral humanitarian organisation's country 
director, who argued that DFID had employed a large number of people as individuals, but 
not as teams with a specific purpose. The result was fragmented operations driven by 
DFID as an umbrella organisation but with limited control. Some interviewees mentioned 
they believed that donors in the field were often ignorant of policy developments and more 
concerned with ticking off their quantitative output indicators than assessing real impact 
and progress. " Some mentioned that accountability and evaluation, furthermore, only 
made a difference if it was based on local information and an understanding of local 
d required to meet requirements. In their opinion, donors were often too far removed an 
goals too different from those of implementing agents, to sufficiently understand local 
conditions and requirements. 
3.4.4 Organisational Learning by Implementing Ag ne ts364 
The vast majority of all non-governmental humanitarian organisations interviewed in 
Sierra Leone criticised their own organisation's as well as partners' lack of organisational 
learning mechanisms. Most argued this was due to a lack of analysis and contingency 
planning. This forced organisations to start from scratch in each emergency and following 
362 Confidential interview with DFID consultant, Sierra Leone, 2003. 
363 Confidential interview with humanitarian emergency organisation, Sierra Leone, 2003. 3" Please note that the concluding chapter seven includes an analysis of DFID's capacity for organizational 
learning. It is therefore not subject of this sub-section. 
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(frequent and rapid) staff turnovers This had a negative effect on strategic policy 
formulation, the upholding of partnerships and cost efficiency. Strategic policy 
formulation was also affected by an organisational failure to think long-term due to short- 
term funding and the inability to uphold stand-by regional logistics capacities. Given their 
total dependence on project funding, many organisations professed to generally lose their 
institutional memory with each completed project. Given the resultant need to re-identify 
partner organisations, re-train staff and re-build capacity with each new project, these 
organisations incurred significantly higher start up costs. Some NGOs argued they tried to 
retain their local staff in order to ensure stability and sustainability beyond funding periods. 
This often proved to be difficult. With the onset of the development phase in Sierra Leone 
and the resultant bilateral (government to government) aid relationship, international 
organisations were prohibited from upholding their so-called incentive schemes (eluding to 
top up payments to national salaries). This frequently resulted in the loss of trained local 
staff (in particular as the GoSL continued to face a real shortfall in public funds). Some 
organisations invited their field personnel for annual strategic reviews, in which staff 
themselves set future strategic objectives. Most often, however, field staff appeared little 
involved in strategic agenda setting. However, they held a relatively high degree of input 
on project objectives due to the remoteness of most areas of engagement they were fairly 
independent and far removed from headquarter control This allowed agency field offices 
to essentially shape local policy, limited only by the availability of resources. 
IS Conclusion on Control 
In summary, this study uncovered a wide-ranging absence of donor control over field 
based policy implementation. It was unable to determine common mechanisms of a wider 
humanitarian emergency strategy or donor mechanisms of effective programme evaluation. 
The research also showed a high degree of flexibility and, at the local level, agent 
independence. However, independence was severely restricted by a general absence of 
long-term funding and strategic planning. 
Nevertheless DFID had the ability to place conditions on funding agencies and 
programmes. Some of these conditions might have been political. It is difficult to 
differentiate between political conditionality and perceived operational necessity (as was the 
case when several governments and ECHO selectively withdrew the funding of agencies 
365 A range of confidential interviews with humanitarian aid organisations in Sierra Leone in 2002 and 2003. 
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working within the Taliban controlled Afghanistan). With regard to humanitarian 
operations in Sierra Leone, DFID has, according to some humanitarian NGOs, used the 
lack of staff security as an argument to force DFID funded organisations to work in 
specific areas only, to suspend operations or to withdraw altogether. ' Allegedly, 
allegations of insecurity were exaggerated, applied inconsistently (EU funded organisations 
were `allowed to remain) or utilized only when politically opportune. This could be both a 
symbol of donor control or conditionality of humanitarian emergency assistance. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated selected aspects of UK sponsored emergency assistance projects 
in Sierra Leone that enabled or inhibited successful implementation of donor policy. This 
chapter concluded that policy implementation fell short of the majority of previously 
defined minimum standards of successful policy implementation. New Humanitarianism 
was neither explicitly communicated to implementing agents, nor did humanitarian 
emergency organisations make a consistent effort to co-ordinate on the basis of common 
objectives. On the contrary; the fragmentation and diversity of the aid environment and a 
pervasive lack of information undermined effective common agenda setting. Both were 
aggravated by the vagueness of the British New Humanitarianism and the breadth and 
complexity of the British intervention in Sierra Leone. Greater policy clarity and more 
assertive publication of donor objectives would have mitigated some of the inconsistencies. 
However, without much more effective rules of implementation, division of responsibility 
and more persistent donor monitoring of field programmes, it remains highly improbable 
that New Humanitarianism could have functioned effectively in Sierra Leone. 
In order to prevent unnecessary repetitions, the following, final chapter rather than this 
section undertakes an assessment of the effectiveness of the British emergency assistance 
policy implementation process and the effectiveness of implementing British policy. 
Chapter seven also appraises the likelihood of successfully implementing British New 
I Iumanitarianism in a post war environment in Sierra Leone. 
366 Action Aid, `Inter-Agency meeting'. 
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VII. Shifting Sands: British New Humanitarianism and Sierra 
Leone 
This thesis has analysed the contents, rationale and implementation of the British New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. The objective has been to investigate the policy's 
coherence and efficacy. To that end, this thesis has explored the extent to which UK 
policy has changed since 1997 towards a broader concept of humanitarian emergency 
assistance. It has also assessed whether policy was translated into a Sierra Leone country 
strategy and programmes. Finally, it has analysed the effectiveness of the policy's 
implementation environment. In other words it explored whether or not the 
administrative structure for policy implementation supported New Humanitarianism. The 
objective of this analysis was to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 
implementation process, and by doing so isolating those aspects that need to be addressed 
in order to raise policy efficiency and effectiveness. The analysis was underpinned by two 
key hypotheses: Firstly, that senior policy makers within the Cabinet Office and DFID had 
attempted to broaden the concept of humanitarian emergency assistance towards 
integrating human rights and peacebuilding concerns. Secondly, that the process of policy 
implementation and the disjointedness of the implementation environment prohibited 
policy change. It was not conducive to delivering policy goals. Both hypotheses were 
proven to be correct. However, at the local-level New Humanitarianism had been less 
assertively promoted than strategic policy guidelines outlining New humanitarianism had 
at first suggested. British humanitarian relief policy as implemented in Sierra Leone had 
changed less substantially than originally anticipated, and as was suggested by the British 
Government's rhetoric in support of New Humanitarianism. The results of this thesis 
highlight a tension within British humanitarian policy between the political rhetoric at the 
senior headquarter level within DFID and policy execution in Sierra Leone. Despite this 
tension this thesis reaches significant conclusions on the coherence of New 
Humanitarianism and the effectiveness of policy implementation: 
At the policy formulation level, key personnel assumed that humanitarian emergency 
assistance had the capacity to address wider political objectives and could (and should) be 
integrated within peacebuilding strategies. In order to raise its efficacy, they developed the 
British New Humanitarianism and advocated the concept of a rclief to-development 
continuum. New Humanitarianism, however, failed to be consistently implemented or 
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promoted in Sierra Leone. It proved far less compatible and complimentary to the broader 
peacebuilding strategy than originally anticipated. Also, its implementation could not easily 
be controlled. This disconnect between strategy at the senior policy making level and the 
country strategy as implemented in Sierra Leone was never acknowledged or addressed, 
neither at headquarters nor in the field. At a rhetorical level, British senior policy makers 
within DFID and the FCO continued to argue emergency assistance's integration within 
the overall British peacebuilding strategy in Sierra Leone. This was not mirrored by their 
actions; on the contrary, the field workers broadly disregarded New Humanitarianism. 
Both the lack of clear policy and the ineffectiveness of the policy implementation process 
undermined a coherent interpretation of New Humanitarianism and its application in Sierra 
Leone. According to the finding of this thesis, it is likely that even if the British 
government had developed and disseminated a clear and effective humanitarian policy 
coherent implementation in Sierra Leone would still have been weakened by the 
inconsistencies within the policy implementation structure. 
This chapter draws out key results regarding the effectiveness of the implementation 
process of New Humanitarianism and its impact on policy coherence (both at the strategic 
level and in Sierra Leone). In a second step it discusses significant changes in the 
operational environment (more specifically the increasing privatisation and militarisation of 
British emergency assistance). It then discusses and pays tribute to the British 
Government's efforts of drawing lessons from its previous engagement and investigating in 
future policy development The thesis concludes by identifying overall recommendations 
that contribute towards improving British humanitarian emergency assistance. 
1. Conclusions on the implementation Process of UK Policy 
The following section sn*nmarce$ this study's principal findings on the process of 
policy implementation. In doing so it follows the key criteria of successful policy 
iraPlementation as identified in chapter two. In order to prevent repetition, the analysis is 
kept brief. Conclusions that could be drawn in several sections are not repeated. 
Zl Policylmplementation 
1.1.1 flear. sistent PoL+cr OjZjectires 
Chapter three analysed the contents of the British New Humanitarianism in detail. It 
concluded that the principles of engagement remained too vague to initiate their common 
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network-wide interpretation. Furthermore, the British Government had not provided any 
guidelines on how to deal with possible foreign policy contradictions. Nor did the majority 
of the DFID administration support a rights-sensitive or conflict-sensitive approach to 
humanitarian emergency assistance. On the contrary, such an approach was initially a top- 
down process, driven by a minority of key decision makers. There was disagreement over 
whether British aid should focus on supporting a vulnerable individual here and now, or 
potentially vulnerable population groups as a whole in the medium-term. Chapters five 
and six showed that this lack of policy agreement and co-ordination was exacerbated in the 
field, given the linkages between emergency assistance, development and security 
programmes (which demanded quite a different focus and modus operan&). According to 
many interviews with governmental and non-governmental personnel in Sierra Leone, the 
UK Government appeared to make up the rules as they went along. Consequently, policy 
interpretation depended on the beliefs of key personnel, and the behaviour of policy 
implementation personnel was unlikely to be consistent This inconsistent interpretation of 
principles led to contradictory communications between DFID's field staff and partner 
organisations, and did not facilitate a common understanding of Britain's objectives in 
Sierra Leone with regard to the role of emergency assistance. Given the British policy's 
vulnerability to external shock: (that is shifts within foreign policy objectives due to 
international developments or changes within the policy coalition), neither DFID nor its 
implementing organisations were able to define long-term strategies. Selectivity rather than 
transparent strategic principles appeared to guide the choice of programmes and partner 
organisations. 
Similarly, as in any area of engagement, there were a wide variety of objectives and 
mandates within the international aid community. Even more so than donor organisations, 
non-governmental humanitarian organisations were reluctant or unable to define clear 
operational strategies beyond general priorities. Randolph Kent argues that this is mainly 
due to the fact that relief organisations 1) usually react spontaneously to need rather than 
engage in longer-term prior strategic planning; 2) have few resources to undertake strategic 
Pining and 3) at the field level tend to believe strategic policy planning is not relevant to 
their work and instead the responsibility of far-removed headquarters. "' This was 
emphasized by several of those field workers interviewed in Sierra Leone, who complained 
367 RAndol h Ken% P `Iiumanitacian Futures: Practical Policy Perspectives', HPN Nd"rk P*ff 46 (April 
2004), S. 
-201- 
Chaptcr VII = Shifting Sands: British New Humanitarianism and Sicrra Lconc 
about a lack of information, time and resources ' that would allow them to effectively 
analyse regional conditions and need and to engage in long-term programming. 
1.1.2 Credibility and Adequate Empirical and Theoretical Reasoning 
From the outset, New Humanitarianism was based on a set of disputed assumptions, as 
the British Government cherry-picked from the international debates on `new wars', `Do 
No Harm' and `humanitarian principles'. This was discussed in detail in chapters three and 
four of this study. The theoretical underpinnings of the broader aspects of DFID's 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy did not succeed in sufficiently encouraging the 
support of implementing agents. Alternatively, these principles and objectives were not 
adequately relayed to the implementing agents. Given the remoteness of many areas of 
engagement and despite DFID's field representation, donor programming and decision- 
making was often based on limited information of local conditions. DFID relied heavily 
on information provided by humanitarian organisations and other British actors present in 
Sierra Leone, for example, the military. Interviews in London and Freetown showed 
inconsistencies between headquarters' and field staffs interpretation of policy objectives, 
which were possibly exacerbated by staff's divergent access to policy debates and' their 
accountability to a different clientele. Senior policy decision makers were accountable to 
ministers and electorate, field staff was accountable to UK bureaucrats and Sierra 
Leoneans, that is local stakeholders. This inability to make evidence-based programming 
decisions reconfirms the need for dear policy principles and rules of engagement. 
The UK government's image in Sierra Leone had taken significant flack. For example, 
interviewees both in London and Freetown pointed out that the UK's credibility had been 
damaged following its involvement with Sandline in breaking the UN arms embargo, 
Similarly, some referred to DFID's lack of transparency in donor/agency relations and its 
one-sided push for agency (yet not donor) accountability. Furthermore, some 
humanitarian organisations in Sierra Leone stressed that, given the UK's military 
involvement in Sierra Leone, any cooperation with British departments compromised their 
neutrality. All of these arguments possibly highlight a lack of donor credibility. This, 
however, could not be substantiated within interviews undertaken in Sierra Leone. Despite 
criticism, the majority of those interviewed expressed their interest in and respect for 
British personnel and the wider British engagement in Sierra Leone. 
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1.1.3 Transparen ; Predictability and Long-Term Policy Stabili 
Given the absence of clear principles on humanitarian emergency assistance and rules of 
implementation, interviews pointed towards a lack of transparent decisions regarding both 
programmes and partners. This, naturally, was worsened by the vulnerability of the British 
engagement to external shock, as discussed in the previous section. The absence of 
formalised channels of communication and frequent staff rotation contributed further to 
incomprehensible policy and programme decisions and a lack of policy predictability. At 
the operational level in particular, relationships between organisations were heavily 
influenced by personal contacts. This overall lack of information and the volatile and 
rushed emergency environment increased the spread of rumours and encouraged decision 
making on the basis of anecdotes. More transparent policy formulation and donor decision 
making or more open dialogue with implementing organisations (at the strategic and local 
levels) would have gone a long way towards preventing this. 
An overall lack of transparency and policy predictability, as well as a need to ensure 
programme and organisational survival led to `shopping bag' behaviour on the part of 
humanitarian organisations. This meant that instead of always basing their programme 
proposals on in-house principles and prior needs assessments, organisations were tempted 
to second-guess donor priorities and jump onto the donor funding band-wagon. 
The volatility of the local environment and the scarcity of resources (both within Sierra 
Leone and in terms of available donor funding for emergency programmes) undermined 
the long-term planning and sustainability of programmes. As such, it also inhibited the 
aggregation of comparable data, the drawing of lessons and reform. Furthermore, a move 
from relief to development (as demanded by DFID and other donors) required the 
presence of a functioning state. Neither political developments in Sierra Leone nor donor 
engagement were predictable. Without predictable donor behaviour and aid flows, aid 
conditionality is even less likely to function successfully. Not only does (humanitarian) aid 
conditionality incur high costs, it also has very limited impact on political change. The 
latter is especially relevant in particular in so-called `poor performing countries', that is 
countries that do not comply with UK Governments governance standards. Furthermore, 
it is particularly relevant given the limited ownership of reform endeavours in the case of 
Sierra Leone and, most importantly, a lack of donor reliability and predictability. 
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1.1.4 Rules of Implementation and Support-by a Committed and %Vell-Qualified 
Bureaucracy and Implementing A=nts 
DFID's early enthusiastic rights-based and conflict management rhetoric was clearly 
driven by a minority within the department's leadership. Despite the tendency of the 
British development bureaucracy to favour longer-term, developmental approaches, the 
speed and contents of bureaucratic adaptation did not match the potentially significant 
policy innovation of New Humanitarianism. On the contrary, the British implementation 
bureaucracy showed itself reluctant to take a politically informed New Humanitarianism 
forward, both at the strategic level in Britain and the operational level in Sierra Leone. 
The involvement of a large number of departments and individuals from several 
ministries in the design and implementation of the British policy in Sierra Leone had 
important consequences for the programme's cohesion and transparency. This separation 
of power and competing and overlapping responsibilities and objectives within the British 
administration, while allowing for a degree of necessary and welcome flexibility, 
undermined a coherent interpretation of and approach to DFID's principles of a New 
Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. The fragmentation of the aid bureaucracy and inter- 
ministerial confrontation, suspicion and rivalry undermined policy and implementation 
clarity. Its piecemeal outsourcing to specialised departments and implementing agents 
prohibited common agenda setting, policy interpretation and co-ordination. This was 
accentuated by the latent antagonism of some of the actors involved. 
Most importantly, humanitarian organisations made only minimal investment in 
prioritising on the basis of a common agenda. They were extremely cautious about 
becoming a tool for donor foreign policy objectives. This study contends that this was 
partially due to the fact that donors and humanitarian organisations were accountable to 
different clients. More fundamentally, humanitarian non-governmental actors received 
their legitimacy from acting independently from governmental direction and on the basis of 
neutrality and impartiality. As a result, active donor engagement in programmatic decision- 
making was mostly understood as detrimental and a sign of micro-management. 
Given the multitude of actors involved in its design, implementation and evaluation, 
DFID policy making and , implementation suffcrcd from unclear lines of responsibility and 
lack of control It was further undermined by the detachment of those responsible for 
DFID humanitarian emergency policy from the implementation area and the difficulty in 
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assigning responsibility for programme success and failure. The failure to ensure assertive 
dissemination of donor objectives and uphold transparent lines of communication was 
detrimental to the consolidation of a wider approach to humanitarian emergency assistance. 
1.1.5 Control 
Overall, DFID had little capacity to drive and control programme implementation. 
Frequent staff rotation, a lack of institutional memory and a fast moving policy 
environment exacerbated problems. Arguably, DFID might also have had little interest in 
getting involved in (and taking responsibility for) project execution. Not only would such 
an attempt have stretched its capacity, it would also have further complicated strategic 
policy making. Furthermore, both the donor organisation and implementing partners were 
interested in and depended upon programme execution and programme success (whether 
real or perceived). This further weakened potential' control mechanisms, such as the 
suspension of funding. 
As a donor organisation, DFID controlled programme contents and implementation 
through the power of the purse. Most often, contracts with implementation partner 
organisations outlined programme contents and areas of operations (with the exception of 
multilateral block funding). Such contracts also specified mandatory reporting and 
evaluation conditions. However, once funding had been granted, DFID had little capacity 
to influence programme direction and the details of project implementation, other than 
through the suspension of funding. In terms of resources (personnel and time), DFID had 
little in-house capacity to monitor programmes in remote areas of operation. To some 
extent, this was improved with the increased appointment of staff and the delegation of 
DFID authority to field offices. Given that DFID relied on partner self-evaluations, it was 
unlikely to have grounds for the suspension of funding. More importantly, both DFID 
and implementing organisations relied on the successful release of funds and positive 
programme evaluations. Both had an interest in long-term, successful partnerships. This 
further reduced the likelihood of the suspension or withdrawal of funding and negative 
programme reports. According to interviews undertaken in the course of this study, DFID 
has not generally made assertive use of available control mechanisms. Ilowever, it was 
frequently mentioned that DFID demanded extensive reports on programme 
implementation and generally expected project impact assessments (which, however, were 
mostly based on inadequate quantitative indicators of project output). Several 
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humanitarian organisations also stressed that it was difficult to obtain longer-term funding 
for humanitarian programmes in Sierra Leone. 
1.1.6 Ownership and Proportional ty of Impact 
Given the extreme lack of resources, Sierra Leone and its government were extremely 
vulnerable. Furthermore, while democratically elected, the GoSL's legitimacy remained 
contested both from within and, to a lesser extent, internationally. It depended on the 
backing of the international donor community and the provision of security through 
international peacekeepers and the British `force on the horizon'. As such, the GbSL was 
pliable to donor demands. This did not make it controllable. On the contrary. as of now, 
the GoSL lacks the capacity to control its own members, to effectively set a policy agenda 
and to efficiently organise public service provision. Just as much as its primary donors, in 
particular the British Government, it depends on continued stability and the eventual 
success of the peace and reconstruction process. Having disproportionately invested in the 
restoration of peace and democracy in Sierra Leone, the UK Government has tied itself to 
the success of its intervention and the fate of the Kabbah administration. According to 
interviews with British personnel, the British Government has long been searching for a 
more effective way to hold the GoSL accountable and for an exit strategy from Sierra 
Leone. Furthermore, there was no consensus within the British government as to future 
policy direction. Parts of the British administration found it more important than others to 
further invest into Sierra Leone and its government in order to uphold the overall peace 
process, than to hold the GoSL accountable to its commitments regarding democratic 
decision-making and reform. 
More importantly, the UK might have had some means to. control the political 
administration in Sierra Leone, but it had little leverage over those forces that might still 
attempt to exploit or stall the peace process. Available control and conditionality 
mechanisms do little to determine the behaviour of the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses and those benefiting from instability and illicit extraction. This puts into question 
the utility of aid conditionality in order to change the behaviour of rogue forces. The 
impact of suspending relief programmes would be disproportionately higher on the victims 
of abuse and the stakeholders of relief aid. 
Given the extreme level of vulnerability, ownership of relief and reconstruction 
programmes has been limited. This is despite many aid organisations' attempt to undertake 
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needs assessment missions and programme appraisals with stakeholder involvement. Only 
in the long-term will it be possible to assess the wider impact of rights-sensitive and 
conflict-sensitive programmes. It remains doubtful, however, whether such a time frame 
will be available, given the likelihood of an earlier withdrawal of the donor community. 
1.1.7 Co-ordination and Coherence 
The previous sections have shown that there was only a limited degree of co-ordination 
in the execution of humanitarian emergency programmes in Sierra Leone. This was 
partially due to a priori vague and possibly even contradicting political guidelines. Mostly it 
was due to highly fragmented and competitive policy making and policy implementation 
environments, and the occurrence of a multitude of mandates. Given the nature of the 
international relief network and the complexity of many areas of operation, this is unlikely 
to change. The utility of conditional wider relief is thus fundamentally reduced as an 
instrument to achieve political change. That said, this argument does not deny a potential 
positive impact at the project level or as an aspect of a bilateral donor/aid organisation 
relationship. Also, it has to be noted that 
... there is evidence that 
UK stakeholders are coordinating their activities 
more effectively than was the case prior to 2001 before the [Conflict 
Prevention] Pools were set up. As one official put it, "we now have 
scrutiny of each other's activities and have input into them that would 
not have happened pre-Pools". Both in the field and in Whitehall there is 
regular formal and informal coordination and information sharing. " 
1.1.8 Monitoring. Evaluation and Accountability 
Generally, humanitarian emergency operations as well as policy making are hampered by 
a lack of solid information. This includes the absence of information on local 
environments, evaluation of existing relief interventions and policy objectives. An overall 
information asymmetry between all actors involved in the process, in particular between 
headquarter and the field, not only limits co-ordination and coherence but also future 
agenda setting. Both donors and relief organisations in Sierra Leone invested resources 
into programme monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment. All were aware of a 
necessity to strengthen such assessments and to record programme data on an ongoing 
basis. Nevertheless, too few resources (including time and personnel) were made available 
to undertake meaningful and sufficiently extensive evaluations. This was partially due to 
363 Department for International Development (DFID), Eudwatiox of the Conflid PPrtenlion Pools: Siena ! tone, 
Evaluation Report 647 (London: Department for International Development (DFID), March 2004). 
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the volatility and rushed nature of emergency programme areas and the immediate and 
extreme needs of vulnerable populations. It might also have been partially due to a general 
lack of will amongst donor and agencies alike to `waste' valuable resources on quasi- 
administrative exercises. And to some extent, it was also due to the reluctance of actors, 
both donors and humanitarian organisations, to give away information that was deemed 
highly valuable. Last but not least, engagement in complex emergency causes a high level 
of insecurity and personal stress. It also requires considerable imagination, commitment 
and personal sacrifice. This might further limit aid workers' acceptance of criticism and 
policy change, in particular if driven by a remote donor. 
1.1.9 Flexibility 
Relief aid programmes in Sierra Leone were mostly constricted by either a lack of access 
to vulnerable populations or a lack of resources. To some extent they were limited by 
donor selectivity of programmes and partner organisation, or donor priority setting. On 
the whole, aid agencies operating in Sierra Leone were free to operate independently. 
According to British Government publications, DFID is. increasingly focusing on 
strengthening reporting and evaluation requirements. The department itself is under 
increasing pressure from other parts of the government to account for resources spent on 
aid operations. It has remains to be seen whether the department will make an effort to go 
beyond limited project evaluations on the basis of short-term quantitative output 
indicators, or whether it will be given the means to invest in longer-term programme 
impact assessment. It will also have to be seen whether such an undertaking will increase 
the perception of a donor/agency `master and servant' relationship, or whether meaningful 
evaluations can be undertaken in partnership with the aid community. 
1.2 Conclusions on the UKNewHumanitan'anism 
In 1997-99 the British Government at the strategic, policy making level assumed that 
humanitarian emergency aid had a role within the pursuit of wider political objectives, 
including development, management of violent conflict and support for human rights. To 
that end DFID drafted the 1998 principles of New Humanitarianism and top-level 
bureaucrats acquired an assertive rights-based and conflict-sensitive rhetoric. New 
Humanitarianism incorporated objectives beyond the immediate, life-saving mandate of 
traditional or principled humanitarian emergency assistance. Its objective was to be more 
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informed by - and in support of - conflict prevention and development. In theory, instead 
of responding to need alone British aid was also meant to `identify and address root causes 
of conflicts and integrate humanitarian emergency assistance into approaches to bring 
about lasting peace .' 
Regardless of this, 'British New Humanitarianism never amounted to a clear and 
rigorously supported humanitarian aid policy. While there existed a vision of a wider 
humanitarian relief policy on the strategic level, it failed to generate sufficient support from 
the policy making and implementation bureaucracies to translate general policy guidelines 
into clear humanitarian emergency assistance country strategies. The policy's general 
vagueness had important consequences for the implementation of humanitarian emergency 
operations and for DFID's relationship with implementing partner organisations. 
Ambiguity allowed for flexibility in implementation; yet it also precluded coherence and co- 
ordination, two essential aspects the British Government had set out to improve. What is 
more, the British Government did not assist aid organisations in maximising their impact 
on behalf of a wider peacebuilding strategy. 
Once power structures within DFID and between British government ministries shifted, 
and as Britain became extensively engaged on other military fronts, such as in the Middle 
East, senior DFID executives within DFID and the Cabinet Office scaled down their 
rhetoric on a wider approach to humanitarian emergency assistance. New 
Humanitarianism was replaced by a less public, more selective, improvised and bilateral 
approach to humanitarian emergency assistance policy implementation. Instead of further 
strengthening its key policy priorities and disseminating them widely to implementing 
organisations, DFID concentrated on strengthening its managerial oversight of the delivery 
of humanitarian emergency relief. Furthermore, the department attempted to increase its 
control over policy implementation by being more selective in its choice of implementing 
partner organisations and by `privatising' large aspects of it. Overall, New 
Humanitarianism lacked a common understanding of the majority of organisations 
involved in its implementation, a clear and co-ordinated goal and, as a consequence, 
leverage. This includes leverage over both the potential spoilers of the peace process in 
Sierra Leone and those parts of the British implementation network opposed to 
broadening humanitarian mandates. DFID did not promote an ongoing, active, impartial 
369 Overseas Development Institute, The New International Development 4a, 5. 
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and critical network-wide dialogue with non-governmental humanitarian relief 
organisations on the future of humanitarian aid. Instead, like other large donors, it tacitly 
promoted an agenda that benefited the privatisation and militarisation of relief aid. 
L3 UFi New"Humanitarianism and Sierra Leone 
Also on the operational level in Sierra Leone, the British New Humanitarianism fell far 
short of a clear and coherent strategy. Contrary to the British rhetoric of humanitarian 
emergency aid strategy and the original assumptions of this thesis, no clear or co-ordinated 
wider emergency aid strategy and' policy on Sierra Leone could' be distinguished. At no 
point was it implemented in Sierra Leone beyond some localised areas of engagement. Nor 
did the UK consistently apply political conditionality to humanitarian emergency assistance 
programmes. The de facto British humanitarian emergency assistance policy in Sierra Leone 
differed significantly from British emergency assistance guiding principles, and the 
principles of successful policy implementation as analysed in chapters two, three and six of 
this study. It remained reactive and improvised and commanded little leverage over 
stakeholder behaviour. It also lacked stability and predictability. At no point did the 
British Government, its field presence in Sierra Leone nor the broad aid implementation 
network achieve agreement on policy objectives and co-ordinated implementation. British 
engagement in Sierra Leone has to be understood as a work in progress, as rules and 
procedures were developed as they went along. As one senior British staff member put it: 
`DFID has been making up rules while going along with little prior planning and 
assessment'. 310 Initially the overall British engagement in Sierra Leone benefited from a 
high-level political commitment (both the Secretary of State for International Development 
and the Prime Minister were personally involved in decision making) and inter-ministerial 
co-ordination. Yet, inter-ministerial and inter-departmental co-ordination proved 
incrementally more difficult throughout its implementation, and was finally found to be 
weak. "1 
The guiding principle of humanitarian emergency assistance in Sierra Leone was that it 
was expected to fit into British foreign policy objectives. As such, it was to support the 
ongoing peace and restructuring process and in the long-term contribute to overcoming 
the root causes of the war. Aid was utilised to keep the peace process afloat and 
370 Confidential interview with senior DFID executive, London, 2003. 
371 Interview with senior personnel, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), London, summer 2003. 
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theoretically (but unsuccessfully) as an incentive for structural and democratic change. In 
other respects humanitarian programmes in Sierra Leone did not differ from traditional 
humanitarian approaches. The UK showed that it was interested in aid agencies addressing 
conflict and human rights. It did not, however, identify clear strategic objectives for the 
delivery of emergency assistance or encourage coherent countrywide implementation of 
New Humanitarianism in Sierra Leone. In chapter five, this study concluded that: 
1) British-funded aid agencies operating in Sierra Leone cherry picked programmes 
which they thought responded to local- need (without necessarily undertaking needs- 
assessments to substantiate this claim), were in key donors' interest and which they 
though they were able to complete. The majority of all programmes and projects 
did not include effective impact assessments; 
2) '1 humanitarian relief was integrated within wider peacebuilding objectives in as much 
as it merged (deliberately as well as inadvertently) with developmental reintegration 
and community empowerment programmes and as humanitarian programmes were 
not supposed to contradict British foreign policy objectives. It was not consistently 
burdened with conditionality requirements; 
3) The UK was unlikely to run a comparably comprehensive programme in Africa in 
the near future; and 
4) The British Government would strengthen its endeavour to outsource humanitarian 
programmes in complex political emergencies to private (profit driven) or security 
companies. 
Given the vulnerability of the fledgling Sierra Leonean state and the scarcity of 
resources, the country was a relatively easy target for assertive donor agenda setting. As the 
most extensively engaged Western donor, the UK acted almost with impunity in Sierra 
Leone. Without stronger support and political agenda setting from a functioning Sierra 
Leonean Government and greater donor coherence, the British intervention (in particular 
the aid intervention) threatens to remain unsustainable. The British intervention in Sierra 
Leone temporarily stopped the immediate violence. The immediate influx of large 
amounts of relief aid sustained the cease-fire and laid the foundation for a peace process. 
The death of key figures within the leadership of the RUP and the rogue parts of the Sierra 
Leonean army (in particular Fodoy Sankoh, Sam Bokaric and Johnny Paul Koroma) and 
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the uprooting of President Charles Taylor in Liberia, brought about a new political reality 
in Sierra Leone and curtailed the opportunities for rebellion. However, as of today none of 
this has yet resulted in sustainable change. The British intervention did not sufficiently 
address the root causes of the conflict; rather it has contained it for the time being. 
Humanitarian emergency assistance and development aid in their present form became 
functional aspects of the former patronage network and shadow economy. 
1.4 Conclusions on the Impact of the Implementation Process on Policy Content 
Chapter two of this study suggested that a policy's strength is directly related to the 
extent to which it has been bureaucratised. Arguably, evidence presented in this study 
suggests that a policy's efficiency is also directly related to the extent to which it has been 
bureaucratised. This does not necessarily imply that such a policy is also effective. British 
humanitarian aid politics have acquired a relatively high level' of bureaucratisation and 
consequently compartmentalisation. According to some of its critics, this has resulted in a 
highly technical approach to humanitarian relief aid and has undermined strategic vision 
and coherence as departments and units operate in isolation. The British New 
Humanitarianism was crucially undermined by the reluctance of the British aid bureaucracy 
to support its implementation and to invest into stronger conflict and rights-sensitive 
agenda setting. 
Evidence presented in this study suggests that the implementation environment had a 
crucial effect on the contents and impact of British humanitarian emergency assistance in 
Sierra Leone, and conflict environments in general. Four key facts led to this conclusion: 
Firstly, when DFID was faced with internal and external criticism (and when it began to 
lose some of the turf wars against other ministries) it dropped its assertive conflict-focused 
humanitarian rhetoric, leaving an ambiguous policy vacuum. Secondly, the rhetoric and 
contents of New Humanitarianism and British-supported emergency aid programmes in 
Sierra Leone differed significantly. Humanitarian policy and programmes remained 
personalised; that is their contents and interpretation depended more on the priorities and 
personal belief-systems of key implementing personnel than on strategy. Thirdly, the 
fragmented nature of the international humanitarian system and inherent contradictions 
both of mandates and working processes of the manifold implementing agents prevented 
common agenda setting and closer co-ordination. From the outset this undermined the 
effective implementation of a wider approach to relief operations and reduced leverage. 
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Fourthly, given - the absence of formalised, mechanisms of communication, the process of 
negotiation among competing interests depended mostly on informal contacts between 
individuals. So did the process by which these competing strategies were translated into 
operations. This process lacked transparency and stability. Most importantly, DFID and 
other humanitarian aid organisations lacked the institutional memory to draw lessons from 
their engagement. Doing so would have benefited future agenda setting and donor/agency 
co-ordination. In the absence of a coherent and long-term international political strategy 
and its coherent and co-ordinated implementation, wider humanitarian emergency relief 
has little leverage over local and international policy environments and behaviour. 
Furthermore, it is likely to remain reactive rather than proactive. 
2. Changes in the Operational Environment: The `Privatisation' and 
Militarisation of Humanitarian Assistance 
Despite the negative evidence presented in this thesis and other studies, emergency 
assistance has today become a political and even military instrument for wider objectives as 
could be seen in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Iraq. It is employed on an inconsistent and 
reactive basis in selected areas of engagement. Increasingly, international humanitarian 
relief NGOs are being employed as, and market themselves as, public service contractors. 
They enter contractual relationships with donor organisations on the basis of either one-off 
or standing partnership agreements that include detailed implementation guidelines and 
measurable output benchmarks. Humanitarian relief organisations are increasingly forced 
to work where they are told or where donors are prepared to invest money. This 
undermines their independence, impartiality and neutrality and decreases investment in 
cross-sectoral, rights-based or conflict-sensitive work. 32 Simultaneously, in Sierra Leone 
and Iraq there are more and more indications that the British Government is outsourcing 
programmes to private (profit driven) or security companies. There are also indications 
that military forces are utilized for the delivery of humanitarian emergency assistance, 
especially in volatile areas of engagement or so-called `countries at risk of instability'. The 
repercussions of this merging of wider security objectives and humanitarian emergency 
assistance as well as of emergency aid personnel and military units are not yet foreseeable. 
However, the recent attacks on civilian humanitarian personnel in Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq are a likely consequence of this development. The merging of emergency 
372 Confidential interviews with humanitarian agencies in Sierra Leone 2003. 
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aid and security policy already has an important impact on donor/humanitarian agency 
relations. The privatisation and militarisation of humanitarian aid and public private 
partnership are an expression of on-going and possibly irreversible changes in the nature of 
humanitarian emergency operations. This is despite a growing unease in national and 
international political circles with regard to the growing employment and dominance of 
private security companies within British policy implementation 373 They raise important 
questions about the future of humanitarian aid and the sustainability and effectiveness of 
international humanitarian intervention. 
The international intervention in Kosovo was one of the first examples of this 
increasing use of private security contractors and military humanitarianism. The trend was 
continued in East Timor, Afghanistan and now Iraq. Private (and security) service 
providers now fulfil an ever-greater role in governmental development strategy. DFID is 
not the only international donor that increasingly works with such contractors: the 
European Union and in particular the United States are known to have employed the 
technical, logistical and man-power support of private contractors and private security 
companies extensively. It mirrors the widespread political tendency to privatise social and 
public services. As of today there are no clear political mechanisms for controlling such 
private companies or private military (security) companies. 
The growing use of security companies and military forces in the implementation of aid 
programmes has led to a violent backlash from local groups against aid organisations in 
some areas of engagement. This is partially due to an increased difficulty in clearly 
identifying civilian and military personnel and aid agencies' loss of neutrality. It has also 
worsened the difficulties of organisational co-operation and common agenda setting. 374 
373 Antony Barnett, Solomon Iiughes and Jason Burke, `Mercenaries in 'Coup Plot' Guarded UK Officials 
in Iraq', 'Ihe Observer (6 June 2004). 12. 
374 Military and civilian humanitarian organisations work in pursuit of different objectives (winning the war 
or organising the peace) and on the basis of very different working processes, organisational structures 
and processes. The structure of military forces is much more hierarchical than aid agencies. Militaries 
operate -secretively, while relief agencies take pain to ensure local ownership and transparency. The 
closer, yet no more efficient, relationship between humanitarian aid organisations and the military has 
been 'formalized through various co-ordination mechanisms, doctrine, frequent correspondence and the 
establishment of centers and institutes', despite continuous tempestuous experiences from several areas 
of engagement (Balkans, Middle East). Eric James, Two Steps Back: Relearning the IIumanitarian- 
Military Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. Journal of h umanitanan Arr%slvn , http: //www. jha. ac. /articles/a125. htm, 9 November 2003,1. 
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In Iraq; this interaction between humanitarian aid workers and the military has led to 
major political and operational quandaries, especially given that the military `intervention is 
seen as illegitimate by significant segments of the population . "s It has also caused a chasm 
between some donors and large parts of the international humanitarian aid network. Given 
that Western donors fund most aid organisations, more and more aid organisations are 
being perceived as the instruments of Western hegemony. As a consequence, humanitarian 
organisations are increasingly being denied access to vulnerable populations. Mark 
Duffield has argued that the redefinition of the root causes of violent conflict justifies 
donor governments engagement in the inner working of foreign governments. Ile argues 
that this is done via international humanitarian, military and private actors and tighter 
reporting and auditing requirements. 37' The UK Government's selective employment of 
large British and international humanitarian NGOs and private security companies in Sierra 
Leone and Iraq, and possibly its secondment of staff to the GoSL are indicators of this 
development. Arguably, the secondment of staff is a much more direct and powerful 
mechanism in changing the behaviour of foreign governments and leaders and instigating 
political change than the employment of humanitarian political conditionality. The latter 
not only lacks leverage in terms of significance, it also does not directly target those it is 
meant to address, that is those that exploit emergency assistance and/or the potential 
spoilers of the peace process in Sierra Leone. 
Relief organisations are currently undergoing a momentous evaluation of their rationale, 
justification and role within international peace operations and development. They 
confront the problem of accepting co-option and becoming members of the evolving 
international security system or refusing to be co-opted. If political trends identifiable 
today solidify, refusing to be co-opted in the short-term might result in the restriction of 
their overall funding base and the loss of access to vulnerable populations in more volatile 
areas of engagement. " 
375 Antonio Donini, Larry Minear and Peter Walker, 'Iraq and the Crisis of Humanitarian Action'. I INP 
Practice and Poky Not& 26 (March 2004), 37-40,37. 
376 Mark Duffield, 'Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid', paper presented at an ODI 
seminar on 'Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension' (Commonwealth 
Institute, London, 1 February 2001). 
sn Antuuiu Dunini, Larry M; near and Peter Walker, 'Iraq and the Crisis of humanitarian Aaiun, 39. 
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3. DFID: A Learning Organisation? 
Despite the criticism of DFID structures and political processes presented in this thesis, 
it also needs to be stressed that DFID has shown itself interested and willing to learn 
lessons from its former engagement and generally improving policy effectiveness and 
efficiency. To that end the British Government has just completed an audit of emergency 
assistance, and DFID has engaged in a long-term restructuring of in-house aid structures 
(up to today with debatable success) and has strengthened contractual guidelines and 
mechanisms for enhanced programme evaluation. The UK has also established several 
new mechanisms and units, within DFID and at the Cabinet Office, which are designed to 
enhance policy effectiveness and public service delivery. This includes: DFID's `Aid 
Effectiveness Group', `Service Delivery Group' and `Working in Difficult Environment 
Group' (all within the Policy Department established in 2003), DPID's `Post Conflict 
Reconstruction Unit' (PCRU), and the Cabinet Office's `Countries at Risk of Instability' 
(CRI) unit (within the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit) 37" In mid-2004 DPID is also in the 
process of reconceptualising aid conditionality. The establishment of all of these units or 
mechanisms shows the UK Government's awareness of shortcomings within policy 
implementation and cross-ministerial co-ordination. Also, it is an indication of its greater 
focus on managerial oversight and its continued striving for generic models of engagement. 
Most of all, it displays the administration's willingness to learn and is a sign of a strong 
effort towards increasing the government's understanding of complex environments and 
engagement therein. None of these units was set up specifically in order to improve 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy and practice. Nor have they to date addressed 
the role of emergency relief in any detail. Nonetheless, all indirectly impact emergency 
policy or are likely to do so in the future. 
Born out of the quandary of the Iraq (and to some extent Sierra Leone) war and the 
subsequent violence ridden and shambolic reconstruction phase, the inter-ministerial Post 
Conflict Reconstruction and the Countries at Risk of Instability units arc meant to increase 
the UK's understanding of conflict and of working therein. The Countries at Risk of 
Instability team is currently in the process of developing an analytical model for assessing 
conflict and to advise on how to best translate it into effective everyday processes of 
378 Also see: Office of Public Service Reform, 'Reforming Our Public Services: Principles Into Practice 
(March 2004, http: //i. vww. pm. gvv. uk/files/pdf/Prin(iples. pdf, 16 June 2004. Also see: Cabinet Office, 
http: //www. policyhub. gov. uk/, 15 June 2004. 
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implementation. It is also going to provide recommendations as to the UK Govemment's 
future engagement with countries at risk of instability. One of its task is going to be to 
generate a much more effective degree of donor co-ordination in responding to conflict. 
The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit is meant to fill the gaps (and drawn on the 
linkages) between humanitarian emergency assistance, peacebuilding and development aid. 
Its rationale and objectives express a somewhat novel conception of the so-called relief-to- 
development continuum. The unit recognizes not only the limits of emergency assistance 
in addressing peacebuilding and long-term reconstruction, but also its contextual and 
operational distinctness from development aid. Furthermore, it recognizes that military 
forces lack capacity and is willingness to undertake post-conflict reconstruction and 
capacity building. The unit is meant to advise the British administration in co-ordinating 
the immediate post conflict phase with regard to reconstruction and capacity building. It is 
to bridge the gap between the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance and more 
developmental types of assistance (prior to the transition to bilateral, state-to-state 
development assistance). It is also to strengthen Whitehall's ability to accumulate and 
process information on complex environments, and translate government policy into 
operational plans and processes. In the long-term, the PCRU is also meant to provide an 
international personnel pool for post-conflict reconstruction operations. By mid-2004, the 
unit has not yet become fully operational. Its concrete focus (and geographical/contextual 
scope) is yet to be developed. As of today, the unit focuses only on reconstruction phases 
that follow British military engagement. Given the UK's reluctance and inability to 
militarily intervene in the majority of complex emergencies and in areas of lesser strategic 
interest, this is most likely to exclude the vast majority of armed conflicts in Africa. Also, it 
remains to be seen whether the unit will be granted the full support across UK government 
ministries. 
Preliminary conclusions by the `Working in Difficult Environments' and `Countries at Risk 
of Instability' units display a changing governmental attitude towards complex emergencies. 
They also demonstrate a realisation of a much more limited capacity of humanitarian 
emergency assistance (and conditionality) in furthering development and stability. And 
they display a clear awareness of the common failure of donor co-ordination and a drastic 
lack of quality information and assessment. The `Working in Difficult Environments' unit 
warns that a results or performance-based assessment of future aid allocations might lead 
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to a possible counterproductive engagement in complex environments. 3" In 2004 
comments by senior DFID personnel also led this study to conclude the UK hopes to 
assume a principal position in fostering donor co-ordination and good-donorship that in 
the future, and that it will strengthen its commitment to delegating authority to regional 
DFID field offices. " This goes a long way towards enabling flexible policy 
implementation on the basis of local information. It might also be an example of DFID 
having taken on board suggestions from the national aid community. 31 Yet without a 
clearer commitment to unambiguous humanitarian principles it also entails the danger of 
micro-management. 
Since its election victory in 1997, the Labour Government has linked the allocation of 
public spending to the performance of ministerial departments. As previously mentioned 
in this chapter, `successful delivery of effective and efficient programmes... arc rewarded 
with financial resources in future spending rounds. " Since its re-election in 2001, `the 
reform and delivery of public services became the defining theme of the second Blair 
administration'. " To that end, in 2003, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury have 
published'several documents to establish standardised guidelines on policy evaluation and 
policy impact assessment'" Within these the Government committed itself to so-called 
`evidence-based' or `performance-based' policy making and evaluation, rather than 
performance reviews on the basis of resource inputs. Also, the Government established 
Public Service Agreements and Service Delivery Agreements that outline key government 
priorities and how to achieve them. However, not all departments or programmes have 
developed such agreements. Nor do performance based evaluations and target setting 
necessarily generate effective data on the wider and long-term policy impact or a prior' 
379 Department for International Development (DFID), `Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments: 
Core Briefing', http: //www. dfid. gov. uk, 28 July 2004,6-7. Also see: Department for International 
Development (DFID), `Policy Division: Director's Delivery Plan', http: //www. dfid. gov. uk, 28 July 2004. 
380 David Batt, `DFID and FCO Meeting with NGOs '. 
381 In late 2002 the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) published an in-depth study on the need 
for greater donor co-ordination and donor accountability. In large parts this was funded by DFID. It 
has also sparked meeting between the DFID and aid organisations in London and abroad. 
3e2 Philip Davies, 'Policy Evaluation in the United Kingdom', paper presented at the KDI Intcmational 
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improve policy effectiveness. As has been discussed in greater detail earlier on, 
government departments and implementing agents are likely to dilute negative performance 
based evaluations in order to uphold government funding. Furthermore, meaningful 
evaluations and impact assessments depend upon multiple variables. They are costly, both 
in terms of time and resources, and most often a burden to individual policy makers. 
Overall, a narrow, output-focused and rather technical policy approach to humanitarian 
assistance and public accountability has negative and restraining repercussions for the 
humanitarian emergency system. Nevertheless, if new resources are made available to 
improve and standardise effective programme evaluation, if field personnel become further 
integrated within the policy making process and if targets are more closely linked to 
stakeholder needs, the British Governments' agenda towards policy reform might well be 
steps in the right direction. It remains to be seen whether the new DFID and CHAD 
structures and the increasing reliance on field-based DFID representation show positive 
results. It also remains to be seen to what degree and how quickly newly established units 
within DFID and the Cabinet Office will be able to influence policy making and how 
encompassing their remit will be. Early indications show both unwillingness within the 
bureaucracy to engage with and support newly established units, and a lack of capacity 
(units are overwhelmed with specific policy assessment/development requests). Most of 
all, despite DFID's willingness and ability to learn, doing so (and instigating policy change) 
could engender the strong opposition from other sectors of government and from earlier 
outlined private (security) service providers. Both have a strong organisational interest in 
opposing a reversal of policy to the detriment of their own influence. As shown in this 
thesis, DFID has few mechanisms to drive sustained policy change in opposition to large 
sectors of the policy (implementation) establishment. 
The Government has made a strong effort to increase its understanding of conflict and 
effective engagement therein. This has yet to be translated into administrative working 
procedures, something the administration has so far been reluctant to take on board. Also 
concern remained that the UK Government's new focus on Iraq and terrorism might lead 
to a reduced willingness to engage in complex emergencies in Africa and to improve 
humanitarian emergency assistance policy. 
This thesis concludes by recommending changes in the British approach to 
humanitarian emergency assistance and donor/agent relations. 
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In order to increase the efficacy of New Humanitarianism, the government needs to 
refine objectives of the policy, both in terms of strategic principles and country strategics. 
As an aspect of this, it must clearly differentiate between military and humanitarian 
objectives. In order to increase transparency and enable co-ordination, these objectives 
should be disseminated widely and assertively, both internally and externally. By doing so 
it is hoped the support of the implementation bureaucracy and the humanitarian 
community at large will be strengthened. 
This thesis has highlighted shortcomings within the implementation process of British 
humanitarian emergency assistance. In order to overcome these, the British government 
needs to agree upon rules for implementation, responsibility for action and individual, 
departmental and organisational accountability for humanitarian relief. Clear lines of 
responsibility and personal accountability would greatly increase the effectiveness and 
reliability of policy implementation. 
Similarly, the government will want to maintain an active and critical dialogue with the 
national and international aid community in order to increase transparency and common 
agenda setting. In order to increase control and quality of impact, it will also want to 
ensure ongoing evaluation of emergency programmes' longer-term impact. This must 
include long-term conflict impact assessment. Meaningful impact assessment requires 
making additional funds available. It also requires standardising such assessments as an 
aspect of all funding relationships. 
Programme quality and sustainability would benefit from improved and standardised 
regional inter-agency humanitarian data collection, monitoring and analysis. This includes 
both donor and aid organisations. In terms of coherence and longer-term planning, it 
would also benefit from monitoring humanitarian emergency and development aid flows to 
Sierra Leone and the region. Information on evaluations and lessons learned needs to 
remain available for all actors concerned beyond the duration of programmes. 
Lastly, efficient humanitarian emergency assistance (in particular as an aspect of a 
peacebuilding process) requires key donor co-ordination on common objectives and 
conditionality criteria. In particular in cases like Sierra Leone in which the United 
Kingdom assumed a lead nation position, the British Government is in a position to co- 
ordinate and maintain effective consultation forums. Most of all, effective humanitarian 
engagement in complex emergencies and political change require a longer-term and 
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coherent political commitment to areas of operation. This commitment must gei beyond 
the provision of humanitarian emergency assistance and the immediate post-conflict phase. 
None of these recommendations is altogether unique. Nevertheless, if they were to be 
implemented they would go a long way towards improving the efficacy of the international 
relief system and increasing the impact of donor strategic agenda setting. 
2. -1 
There is a theory that states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what 
the Universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be 
replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. "' 
385 Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: The Trilogy of Four (London, Basingstoke and Oxford 
Picador (Pan Macmillan), 2002), 189. 
. m. 
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Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, 'Sovereignty Under Siege: From humanitarian 
Intervention to I Iumanitarian Space, ' in: Gcncr Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (cds), 
119vnd Wespbalial National So, vrr knty and Ixternatiowllxtenrnlion (Ifaltimorc: Johns 
I Iopkins University Press, 1995), 87-114. 
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in: brie Stcm, 
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Annex I: Origins of Wider Humanitarian Emergency Assistance: 
The Principles of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance 
The following section introduces the legal principles defining humanitarian emergency 
assistance and its delivery and changes thereof over the last decade. An understanding of 
the contents and practical and legal confines of the profession is essential, in order to 
comprehend the effect of widening or restricting the humanitarian mandate. It also 
explains the motivation driving international governmental donors and aid agencies in 
promoting the extension of traditional policy approaches. 
Humanitarian emergency assistance is mandated and protected by international law, 
including customary law, human rights law and, most crucially, the humanitarian principles 
enshrined in the laws of war': the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. ' 
The laws of war define acceptable conduct by warring factions in times of war. The 
provisions most relevant for this study include: 
0 Respect for and protection of non-combatants and civilian targets; 
" Proportionality and the safeguarding of assets essential to the survival of a 
population (e. g. agricultural land); 
" Security provisions for humanitarian agencies and for those they protect. 
Throughout war, these conventions or sets of law have remained contested and have 
rarely been fully guaranteed. While legally binding, they are too vague and contain 
insufficient leverage to hold states and belligerent parties to account. The treatment of 
civilians and prisoners of war by the US military and coalition forces in the recent conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and by warring parties in, for example, Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and most recently Sudan, and the destruction of civilian 
assets by the allied forces in Kosovo and Bosnia are prime examples of this. In order to 
translate the Geneva Conventions into operational guidelines, the Red Cross developed 
four `principles of humanitarian action': humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
These principles form the basis of the Red Cross `Code of Conduct', a code most 
386 For an account of the laws of war refer to: L C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 
(Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
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humanitarian agencies and donors support, albeit with various, and at times conflicting, 
interpretations 387 
The principle of humanity refers to an individual's right to emergency assistance and 
protection (that includes safeguarding of their legal, physical, economic and political rights). 
Until recently, actively pursuing protection was seen outside the remit of non-governmental 
humanitarian organisation. It was also feared that protection of and solidarity with 
vulnerable populations and victims of abuse might jeopardise the provision of material 
emergency assistance and undermine essential humanitarian principles, in particular the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality. This perception is changing. Today, many 
humanitarian actors believe in the necessity of ensuring stakeholders' protection just as 
much as their survival. '" 
Inspartiality refers to non-discrimination and proportionality on the basis of humanitarian 
need. Both principles, humanity and impartiality, are active normative concepts that define 
the delivery of assistance. In contrast, neutrality and independence tend to be a means to an 
end. They are passive or restrictive principles that define those actions agencies will abstain 
from. The principle of independence is a tool: it allows agencies to operate and helps gain the 
consent of warring factions. The principle of neutrality refers to an agency's commitment to 
refrain from taking a political stance and restricting all action to the delivery of 
humanitarian emergency assistance on the basis of need. The principle of neutrality is 
increasingly being reinterpreted, as more humanitarian organisations either select to work 
on specific sides of a conflict or speak out against human rights abuses and the diversion of 
relief aid. More and more, donors selectively choose when and where to get engaged and 
which organisation to support - putting into question the principles of 
both neutrality and 
impartiality. 
The Red Cross Code of Conduct, the `Sphere Project' on minimum standards and other 
more country-specific mechanisms (like the Operation Lifeline Sudan) have outlined the 
387 J. Pictet, The Fundamental Prinz 4s of the Red Cross (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1979). The 
interpretation and changing nature of the principles of humanitarian action will be discussed in greater 
detail later on in this chapter. 
388 See, amongst others: Hugo Slim, Doing the Right Thing Hugo Slim, 'Relief Agencies an d Moral Standing in 
War. Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity', Detrlopment in Practice 7,4 (1997), 
342-352; Nicholas Leader, `Proliferating Principles: Or flow to Sup With the Devil Without Getting 
Eaten', Disasters 22,4 (1998), 288-308; Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Peinciple. 
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ideal relationship of aid agencies, warring parties and relief recipients. " They are, 
however, not legally binding, and are subject to interpretation and as such to negotiation. 
In theory and in international law humanitarian assistance is not subject to conditions. 390 
In practice, however, the delivery of humanitarian relief depends on sufficient 
`humanitarian space'; that is, on the compliance by all actors with the principles of 
humanitarian action in order to gain and uphold access to a vulnerable population. 
Assistance based on these principles assumes and depends upon the compliance of 
international actors and belligerents with the laws of war and, in particular, their restraint. 
This, unfortunately, cannot be presumed nor easily enforced. 
The principle of impartiality cannot be assured as it depends on the consent to equal, 
unrestricted access to those in need. Limited access to vulnerable populations in times of 
war and the selective choice of implementing agents and projects by donors question the 
principle's applicability. The principle of independence cannot be assured, as humanitarian 
agencies not only depend on the consent of warring factions (which all too often needs to 
be negotiated or `bought), but also on state/donor funding. Given their moral rather than 
physical leverage, agencies cannot guarantee their protection mandate when relief recipients 
are being targeted or abused. Furthermore, upholding the principle of neutrality potentially 
contradicts human rights law. The latter demands that agencies speak out against abuse 
and proclaim solidarity with the victims. Many relief workers have argued that doing so 
would jeopardize the perception of their neutrality and therefore put people at risk and 
threaten future access. These weaknesses of the practical application of the principles of 
humanitarian action in contemporary armed conflict bring into question the principles' 
universality and efficacy. They also make a strong case for an overhaul of international 
relief aid. 
389 Sphere Project, humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Geneva, 1998). 
390 See for example: Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Lau', 306 and 353; 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Pmtect VIII; 
Pierre Laurent, Humanitarian Assistance is a Right', in: Clair Pirotte, Bernard Iiusson and Francois 
Grunewald (eds), Responding to Emergencies & Fostering Deaelopment the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid 
(London and New York: Zed Books, 1999), 122-124,122. 
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Annex II: Humanitarian Conditionality: A Typology 
The following section defines and discusses humanitarian conditionality. For the 
purpose of this paper, humanitarian conditionality has been divided into three working 
definitions indicating levels of coercion: `humanitarian conditions', `humanitarian 
conditionality' and `humanitarian political conditionality'. This thesis assumes that all three 
forms of conditionality were employed in Sierra Leone, albeit to different degrees. This 
assumption could not be sustained in the subsequent analysis of British New 
I Iumanitarianism and its application in Sierra Leone. While the British government did not 
entirely rule out the application of conditionality and while it was possibly applied in 
specific circumstances in Sierra Leone and elsewhere (m particular in the selection of 
implementing organisations), the approach does not seem to have played an essential role 
in Sierra Leone between 1999 and 2003. 
Humanitarian Conditions (passive reliefl 
As was discussed in the previous section, humanitarian emergency assistance itself is 
based on and subject to a complex set of conditions that are codified in international law. 
The Red Cross Code of Conduct further outlines those standards essential for the 
provision of humanitarian emergency assistance. "' These standards (or conditions) are 
neither an objective in themselves nor are they a means to reach other political objectives. 
Humanitarian conditions resemble nothing more than the most fundamental standards that 
must be upheld in order to facilitate principled humanitarian emergency relief. 
Humanitarian Conditionality Cposýý itive engagement') 
Humanitarian conditionality is here defined as all proactive action undertaken by 
humanitarian agencies and donors in order to widen humanitarian space, including the 
dissemination of humanitarian principles and humanitarian conditions. It includes 
advocacy on behalf of humanitarian principles and negotiations with parties to the conflict 
beyond those regarding access to populations in need in specific areas of engagement. 
Arguably, it also includes human rights advocacy, as long as these rights are vital aspects of 
humanitarian principles. Their guarantee is essential to facilitate principled humanitarian 
relief work. Speaking out against the abuse of humanitarian principles, and pointing 
391 International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), The Code of Condrat (Geneva: IFRC, 
1996). 
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towards those responsible, is another aspect of `positive engagement'. It is an essential 
means to further humanitarian protection. However speaking out might jeopardise an 
agency's neutrality (or perception of neutrality) and access, and in doing so may threaten 
the delivery of assistance. Christa Rottensteiner contends that this in itself would be a 
violation of international law. ""' Others have responded that agencies have a moral and 
practical obligation to speak out against abuse. 393 In failing to do so and in allowing the 
continuation of abuse, agencies and donors alike would fail their protection mandate, as 
well as their commitment to norms such as universal human rights. Positive engagement 
also includes such punitive measures as the suspension of relief, or its reduction and 
withdrawal, if the conditions are not in place to enable effective humanitarian assistance. 
Such measures, however, punish people for the actions of their leaders, something they 
might have limited capacity to influence. There is an essential distinction to be made 
between unconditional positive engagement and positive engagement that is used as a lever 
and tactic (entailing a negative aspect) to instigate policy reform or change the behaviour of 
warring parties. 
ty Humanitarian Political Conditionali 
Humanitarian political conditionality includes all those actions undertaken and 
conditions set that go beyond advocating humanitarian space. It involves threatening to 
reduce or actually terminating emergency assistance if the recipient does not meet set 
conditions. An example of this type of conditionality was DFID suspending all British 
humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone in 1997, despite the British government's argument 
to the contrary. 394 Selectivity, or working only with those in favour of donor objectives, is 
another more implicit form of humanitarian political conditionality. 
Humanitarian political conditions might be identified and set in an attempt to address 
the root causes of a given crisis or violent conflict and to make humanitarian emergency 
assistance more sustainable. Here, political conditionality involves creating incentives to 
undertake democratic reform, to improve human rights standards and to increase security 
392 See for instance: Christa Rottensteiner, The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime Under 
International Law', International Review of the Red Cross 853, (1 September 1999), 555-582. 
393 See, for instance: Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian Action in War. Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a 
Policy Vacuum', Adelphi Paper 305 (1996), 9; Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choices and Moral Dilemmas in 
Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefields, 1998). 
394 At the time, DFID argued that it was concerned for the safety of relief workers; yet simultaneously stated 
that relief aid could resume as soon as President Kabbah was reinstated and continued to support relief 
efforts by the European Union. 
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or support peace by working towards a lasting solution or peace agreement. '' These 
objectives might be set as a condition to increase donor involvement or funding (selective 
engagement). Humanitarian political conditionality can involve threatening to withhold or 
reduce humanitarian aid as a means to encourage dialogue between the parties themselves 
and between them and the international community. It can also involve threatening to 
withhold or reduce humanitarian aid in order to encourage political change in support of, 
for example, human rights and political or economic reform. This assumes a positive 
correlation between development, human rights and security; or an assumption that 
improved human rights standards and democratic reform would alleviate the crisis and 
benefit development. The distinction between humanitarian conditiona&Y and humanitarian 
political conditionality is all too easily blurred and very difficult to substantiate. When it comes 
to its objectives and tactics, humanitarian political conditionality can be compared to 
second-generation development conditionality. " 
395 Refer to: Joanna Macrae, The Origins of Unease: Setting the Context of Current Ethical Debate', 
Background Paper for the Forum on Ethics in Humanitarian Aid 9-10 December 1996 (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 1996); Mark Duffield, 'Aid Policy and Post-Modern Conflict: A Critical 
Review', Occasional Pr fier 19 (I3irmingham: University of Birmingham, 1998). 
3% Olav Stokke has argued that `in the 1990s, aid donors have increasingly made ODA [official 
development assistance] conditional on political and administrative reform in recipient countries. (Olav 
Stokke (ed), Aid and Political Conddtionality, EADI Book Series 16 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 1. ) The 
impact and success of development conditionality in bringing about policy change is questionable, as is 
increasingly argued by the World Bank itself (up to now a staunch promoter of development aid 
conditionality and structural adjustment policies). (Refer for instance to: Joan M. Nelson, 'Promoting 
Policy Reforms: The Twilight of Conditionality', World Development 24,9 (1996), 1551-1559; Olav Stokke 
(ed), Aid and Political Conddtionak'ty, Paul Collier et al., 'Redesigning Conditionality', lVord' Development 25,9 
(1997), 1399-1408; 'luny Killick, 'Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality', Journal of 
International Development 9,4 (1997), 483-396. ) Second generation political development conditionality 
targets areas of governance on a systemic level that were previously considered sovereign: it sets 
conditions that have a potential impact on governance structures. Recipients have met conditional 
development assistance with considerable resentment depending on the level of intervention (Olav 
Stokke (ed), Aid and Political Condrtionality, 29). The higher the level of intervention - that is addressing 
aspects vital to a government's continuity - the more likely has been resentment, disregard or outright 
opposition. Also see: Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, Global Goals, Contentions Means. Issues of Mu&pleAid Conditionality (Washington, D. C: Overseas Development Council, 1993). 
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Annex III: Chronology of Key Events and Policy Developments 
1787: Repatriated and rescued slaves are settled in Freetown. 
1808: Freetown settlement becomes crown colony. 
1896: Britain sets up a protectorate over the Freetown hinterland. 
1954: UK appoints Sir Milton Margai, leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), 
chief minister. 
1961: On 27 April Sierra Leone receives independence from Britain, with Milton Margai 
as prime minister. 
1964: Milton Margai dies. Ile is succeeded as prime minister by his half-brother, Albert 
Margai. 
1967: Siaka Stevens - who in 1957 broke away from the Sierra Leone People's Party 
(SLPP) to form his All People's Congress party (APQ - is elected prime minister by 
a tight and contested margin and amidst political unrest. However, he is 
overthrown in a coup led by Brigadier Andrew Juxon-Smith before assuming his 
position. 
1968: Stevens is returned to power in an army mutiny. In the following years, the 
government clamps down on the political opposition. Sierra Leone experiences 
increasing amounts of political unrest and politically motivated violence. 
1971: Sierra Leone is declared a republic. Stevens named president and head of 
government amidst public unrest. 
1973: Opposition SLPP does not contest the general elections amidst political unrest and 
violent prosecution. Stevens, of the APC, is the sole candidate. His rule is 
increasingly authoritarian. 
1976: Stevens is re-elected to the presidency for a second five-year term. 
1977: 1 February - Stevens, responding to student demonstrations and amidst increasing 
political tension, declares a state of emergency which remains in effect for one year. 
May - General elections held a year earlier than scheduled following even more political 
unrest and violence. 
1978: June -A widely contested referendum approves a new constitution that provides 
for a one-party state. The All People's Congress becomes the sole legal party. 
14 June - Stevens is sworn in for a seven-year term as president. SLPP MPs join the APC. 
1981: There is increasing opposition to the government following growing allegations of 
state corruption. 
August -A state of emergency is declared to suppress a general strike against rising prices 
and food shortages. 
1982: May - General elections take place. There is a serious outbreak of violence. 
1983: May - Violence between political factions in the Punjehun District results in heavy 
casualties. 
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1984: January - Student demonstrations against food shortages and rising prices leads to 
riots. Four people are killed as the army opens fire. Later in the year, teachers and 
council workers strike through to early in 1985 after the government fails to pay 
their salaries. 
1985: April - Maj-Gen Joseph Momoh runs for president unopposed and is elected to 
replace the ageing Siaka Stevens. Momoh is generally considered a weak choice, 
meant to allow Stevens to hold on to the rains of power. 
November - Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia are strained after Liberian 
President Samuel Doe accuses the Freetown government of involvement in an 
attempted coup in Liberia. Doe temporarily closes the border. 
1987: January - Student demonstration against inadequate food allowances results in 
violence. 
March - The government announces it has foiled a coup in which at least 60 people are 
arrested. In early April, Vice President Francis Minah is arrested and later charged 
with treason. Momoh declares state of economic emergency. 
1989: Six are executed for allegedly plotting to assassinate Momoh and overthrow his 
government. 
1991: The Constitutional Review Commission submits draft for a multiparty system of 
government following lengthy popular support. 
March - Begin of the war as about 100 fighters based in Liberia cross the border into Sierra 
Leone in an attempt to overthrow Momoh. The fighters eventually call themselves 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The Sierra Leone government had been 
supporting a Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, which was 
preventing Liberias Charles Taylor from capturing Monrovia. 
April - Government launches a retaliatory raid against RUF rebels in Liberia. By midyear, 
the army - with Ghanaian and Nigeria help - recaptures several RUF-held towns in 
the east and south of Sierra Leone. The government troops were helped by 1,200 
Liberian soldiers who fled to Sierra Leone in September 1990. 
23-30 August -A national referendum on a new constitution is approved that permits 
formation of political associations. A number of political parties are granted legal 
recognition. 
1992: 30 April - President Momoh flees the country after believing a coup is in the 
making when Captain Valentine Strasser and other junior officers of the Sierra 
Leonean Army (SLA) approach State House to complain about the poor conditions 
for soldiers at the front, including lack of food and pay. The presidency lands in 
the lap of Strasser who establishes the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC). Under international pressure, Strasser affirms his commitment to the 
introduction of multiparty politics and multi-party elections. Meanwhile, the RUF 
gains strength and some members of the SLA, angry over their poor conditions, 
join the RUF's campaign. 
December - An attempted coup is mounted by former army officers calling themselves the 
Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement. Nine suspected coup plotters and 17 
other prisoners convicted in November on treason charges are executed. 
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1993: March - Nigeria, which had peacekeeping troops based in Monrovia, moves two 
battalions to Freetown to support Strasser in his war against the RUF. 
December - The government ends the state of emergency that had been in force since 
April 1992. 
1994: January - Strasser more than doubles the military's ranks to about 12,000. Some of 
the new recruits, however, are street children as young as 12 years old and lack any 
formal training. This has negative repercussions for the army for years to come. 
Later in the year, civil vigilante groups form from traditional hunters and with the 
objective to protect towns from both rebels and vigilante soldiers. One of them, 
the Kamarjors, repels an attack on Bo and receives much public, and later on 
international, support. Subsequently, at least large parts of the so-called Kamajors 
become drawn into the conflict and the region's flourishing war economy. 
1995: March - Strasser invites the South African private security company Executive 
Outcomes (EO) to help the government fight the RUF, which is closing in on the 
capital and controls much of the country's diamond areas. EO begins by training 
government troops and then defends the capital alongside West African 
peacekeepers. 
December - EO expands its operations into the countryside and retakes a number of 
key 
diamond areas from the RUF. EO also begins to collaborate with the Kamajors. 
EO troops provide the civil militia, which are commanded by llinga Norman, a 
former army captain, with training and logistical support. The RUF suffers a 
number of defeats and initiates peace negotiations with Strasser. 
1996: January - Brig-Gen Julius Maada-Bio deposes 
Strasser in a palace coup one month 
short of general elections. The RUF demands the suspension of the elections until 
peace talks are held. However, arrangements are too advance for the elections to 
be called off. 
26 February - Elections are held despite 
intimidation by the RUF. 
29 March - Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who worked 
for the UN Development Programme for 
20 years, wins the elections amidst a high degree of political unrest, violence and 
allegations of fraud. Kabbah appoints Hinga Norman as deputy minister of 
defence and agrees to keep on foreign security companies. His close relationship 
with the Kamajors angers the army. 
November -A peace agreement is signed in Abidjan, Cote 
d'Ivoire, between the Kabbah 
government and the RUF, stipulating that EO leave Sierra Leone by January 1997. 
Public opinion has turned against EO because of the high fees it charged - US $1.8 
million per month - and its activities in the country's 
diamond areas. However, 
EO's affiliate company, Lifeguard, stays on in Sierra Leone through security 
contracts with several mining companies. 
1997: January - Executive Outcomes formally withdraws from Sierra Leone. 
March - Sank-oh is arrested on an arms charge in Nigeria. At the FCO's suggestion, Peter 
Penfold meets with private military company at their offices. Penfold arrives in 
Freetown to take up post as High Commissioner. 
May - On May 25, Major Johnny Paul Koroma and a coalition of junior army officers 
topples Kabbah, who flees to Guinea. Koroma, who was over-promoted with the 
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army expansion under Strasser, suspends the constitution, abolishes political parties 
and establishes the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), including 
members of the Sierra Leonean Army. Days of looting by soldiers follow the coup. 
An attempt by Nigerian troops, backed by some South Africans working with 
Lifeguard, to oust the Koroma junta fails. 
May - DFID publishes guidelines on humanitarian assistance. 
June - Koroma invites the RUF to join the junta. June 4, British Foreign Office officials 
(Everard) and Sandline (Spicer) discuss a potential Executive Outline engagement 
in Sierra Leone to restore Kabbah to power. DFID freezes all aid programmes in 
Sierra Leone. Clare Short cites insecurity as the main reason. 
July - The British company Sandline is hired by allies of Kabbah. Indian-born Thai banker 
Rakesh Saxena offers to provide up to US $10 million for a counter-coup in Sierra 
Leone in exchange for diamond concessions. The Commonwealth suspends Sierra 
Leone. The UK takes on a leading role in drafting UN sanctions on Sierra Leone. 
All British development programmes are suspended pending on the restoration of 
President Kabbah's government. 
August - The FCO sends instructions to the UK mission in New York to support a UN 
arms embargo. During DFID/humanitarian agency discussions, DFID claims 
there was no humanitarian emergency in Sierra Leone and that British humanitarian 
agencies were abusing the present crisis to obtain funding. DFID continues to 
assess humanitarian aid proposals on an individual basis; it continues to fund ICRC 
programmes in Sierra Leone as well as EU programmes (the EU budget for Sierra 
Leone, however, is severely reduced). At the end of the month, it suspends all 
British humanitarian assistance. 
October - On October 8, the UN Security Council adopts British-proposed Resolution 
1132, imposing sanctions against the regime in Sierra Leone, including barring the 
supply of arms and petroleum products. A British company, Sandline, nonetheless 
supplies logistical support', including rifles, to Kabbah's allies. It claims to act on 
behalf and with the knowledge of the British Foreign Office. 
November - Penfold meets Sandline in Conakry. DFID publishes its first White Paper on 
International Development. The White Paper gives only marginal reference to 
humanitarian emergency assistance, yet repeatedly, top DFID personnel argue 
publicly for a wider (rights based) approach to humanitarian emergency assistance. 
December - On December 3, Penfold, officials from the Cabinet Office, FCO and MOD 
have an informal meeting, at which the MOD reports that Executive Outcomes are 
arming and supplying the Kamajors. A meeting is arranged between Kabbah and 
Sandline. Penfold meets President Kabbah and is shown the draft Sandline 
contracts. Penfold writes to the UK FCO (to Grant) reporting on his meeting with 
Spicer. The letter fails to arrive. Penfold goes on leave until 27 January. 
1998: February - On February 13, Nigerian-led West African troops, backed by logistical 
and intelligence support from Sandline, and the Kamajors storm Freetown, ousting 
the AFRC/RUF junta. The RUF and AFRC, including members of the SLA, 
retreat to the countryside. On 23 February Sandline's arms shipment arrives at 
Lungi airport. 
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March - Kabbah is returned to power by Nigerian peacekeeping troops. A British military 
vessel, the HMS Cornwall, distributes humanitarian aid. The Observer publishes a 
story about talks between Penfold and Sandline. Sierra Leone and Sandline's 
involvement is discussed in the British Parliament (10/12 March). The IIMS 
Cornwall repairs Sandline's helicopter. George Foulkes discusses the principles of 
a British new humanitarianism at a conference at the Overseas Development 
Institute in London. British humanitarian assistance programmes are continued 
and increased. 
April - On April 28, a law firm, Berwins, writes to the Foreign Secretary and other 
Ministers on behalf of Sandline setting out Sandline's understanding of the arms 
deal to Africa and the Foreign Office's involvement. Clare Short discusses the 
principles of a British New Humanitarianism at a conference at Church House in 
London. 
July - Publication of the Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation, the so-called Legg 
Report that investigates the British Government's involved in and knowledge of 
weapons delivered to Kabbah and his allies in breach of the UN arms embargo. 
October - The High Court in Sierra Leone sentences Sankoh to death for his role in the 
1997 coup. Kabbah makes repeated calls for rebel forces to surrender and offers a 
general amnesty. 
Fall 1998 - July 1999 - The UK Parliamentary International Development Select 
Committee investigates allegations of the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) having withheld humanitarian emergency assistance from 
Sierra Leone in order to pressure the rebels to reinstate the ousted Sierra Leonean 
Government. Although the case was subsequently dropped, DFID was publicly 
criticised for its actions. 
1999: January -A mixture of RUF rebels and former Sierra Leonean Army troops launch 
an assault on Freetown, seizing parts of the city from ECOMOG. The 
peacekeepers retake control of the capital, but not before at least 5,000 people are 
killed and large parts of Freetown are destroyed. Thousands of people are 
abducted by rebel forces. 
February - Publication of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs report on the arms to 
Africa affair, in which the Foreign Office is criticised for its handling of the affair. 
April - Sankoh is temporarily released from prison and allowed by Kabbah to go to Togo 
for internal consultations with his field commanders in capital, Lome. 
May - Rebels submit their peace proposal to Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema, 
who is leading regional mediation efforts to end the war. The RUF calls for 
Sankoh's release as a condition for negotiations to end the fighting. 
July -A peace accord is signed between the government and the RUF. Controversy 
surrounds a clause that provides a blanket amnesty following years of atrocities that 
included rape, mutilation and the killing of civilians. The accord also provides for 
the establishment of a unity government that includes members of the RUF and 
former AFRC junta. Sankoh becomes the country's minister for mineral resources, 
including diamonds. Clare Short travels to Freetown. UK pledges 7.1 million $ for 
training and equipping the Sierra Leonean armed forces. 
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August - Former SLA soldiers hold several UN officials, ECOMOG troops, journalists and 
others hostage. Most are released within a week. RUF commanders who were also 
held are freed a month later. 
October - Sankoh and Koroma return to Freetown. 
November - UN troops begin arriving to replace West African peacekeepers. The UN 
Security Council expresses concern about continued ceasefire violations. 
2000: January - Peter Hain visits Freetown. 
February - The UN Security Council expands size of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, 
UNAMSIL, from 6,000 to 11,100 and revises its mandate to provide security at key 
locations, including government buildings and sites used in the country's 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. It is also to help law 
enforcement authorities. (Secretary-General Kofi Annan later asks for the troop 
strength to be increased to 13,000 and then to 20,500. ) Clare Short visits Freetown. 
April - Rebels attack UN forces in the east of the country, seize weapons and equipment. 
May - More than 500 UN peacekeepers are abducted by the RUF. Sankoh, accused of 
obstructing the peace process, is captured by pro-government forces and 
imprisoned nearly two weeks after a demonstration by thousands of people who 
marched to his home in Freetown. At least four of the demonstrators are shot 
dead by RUF fighters. The abducted peacekeepers are eventually released. 800 
British paratroopers arrive in Freetown to evacuate British nationals if security 
deteriorates and to secure the airport. British advisers arrive to provide support for 
the UN forces. 
June - The Kabbah government ratifies a treaty to establish an International Criminal Court 
for Sierra Leone. The issue of trying child soldiers raises controversy. UK forces 
begin to train Sierra Leonean army. 
July - The UN Security Council imposes an 18-month ban on the trade of uncertified 
rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to stem sale of the gems by rebel forces for 
arms. The last batch of detained UN peacekeepers is rescued by UN forces. 
August -A rebel faction, the West Side Boys, hold 11 British troops hostage. 
They release 
five but keep the six others hostage. The RUF gets a new leader, Issa Sesay, to 
replace Sankoh. 
September - British paratroopers attack the camp of the West Side Boys in the Occra Hills 
and rescue the detained British troops. One British soldier and 25 West Side Boys 
are killed. Most of the remaining West Side Boys later surrender. The RUF begins 
raids into Guinea on Western and Eastern borders. India announces its decision to 
withdraw its troops from UNAMSIL following a dispute with Nigerian officers in 
the force. Jordan also decides to withdraw from UNAMSIL. 
November - Secretary-General Kofi Annan names Lt-Gen Daniel Opande, of Kenya, to 
replace Maj-Gen Vijay Jetley, of India, as commander of UNAMSIL Abuja 
Ceasefire Agreement is signed on 11 November 2000 between the government and 
RUF. A taskforce of 500 British Royal Marines arrives in Freetown to reinforce 
British troops who are already training the Sierra Leonean military. 
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December - The British Ministry of Defence announces that 300 Gurkha soldiers are to 
help train the Sierra Leone Army. DFID publishes its second White Paper on 
International Development. 
2001: January - The government postpones presidential and parliamentary elections - set 
for February and March - for six months because of continuing insecurity. 
February to April - The RUF suffers heavy casualties. UNAMSIL 
begins further 
deployment into RUF-held territory. Increased fighting in Kono District led by the 
Kamajors. 
March - DFID publishes report on the causes of conflict. 
May - RUF and GoSL reaffirm their commitment to the Abuja Cease Fire Agreement. 
They agree to recommence the stalled DDR process on 18 May 01. The RUF 
withdraws from Kambia District, which is immediately reoccupied by the GoSL. 
British-trained Sierra Leone army starts deploying in rebel-held areas. 
June - The RUF and CDF join the DDR programme throughout the country. 
2002: January - The war is declared over. The UN mission says the disarmament of 
45,000 fighters is complete. The government and the UN agree to set up a war 
crimes court. 
February - UNHCR and Save the Children publish a study on sexual exploitation in West Africa; this causes a major international public outcry. 
March - The state of emergency is lifted. Foday Sankoh is charged with murder. 
April to June - Refugees and IDPs continue to return to their areas of origin by the 
thousands, resettlement programmes continue admist controversies. 
May - Kabbah wins a landslide victory in elections on May 14. His Sierra Leone People's 
Party secures a majority in parliament. RUF secures only marginal votes. Minor 
riots take place in Freetown prior to and following the elections. 
July - British troops leave Sierra Leone after a two-year mission. 
September - UN Security Council votes to extend its military mission for another six 
months. 
October - Continuing, intensified fighting in Liberia results in more than 3,000 refugees 
fleeing into Sierra Leone. 
The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) releases a report which 
claims that its follow-up investigation upon the UNIHCR/Save the Children study 
on sexual exploitation in West Africa has found `no widespread abuse by aid 
workers' due to the lack of hard evidence. This causes unrest. 
2003: January - Shooting incident at Freetown army 
barracks, 13 people are arrested. 
Later on, Johnny Paul Koroma goes into hiding after the police search his house in 
his absence. 
March - Britain deploys 300 troops. 
The UN Special Court hands down its first 
indictments and arrests the current minister of internal affairs, 
formerly leader of 
the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), Samuel Hinga Norman, as well as former RUF 
leaders Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon. The tribunal also calls for the extradition of 
the former rebel leader Sam Bockarie and the former military 
leader Johnny Paul 
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Koroma. Hinga Norman's arrest continues to cause unrest until today. Many 
Sierra Leoneans argue that someone fighting on the side of the people and on 
behalf of the government should not be charged alongside the RUF rebels who 
were the real perpetrators of the war. 3" 
April - The first public hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission takes place. 
Later, former RUF security chief, Augustine Gbao, pleads not guilty to all charges 
before the UN war crimes tribunal. 
May - On May 6, the Liberian Government reports the death of Sam Bockarie in a shoot 
out with Cote d'Ivoire on the Liberian border. His body is later on transported to 
Freetown for verification. 
June - LURD rebels overrun refugee camps on the outskirts of the Liberian capital 
Monrovia. Hundreds of refugees are from Sierra Leone and are forced to flee; 
others camp in front of the UNHCR headquarter. Johnny Paul Koroma is killed 
while in hiding in Liberia. The Special Court indicts then President Charles Taylor 
of Liberia for his role in Sierra Leone's war. 
July - Rebel leader Foday Sankoh dies of natural causes while in custody. 
August - President Kabbah appears before a truth and reconciliation commission looking into civil war human rights abuses. He says he had no say over the operations of 
pro-government militias, accused, alongside the rebels, of brutality against civilians. Liberian President Taylor hands over the government and leaves for exile in Nigeria. Moses Blah is declared interim Liberian President. Peace in Liberia seems 
possible. 
September - Santigie Kanu, a non-commissioned officer who formed part of a military junta that ruled Sierra Leone from 1997 to 1998, is indicted for war crimes. 
2004: March 10 - Inauguration of the Sierra Leone War Crimes Court. Inauguration 
attended by Hillary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development. 
Sources: 
UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, Sierra Leone: MIN chronology of 
significant events since independence, 
http: //wwww. reliefweb. int/w/rwb. ns f/O/b6347da4b9af 7b 69852569c8005e2055? OpenDo 
cument, 29 December 2000; BBC, Timeline: Sierra Leone, A chronology of key events, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/country_profilcs/1065898. stm, 6 
August 2003; Institute for Strategic Studies, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL Hits the 
Home Straight, Monograph 68, 
http: //www. iss. co. za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chronology. html, 6 January 2004; various 
DFID publications. 
397 Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Sierra Leone Special Coxat Accuses Indicted Militia Chief of 
Inciting Civil Unrest (Freetown: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 22 January 2004). 
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